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Abstract
This is a book of documents, comments, and cases that has been prepared, at the request of the
European Institute for the Media, for the use of government officials and citizens interested in
strengthening public service broadcasting in transition societies.
In this book we try to provide a small chest of tools and background information that will be of
assistance. We start, in Chapter 1, with an overview of some of the general principles of public service
broadcasting, and include pertinent comments on each of them. Here, as throughout the book, we
concentrate on issues of governance and financing, with some attention as well to issues surrounding
programming. In Chapter 2, we turn to current issues in the European-level debate, partly from the
perspective of European expectations and standards that are employed in evaluation and accession
processes. In Chapter 3, we look primarily at the UK and Germany, and also at Canada, presenting
documents that might illuminate and help in the understanding of the respective models that these longestablished systems represent. In Chapter 4, we provide documents on the experience with public service
broadcasting in various transformations in transition societies in the last decades.
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I NTRODUCTION
This is a book of documents, comments, and cases that has been prepared, at
the request of the European Institute for the Media, for the use of government
officials and citizens interested in strengthening public service broadcasting in
transition societies. We recognize the perils of this enterprise. First, the process
of picking examples and models from one society and even parading them for
another has its dangers. Too often, only the benefits of a proposed model are
described without acknowledging the stresses they are under in their own
homes. It is difficult to take a framework that has been shaped in one
complicated organic context and adapt it in another.
Second, complex issues surround public service broadcasting all over
the world. We discuss many of these in Chapter 5, but for the moment, a few
opening comments are pertinent. Public service broadcasting finds itself in the
uneasy perch between state broadcasting (where there is direct dominance)
and commercial broadcasting, the seemingly inexorable consequence of widelylauded “market forces.” There are direct interests, direct lobbies, and direct
instrumental consequences for each of these poles. Public service broadcasting
is more of an ideal, more of a consummation of citizen desires and an element
of a perfected democracy. Those who shape policy usually do so because of a
specific output they desire. As a result, only if citizens and those who hold
strongly to a set of public policy goals are deeply engaged can public service
broadcasting obtain and hold a necessary constituency.
Third, it is essential to examine the specific utility and importance of
public service broadcasting in transition societies as well as the special risks
and dangers that architects of public service broadcasting will face. Over the
last decade, patterns have become apparent in the post-communist transitions.
Public service broadcasting is needed as a tool of pluralism and diversity, as an
instrument of education, unification, and building a constructive national identity.
Public service broadcasting can sustain languages and cultures and help
develop national talents in production and creativity. Public service broadcasting
can act as an aid to reconciliation.
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But public service broadcasting comes at a price, financially, in the
capacity of the state to tolerate criticism and keep its hands off management
and, in the resources needed to nurture an audience against the pressures of
the persuasive and appealing channels of a newly opened global bazaar of
entertainment (and information). In economies that must contend with balancing
extraordinary claims on a struggling budget, public service broadcasting must
be widely understood and its principles appreciated for expenditures to be
justified. In many societies, the license fee will be the appropriate means to
finance (or finance in part) the public service broadcasting sector, but this does
not always go down well (as it can be seen as another tax) and does not always
perform its purpose of limiting state interference. In economies where there is
an underdeveloped consumer economy, advertising as a measure of support
can be weak, and the willingness of individuals to pay a supplemental fee is
often absent. This is even more difficult at a time when state budgets are
stretched.
As we try to show in Chapter 4, all transition societies have struggled
with these questions. Governments have been loath to surrender control over
boards of management, over the directorships of channels, or over the content
of programming. Most transition societies have had financial difficulties. Finally,
most transitional societies have found that the appeal of commercial television
has weakened the hand of public broadcasting.
In light of all of this, building a sustainable, accepted public service
broadcaster is a complex task. In this book we try to provide a small chest of
tools and background information that will be of assistance. We start, in Chapter
1, with an overview of some of the general principles of public service
broadcasting, and include pertinent comments on each of them. Here, as
throughout the book, we concentrate on issues of governance and financing,
with some attention as well to issues surrounding programming. In Chapter 2,
we turn to current issues in the European-level debate, partly from the
perspective of European expectations and standards that are employed in
evaluation and accession processes. In Chapter 3, we look primarily at the UK
and Germany, and also at Canada, presenting documents that might illuminate
and help in the understanding of the respective models that these longestablished systems represent. In Chapter 4, we provide documents on the
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experience with public service broadcasting in various transformations in
transition societies in the last decades.
We wish to acknowledge the assistance of Jessica Stalnaker, who was
project coordinator and research associate in the development of the project.
Bethany Davis and Darcee Olson, of PCMLP and Jennifer Green at Covington
and Burling, London, were instrumental in bringing the project to completion.
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C HAPTER I
PUBLIC SERVICE
BROADCASTING:
PRINCIPLES AND ISSUES
Public service broadcasting, in the spirit of serving the public interest, is driven
by a small number of broad, general principles. In this chapter, we present a
number of texts that attempt to synthesize these principles. In 2000, the World
Radio and Television Council, an international nongovernmental organization
supported by UNESCO, produced a basic document intended to define and
outline the principles of public service broadcasting. This document introduces
the reader to certain of the major debates that are faced in Europe, Canada, the
US, and throughout the world. We have used it here as the core around which
we have added other documents on the specific issues of financing,
programming, and structure of public service broadcasting.
There is something fascinating about public service broadcasting at this
very moment: in spite of its recognized importance, it is under attack, and in
many states, in danger of serious decline. In spite of the proud rhetoric that
surrounds it, despite all the effort to advocate the adoption of public
broadcasting systems in transition societies, major problems face these
channels. These are problems of financing and problems of purpose. There
may be free speech questions, even in states that have the highest commitment
to freedom to receive and impart information; more serious questions are those
on the place of public broadcasting in a multi-channel world where competition
and private enterprise are so highly vaunted.
The main themes of this book are funding, programming, and structure.
While subsequent chapters develop these themes, our goal here is to suggest
some of the complexities with respect to each of them. On the critical question
of funding, we present an extract from Public Service Broadcasters Around the
World, a report prepared by McKinsey & Company at the request of the British
Broadcasting Corporation in January 1999. This document highlights a number
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of controversial questions such as the appropriate mix of public and commercial
revenues for public broadcasters, and the relative merits of various means of
generating public funding. In this section, we also include an extract from a
Canadian report that examined different models for the funding of public
broadcasting. Regarding programming, we include a document about Ireland
that discusses the problem of objectivity and impartiality in broadcasting. And to
illustrate a generic approach to the question of ensuring the independence of
public service broadcasters, we present an extract from the Model Public
Service Broadcasting Law prepared by Dr. Werner Rumphorst of the EBU.
Finally, this chapter closes with an overview that addresses in a general
way the problems that have been presented, in a brief article by Marc Raboy,
originally published in the winter 1999–2000 issue of Diffusion EBU, the official
bulletin of the European Broadcasting Union.

I. 1

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

The following excerpts represent the ideal of public service broadcasting. In
looking at each point, consider the ways in which the principles are under fire,
the particular rationales and techniques used to obstruct the goals, and possible
strategies for structuring these institutions to render the goals achievable.
World Radio and Television Council,
Public Broadcasting, Why? How?, 2000

Understanding Public Broadcasting
Public broadcasting rests on certain basic principles, defined in an era of
general-interest media, long before the multiplication of channels and the era of
specialization. These principles remain essential today and public broadcasting
authorities must give them a meaning, reinterpret them in some way, in a world
characterized by media fragmentation.
Principles
Universality, diversity and independence remain today, like yesterday, essential
goals for public broadcasting. To these three principles must be added a fourth,
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particularly important when the public broadcaster exists side by side with
commercial broadcasters: distinctiveness.
(1)

Universality

Public broadcasting must be accessible to every citizen throughout the country.
This is a deeply egalitarian and democratic goal to the extent that it puts all
citizens on the same footing, whatever their social status or income. It forces
the public broadcaster to address the entire population and to seek to be used
by the largest possible number. This does not mean that public broadcasting
should try to optimize its ratings at all times, as commercial broadcasting does,
but rather that it should endeavour to make the whole of its programming
accessible to the whole population. This does not merely involve technical
accessibility, but ensuring that everyone can understand and follow its
programming. As well as democratic, public broadcasting programming must be
“popular”, not in the pejorative sense that some give this term, but in the sense
that the public forum it provides should not be restricted to a minority. Thus,
public broadcasting, while it should promote culture, should not become a
ghetto constantly frequented by the same group of initiates.
(2)

Diversity

The service offered by public broadcasting should be diversified, in at least
three ways: in terms of the genres of programs offered, the audiences targeted,
and the subjects discussed. Public broadcasting must reflect the diversity of
public interests by offering different types of programs, from newscasts to light
programs…. Diversity and universality are complementary in that producing
programs intended sometimes for youth, sometimes for older people and
sometimes for other groups ultimately means that public broadcasting appeals
to all.
(3)

Independence

Public broadcasting is a forum where ideas should be expressed freely, where
information, opinions and criticisms circulate. This is possible only if the
independence—therefore, the freedom—of public broadcasting is maintained
against commercial pressures or political influence. Later we will examine
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specific means for guaranteeing respect for this principle and ensuring the
credibility of public broadcasting in the eyes of the public. Indeed, if the
government influenced the information provided by the public broadcaster,
people would no longer believe in it. Likewise, if the public broadcaster’s
programming were designed for commercial ends, people would not understand
why they are being asked to finance a service whose programs are not
substantially different from the services provided by private broadcasting. This
latter example, by the way, leads us to lay down another principle that is
particularly important in countries where public broadcasting exists side by side
with private commercial services.
(4)

Distinctiveness

Distinctiveness requires that the service offered by public broadcasting
distinguish itself from that of other broadcasting services. In public-service
programming—in the quality and particular character of its programs—the
public must be able to identify what distinguishes this service from other
services. It is not merely a matter of producing the type of programs other
services are not interested in, aiming at audiences neglected by others, or
dealing with subjects ignored by others. It is a matter of doing things differently,
without excluding any genre. This principle must lead public broadcasters to
innovate, create new slots, new genres, set the pace in the audiovisual world
and pull other broadcasting networks in their wake.
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I. 2

FINANCING

While financing is always a critical issue, in many of the most developed
societies, there is the luxury of choice: a strong economy, a group of supportive
viewers, and a legislature with ample funds to allocate. One can read the
following section and ask which of the financing options are really available, and
what resources can be tapped in transition societies that would not be
opportunities elsewhere.
Issues of financing public service broadcasting are—quite obviously—
key to its success and its pattern of performance in a society. Globally, there
has been a search for the magic way to provide financing that has aspects that
are almost always impossible, in combination, to achieve. The ideal financing
has these qualities: (a) it is guaranteed for many years so that politicians cannot
interfere; (b) it is sufficient to achieve the multiple tasks the public service
broadcaster must perform; and (c) it allows some opportunity for accountability.
As we shall see, there are several standard sources for financing.
These are subscriber license fee, funds from the state budget, advertising and
voluntary contributions from viewers and charities. There is support for the
broadcaster and, from time to time, specific funding for programmes. To these,
in transition societies, must be added support from European institutions,
foreign governments and large scale NGOs.
World Radio and Television Council,
Public Broadcasting, Why? How?, 2000
What type of financing should be favoured for public broadcasting? This
question is important since the sources of financing may enhance or diminish
the public broadcaster's ability to carry out its mandate and missions.
License fees—a tax linked to the ownership of receivers—have been
the historical form of financing of public broadcasting. In principle, they create a
direct relationship between the broadcaster and its public, the citizens.
Consequently, license fees appear as the ideal form of financing. While license
fees remain the most widespread form of financing in Europe, at least, they are
far from being the only one; none are levied in many countries, where public
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funds are instead allotted as subsidies. License fees are less widespread
outside of Europe. In Canada and Australia, for instance, public broadcasting is
financed out of the State's general funds. Indeed, a cursory examination of the
various national situations shows a wide variety of situations; few countries rely
on a single source of financing. The BBC and Japan’s NHK, financed solely
through license fees, are exceptions. We see more and more a mix of public
and commercial financing. Thus, these past few years, many public television
broadcasters have opened up to advertising or resorted to it more, created new
subscriber services or launched wholly commercial activities to finance their
main service.
Is reliance on commercial sources of financing acceptable for public
broadcasting, considering it owes its existence to the desire to shelter this
cultural sector from commercial pressures? The easiest answer perhaps, and
also the most realistic, particularly as regards advertising income, is to say that
it may be acceptable provided it does not interfere with the public-service
obligations incumbent upon public broadcasting. But beyond a certain level, if
the need for commercial financing becomes a dominant concern for the public
broadcaster and changes the nature of the programming, we should obviously
be concerned. Others, to the contrary, warn against advertising phobia. A
French Senate report points out that to the younger generation, the absence of
advertising would seem suspicious, a sign of something elitist, therefore boring,
even square. The report considers that advertising, used in moderation,
prevents public networks from cutting themselves off from the rest of the
audiovisual landscape, while showing their difference.
On the other hand, what may be harmful to public broadcasting is to be
forced into a very competitive position and have to hustle for advertising
revenue to ensure its survival. The temptation then is very strong to stray from
public-service obligations and produce the same type of programming as
private competitors.
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Public Service Broadcasters Around the World: McKinsey & Company,
‘Public Service Broadcasters Around the World: A McKinsey Report for
*
the BBC’, 1999
We found clear evidence that a PSB’s funding model has profound implications
for its ability to pursue successfully [its] new strategies. Many PSBs are funded,
at least partly, through advertising. Our survey shows clearly the potential
dangers of this approach. We have found evidence that the higher the
advertising figure as a proportion of total revenues, the less distinctive a public
service broadcaster is likely to be.
Pressures on funding are increasing as governments seek to reduce
the overall tax burden and as increased competition reduces available
advertising revenues (Exhibit 6). As a result of these challenges, and
particularly the significant loss of share (and therefore influence) to the new
commercial broadcasters, many observers over the past several years
considered the PSB an outdated concept. The future, they argued, would bring
a multiplicity of channels, as in the United States, with seemingly enormous
variety. Many PSBs were considered inefficient relics of an earlier, statedominated age. The PSBs did tend to carry much higher overheads as they
contained large production units, education departments, and many other
commitments, which the more streamlined commercial broadcasters did not; the
absence of competition had made many of them complacent and overstaffed.
Furthermore, commercial broadcasters were often more sophisticated in their
use of marketing techniques. The new commercial broadcasters were seen as
more progressive and exciting than the staid, familiar PSBs.

*

Online [September 2001] Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/info/bbc/pdf/McKinsey.pdf
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Pressure on Funding is Increasing
EXHIBIT 6:
Government Funding
• Other uses for tax revenue (e.g., health, education)
• Overall lower government spending for political reasons
(e.g., to meet Maastricht criteria)
• Government spending is highly scrutinised, and funding a
public service broadcaster from tax revenue is not always
popular
Advertising Funding
• Competition from new terrestrial channels
• Competition from new cable/satellite channels
• Competition from other media (e.g., magazines, Internet,
digital TV)
• Advertisers are becoming more sophisticated, and have
many more options in how they reach their defined
segments

Monopolies Evolving into Ecologies
However, the landscape has fundamentally changed. With the introduction of
competition, broadcasting has been transformed from a simple, predictable
monopoly into a complex, more volatile ecology, where the PSB is just one of a
number of players fighting for survival. Each broadcasting market now has a
number of key groups with varying degrees of power—audiences,
government/regulators, infrastructure and equipment providers, advertisers,
programme providers, and the public service and commercial broadcasters—
that interact to reinforce or diminish the overall health of the market. Each of
these groups has their own objectives or aspirations, which interact in complex
ways.
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Sweden provides a good example of how the different elements of the
ecology—particularly the regulator and the PSB—can work together to improve
the quality of the broadcasting market as a whole. Commercial terrestrial
competition began in 1991, and new competitors like TV3 and TV4 gained
significant share fairly quickly. However, as SVT is funded by a licence fee, this
loss of share did not immediately affect SVT’s revenue. SVT adopted more
sophisticated scheduling tactics (for example, scheduling its entertainment
shows at the beginning of peak time) but maintained its overall broad-ranging
schedule, and kept the appetite for high-quality programming alive in the
market. Consequently, the overall programming standards of the Swedish
market are quite high and SVT currently has a prime time share of over 50%.
Conversely, in Portugal, the elements of the ecology have interacted in
a negative fashion and a spiral of decline has ensued, leading to a loss of
overall distinctiveness for the market. Terrestrial competition began in 1992,
and, as in Sweden, the commercial channels (SIC and TVI) quickly gained a
significant share of viewing. However, as RTP is primarily funded by
advertising, its loss of share prompted a significant reduction in revenues.
Although the government eased the burden somewhat by increasing grant
income (with restrictions on how it could be spent, e.g., orchestras, educational
programmes), RTP was forced to adopt a much more commercial schedule in
an effort to increase advertising revenues. As a result, the overall
distinctiveness of the Portuguese market is now relatively low. RTP has lately
been adjusting its programme mix to become more distinctive and has halted its
slide in share.
Determining the Appropriate Funding Model
for Public Service Broadcasters
While there are many areas, which are critical to the long-term success of a
PSB, perhaps the most important is the right funding model. Throughout this
survey, we found examples of broadcasters whose funding model either acted
as a key element of its success or as a burden. The ideal funding model is one,
which is:
•
•

Substantial enough to create a true competitor to commercial channels
Independent from undue government or other influences
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•
•
•
(1)

Predictable over the medium term
Growing at a similar or faster pace than the PSB’s costs
Sufficiently simple and equitable that it can be administered with
minimum political controversy.
Substantial

The level of funding of PSBs varies widely between countries, both on an
absolute and a per capita basis. However, we found a close link between
funding levels and the ability to maintain sufficient audience share to retain
market influence. While it may be tempting to cut the funding of a seemingly
underperforming (or high-performing) PSB, governments must bear in mind the
critical role the PSB plays in the market ecology. Those PSBs that have been
forced to chase market share (e.g., Portugal, Spain) in order to fill their funding
gaps have had a very difficult time. The overall standards of the market have
been affected and it has only taken a short while for audience tastes to descend
to the lowest common denominator.
(2)

Independent

One of the key elements of the PSB mission is that it be seen as unbiased and
trustworthy. The funding method can have a significant impact on audience
perceptions. Government grant income may imply a bias toward the
government. In South Africa, the SABC’s coverage of current events was
regularly questioned by observers who found it too sympathetic to the
government. Advertising can have an even more profound effect. Our analysis
shows clearly that an increased dependence on advertising has led inexorably
to a more populist and less distinctive schedule […]. This has significant
ramifications in those markets that have increasing competition for advertising.
This effect is strengthened if the channel also depends on government grant
funding, which tends to ebb and flow depending on the mood of the
government. This reliance on populism at the expense of distinctiveness can
potentially compromise the rigour of a PSB schedule. Our analysis also shows
that, between 1993 and 1996, advertising as a percentage of revenue declined
across a sample of PSBs, yet the programming mix of the advertising supported
channels remained broadly the same. This implies that even the least rigorous
advertising-funded PSBs are seeing decreasing financial benefits from their
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relatively populist schedules. The principal cause appears to be increased
competition for advertising. Accordingly, if advertising-funded PSBs are to
increase their advertising revenue, they will have to become even less rigorous.
Unless their funding mechanisms are fundamentally altered, these PSBs may
find they have economic incentives to fritter away their distinctiveness, thereby
harming the entire market.
(3)

Predictable

The vast majority of PSBs are funded either by pure public funding (licence fees
or government grant), or by a mixture of public funding and advertising and
sponsorship. Our work has highlighted some key characteristics of each of
these funding approaches:
Advertising. Advertising income tends to be quite volatile, due to its
dependence on the business cycle and susceptibility to competitive pressures.
This makes it difficult for a PSB to plan its investment strategy, whether for
programmes or for operational improvements. As competition for advertising
increases in markets, broadcasters will have to use increasingly sophisticated
pricing and yield management tools to generate the same levels of income they
now enjoy. Volatility may even increase, as existing sellers lose power in the
market.
Government Grant. In countries where the PSB is heavily reliant on
direct government funding, revenues have also been quite volatile, making it
difficult for the broadcaster to stay within its budget and to meet its (and the
government’s) aspirations. Furthermore, its inclusion in the annual budget round
makes it susceptible to reductions in its funding in times of economic downturn,
and consumes an inordinate amount of management time.
Licence Fee. Our analysis shows that licence fee-funding has been
more stable and predictable than the other forms of funding. This allows PSBs
to invest in programming or operational improvements, as they can be confident
about their revenue for the term of the licence agreement.
(4)

Simple and Equitable

Within most licence-fee-funded systems, there exist concessions for certain
groups in society. In most countries with a licence fee system, the blind are
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exempt or pay a reduced rate (as in the UK). In some countries, fees have also
been reduced for the elderly or those on low incomes. These countries have
found that the resulting reduction in income has necessitated significant
changes to legislation.
In France, a 1982 decree passed by the Mitterrand Government
stipulated that persons over the age of 60 and on a low income would be
exempt from paying the licence fee. However, as time progressed and the
number of people falling into this category grew, the lost revenue associated
with this concession became significant. Lobbying from France 2 and France 3
prompted a change to the legislation in 1993 with the age limit being raised to
65. (However, the rights of those already exempt were reserved.) Despite this
adjustment, the revenue loss continued to be considerable and in 1996, further
legislation led to the exemption condition being restricted from 1 January 1998
to those over 65 and on a very low income
A similar situation arose in New Zealand. People over 60 and receiving
the New Zealand state pension or war pension were entitled to a 33% reduction
in their licence fee but the age limit is currently being raised in three-month
increments to 65.
Not surprisingly, cuts in funding through significant concessions must
invariably be made up from some other revenue source—either funding is
increased or service is cut. Neither one of these is optimal from the point of view
of the government or the broad majority of viewers. As these examples show,
concessions, if not drawn up with a longterm view, create strains in the system
that lead to a series of politically difficult changes. Furthermore, those groups
who are most often singled out for concessions—elderly, low-income, and
disabled viewers—are often ‘superserved’. These groups watch more television
than the average viewer, and can be thought of as having a low unit cost per
hour of television consumed […]. While the government may be inclined to offer
concessions as a form of income benefit, this has little to do with the
performance of broadcasters; in most cases, these groups are well served by
both public and commercial broadcasters.
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“Towards a Rational Funding System”, chapter II.6.4, in Making our Voices
*
Heard, Canada, Mandate Review Committee, 1996
In developing our recommendations for an alternative funding system for the
CBC, we [the Committee – Eds.] spent a great deal of time examining the way
other public broadcasters around the world are financed. We discovered that
relatively few of the major public broadcasters rely on the combination of
government appropriation and commercial revenue for the bulk of their income.
The BBC, for example, is non-commercial, and is funded almost entirely
by a licence fee (on radio and television sets). NHK and SVT in Sweden are
funded predominantly through different kinds of licence fees. PBS, which is also
non-commercial, is primarily funded through a combination of Congressional
appropriation and direct financial contributions from its viewers.
A 1993 survey of public broadcasting funding, conducted by the well
known American management consulting firm, McKinsey and Company,
reached a number of fascinating conclusions:
•
•
•
•

Public broadcaster dependence on advertising revenues creates a
conflict of interest that prevents them from meeting public service
obligations;
The reliance on voluntary donations does not generate enough money
to support a broadly based, public service broadcaster;
Direct government funding has resulted in an annual budget squeeze
for those public broadcasters who rely on it (particularly in the 1990s),
and has led to declining program standards;
Licence fee funding, although it tends to vary a good deal from country
to country, has the fewest disadvantages for public broadcasters.

As we have indicated throughout this chapter, we tend to share
McKinsey’s assessment; and as a result, we have adopted the following criteria
for an alternative funding system.
•

The system should provide for stable, predictable, multi-year funding.

*

Online [July 2001] Available:
http://www.canadianheritage.gc.ca/culture/brdcstng/pubs/juneau/Page-en.htm
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•

•
•
•

It should provide sufficient revenue to support significant public radio
and television services in English and French, which are strongly
Canadian, distinctive, publicly owned, and deeply rooted in the regions
of Canada.
It must be compatible with the present budgetary policies of the Federal
Government, and include a built-in productivity factor.
It must be largely independent of advertising revenue.
It must not be dependent on an annual subsidy or appropriation from
Parliament.

In arriving at those criteria, the Committee has considered the
recommendations of various royal commissions and fact finding committees
over several decades, who have commented on the inadequacy of the CBC’s
present funding system and who have recommended approaches more
consistent with the needs of a public service broadcaster.
We have also taken into account the often stated government intention
(and the number of failed attempts) to establish a multi-year financing system
for the CBC, based on annual appropriations. It now seems clear that such a
system cannot work. As a result, we began the process of looking at a number
of other ways to finance the CBC that met the criteria set out above.
The Options Considered by the Committee
The options considered by the Committee and its team of expert advisers
ranged all the way from measures that were variations on a licence fee (such as
an excise tax on new purchases of radios and television sets) to a dedicated
income tax provision. The options were evaluated on their suitability for the
CBC (whether it was likely to generate enough revenue at a reasonable tax
rate)... and also from a broader, public policy perspective. Clearly, any levy or
tax had to be relatively easy to administer, and have a fairly straightforward
compliance mechanism. It also had to avoid placing an unfair tax burden on
individual households or businesses. Two of the three of the options we
considered are described here.
Option 1. As an example of the approaches we considered, the
Committee reviewed whether it would be possible to collect dedicated revenues
nationally, without having to establish a new agency to collect “licence fees.”
The income tax administration and collection system operated by Revenue
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Canada, we concluded, could provide a potential way of collecting an annual
fee from all Canadians to support the new CBC. The income tax system is a
national one, and a dedicated fee imposed as part of income tax collection
would be far less expensive than any new, stand-alone system.
While such a broadly based fee has obvious attractions because it
retains some of the characteristics of the licence fee systems operating in
Europe, we concluded that it was unlikely to be an acceptable mechanism to
finance the CBC. All of the advice we received suggested that the designation
of a general tax for a specific spending purpose would represent a difficult
precedent from a tax policy point of view.
Option 2. As a second option, the Committee considered the
introduction of a levy on all of the companies who are distributors of electronic
communications. We took particular note of the fact that the House of
Commons Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage; the Grant Report; the
Report of the Working Group on Canadian Programming and Private Television;
and the Report of the Information Highway Advisory Council have all recently
advocated the concept of a levy on distribution systems to finance Canadian
programming. Such a levy would build on a long standing tradition in Canadian
broadcasting policy that has required the cable sector to provide some level of
support to both broadcasters and independent production, in a number of
different ways.
This option of a tax on communications distribution systems has a
precedent in Canada prior to the introduction of the GST. From 1984 to 1990,
all Canadian residential and business customers paid a tax on their cable and
telephone bills, which reached 11% in 1990. A form of excise tax, these levies
were called the Telecommunications Services Tax (TST), and the
Telecommunications Program Services Tax (TPST). The TST excluded charges
for local residential telephone services.
If such tax was reintroduced today, it would have to be broadened to
include satellite companies and other service providers. We would argue that
rapidly converging technologies require that direct to home satellite services
and telephone service providers should be expected to support Canadian
content programming in the same way as cable has. The Government has
already signalled its determination to extend a similar Canadian content funding
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obligation (a percentage of gross revenues invested in content) to the first
generation of cable competitors—the direct to home satellite services.
This relatively broad definition of the communications services that
would be included in the proposed tax base has several advantages. A broad
base keeps the tax rate within an acceptable range. It recognizes the
phenomenon of converging technologies, and the fact that enormous
investments are being made by many potential broadcast service delivery
systems. A tax that was limited to only the current signal providers would unduly
handicap them in developing their systems for the future, particularly since it
now seems that a broader range of competition is inevitable.
As a consequence, this option would involve a levy on all distributors of
electronic communications—the Communications Distribution Tax (CDT). It
would apply to cable, direct to home satellite companies, and other
telecommunications services such as telephone companies. It could exclude,
however, local residential telephone services.
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I. 3

PROGRAM CONTENT

We turn to discussions of public service broadcasting and the choice of content.
Here too most analyses reflect a context in which the public broadcaster has a
choice: it has the production facilities, the ability to buy in the market for
programming, the privilege of deciding on a programming strategy. This may
not be true of all public service broadcasters in societies in transition. First, one
can ask what role law can play, what role the institutional structure plays in the
shaping of programming strategies. Then, one can ask whether those strategies
fulfil the public purpose.
Among programming and content issues that are generally flagged,
especially in the changing environments are the following: what makes THIS
public service broadcaster distinctive and perhaps even necessary to meet the
changing needs of a particular society? Is it the diversity, the addressing of
minority needs and interests (cultural, ethnic, national and other substrata) not
addressed by commercial broadcasters? Is it an obligation to provide
information for citizenship? Does public service broadcasting have a special
obligation to encourage creativity and production by its citizens? What, in postconflict zones, is the special responsibility of public service broadcasting to act
as a mode for reconciliation and identity-building? To what extent does public
service broadcasting program perform differently in a time of global channels
and new information technologies. Finally, how does a public service
broadcaster (as opposed to a state-controlled broadcaster) ensure that the
programming is objective and impartial, reflecting a variety of political views?
These issues will be discussed here and throughout these materials (in
subsequent chapters).
World Radio and Television Council,
Public Broadcasting, Why? How?, 2000

What Programming for Public Broadcasting?
What programming should public broadcasting offer? Of all the questions raised
in this paper, this is probably the one that calls for the most nuances. We
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cannot ask all public broadcasters to adopt the same programming model. In
television, for example, public broadcasters with substantial resources can
produce expensive drama programs that others cannot afford. So the particular
context of each public broadcaster demands that certain types of programs be
given preference over others. For example, in a vast country inhabited by many
different communities, there may be a need for more local or regional
programs—a need that may not be felt in small countries. It is clear also that a
distinction must be made between the public broadcaster's radio and television
programs, since the resources required by production are not the same.
Bearing in mind the principles linked to the very existence of public
broadcasting and the threefold mission incumbent upon it—information,
education and entertainment—this part of the paper seeks to clarify the
question of public broadcasting programming.
(1)

Unbiased, Enlightening Information

Because of the status of public broadcasting, because it is financed by the
public and intended to be at its service, expectations in the area of information
are high and so are the requirements. Public broadcasters must provide
information enabling listeners to form the fairest possible idea of events; if not
objective, the information should at least be unbiased. Such information will
allow the different viewpoints to be expressed and foster an enlightened
understanding of current events. Between the frequent propaganda of State
broadcasting and the often-gratuitous polemics of some commercial
broadcasting stations, public broadcasting must appeal to the audience’s
intelligence and understanding. The information broadcast by public
broadcasting must be treated with a concern for in-depth explanation and
examination to enlighten citizens on the issues at hand and, in so doing, enrich
democratic life. It is often this ability to act as a reference in the area of
information that brings the public to recognize the importance and role of public
broadcasting, and identify with it.
(2)

General Interest and Service Programming

For public broadcasting, information is not restricted to newscasts and public
affairs programs; it extends to all programs enabling citizens to find out about
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different subjects of interest to them and to all those programs simply called
“service programs” or “general interest programs,” which often deal with matters
of current or practical interest to people. These programs, which address
consumer or legal issues, give practical advice, discuss health issues, publicize
community services, etc., make public broadcasting itself a service offered to
the public. It is through such programs that the public broadcaster gets closer to
people’s specific needs. In a certain way, with greater means and on a greater
scale, public broadcasting must, according to needs, offer the kind of useful
information that rural and community radio provide in part in many developing
countries. Many of these radio stations were in fact set up for the explicit
purpose of meeting hitherto unsatisfied development needs.
Community radio stations have multiplied in the past few decades.
Neither commercial nor State-controlled, these radio or television stations, if not
tied to any particular interests, make up a new element of and an original
contribution to public broadcasting. Sensitive to the needs of the communities
they serve, community media facilitate citizens' access to the broadcasting
system and their participation in public life. Their programming is perfectly
consistent with the spirit of public broadcasting.
(3)

Programs that Leave Their Mark

Radio and television must promote the arts and culture, broadcast existing
works and cultural products, and support the creation of original works: theatre,
concerts, and also light music or variety programs. Public broadcasting, too,
must feature entertainment programs intended for a wide public. But it must do
so differently, distinguishing itself from commercial media. We can hope that
public broadcasters' programs will leave their mark. It is possible to present
game shows that are both informative and entertaining. Drama, even at a low
budget, also provides an opportunity to deal with contemporary matters of
interest to people; historical drama may serve to teach about the past and,
therefore, enlighten the present. On the other hand, the educational mission of
public broadcasting should not be exaggerated. We must bear in mind, says
Jacques Rigaud, that the media, and television in particular, are not night
courses.
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(4)

In-House Production

Public television cannot merely be a programmer. The particular ethics of public
broadcasting demand that programs be designed with particular care. This
requirement implies that the public broadcaster should also become involved in
audiovisual production. While public broadcasters may buy or commission
some programs, in-house production not only guarantees that programs will
adequately meet the purpose of the broadcaster, but also ensures the
perenniality of expertise—some would say a “culture” of creativity—particular to
the public broadcaster. This is even truer of new public broadcasters, which
must develop an identity, a “signature,” distinguishing them from other stations.
(5)

National Content

More than any other broadcasting programming, that of the public broadcaster
must be national in content. This does not mean that foreign productions should
be excluded; however, according to their role as a public forum, public
broadcasters must first promote the expression of ideas, opinions and values
current in the society where they operate.
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I. 4

OBJECTIVITY AND IMPARTIALITY

We are including this short discussion of an Irish broadcasting statute because
of its mention of the difficult concept of “objectivity and impartiality,” a test
sometimes applied to public broadcasting offerings. What is objectivity and
impartiality? Does each program have to reflect these qualities? Can a balance
of diverse partisan views be achieved, and will such programming be accepted
by the viewers?
Irish Radio and Television Act, 1988
When the 1987 Bill was published, there was no prohibition on the expression
of the sound broadcasting contractor's own views in relation to the reporting of
news or in relation to the broadcast treatment of current affairs. In the Dail the
opposition parties argued that the prohibition on the Radio Telefis Eireann
Authority from expressing its own views in relation to these issues as stipulated
in section 18(1) of the Broadcasting Authority Act 1960 (1960 No. 10) as
amended by section 3 of the Broadcasting Authority (Amendment) Act 1976
(1976 No. 37) should be extended to the new broadcasting services. The
Minister stated at the Committee Stage of the Bill that the reason why such an
obligation did not appear in the Bill was because of advice received from the
Attorney General's Office that such a provision would be contrary to the
freedom of expression provisions in Article 40.6.1.i of the Constitution which
oblige the State to guarantee the rights of the citizens to express freely their
convictions and opinions subject to public order and public morality. The State
is obliged pursuant to Article 40.6.1.i to endeavour to ensure that organs of
public opinion like radio and television are not used to undermine public order or
morality or the authority of the State (See State (Lynch) v. Cooney 1982 I.R.
337). The analogy was stated that a prohibition on the expression of the sound
broadcasting contractors' own views would be tantamount to preventing
newspapers from carrying editorials. In the light of the "unanimity of views in the
House" on the issue, the Minister consulted further with the Attorney General's
Office and while that Office considered that there would still be a risk that the
provision would be declared unconstitutional, such a "risk was very small
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indeed." (381 Dail Debates, Cols. 1155-1156, June 1, 1988). The Minister
accepted the opposition's amendments in principle and the Act now prohibits
each sound broadcasting contractor and, by virtue of section 18 of this Act, the
television programme service contractor from presenting their own views in
relation to the news broadcast by them and in their treatment of current affairs
including matters of public controversy and the subject of current public debate.
A former Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, Dr. Cruise-O'Brien,
correctly noted when the original section 18(1) of the Broadcasting Authority Act
1960 (1960 No. 10) was amended by section 3 of the Broadcasting Authority
(Amendment) Act 1976 (1976 No. 37) that "objectivity and impartiality are
probably philosophically unattainable by human beings." (81 Seanad Debates,
Col. 47, June 4, 1975). However, the then Minister considered it desirable, on
balance, that a public corporation supported by all the people should have the
obligation enjoined on them to move in that direction.
The obligation of objectivity and impartiality first appeared in statutory
form in these islands in section 3 of the Television Act 1954 (c. 55). The 1954
Act established the U.K. Independent Television Authority. This obligation of
objectivity and impartiality has been a feature of U.K. legislation on
broadcasting since the 1954 Act. It is noteworthy that the prohibition on the RTE
Authority from expressing its own views in relation to current affairs does not
apply to any broadcast in so far as the broadcast relates to any proposals
concerning policy as regards broadcasting which is of public controversy or the
subject of current debate and which is being considered by the Government or
the Minister for Communications. (s.18(1) of the Broadcasting Authority Act
1960, (1960 No. 10) as amended by substitution by s.3, of the Broadcasting
Authority (Amendment) Act 1976 (1976 No. 37)). No such exemption applies to
broadcasting licensees under this Act. It is also of interest that the prohibition on
the British Broadcasting Corporation, pursuant to clause 13(7) of the Licence
and Agreement between the Secretary of State for the Home Department and
the British Broadcasting Corporation dated April 2, 1981 (Cmmd. 8233) from
sending any broadcast matter expressing the corporation's own opinion on
current affairs and matters of public policy does not extend to the subject of
broadcasting itself and any matter contained in programmes which consist only
of proceedings in either House of Parliament or proceedings of a local authority,
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a committee of a local authority, or a committee of two or more local authorities.
A similar prohibition on all expressions of opinion in the programmes of the U.K.
Independent Broadcasting Authority pursuant to section 4(2) of the
Broadcasting Act 1981 (1981 c. 68) contains an exemption similar to that of the
BBC in relation to a programme consisting of proceedings in either House of
Parliament or, proceedings of a local authority, a committee of a local authority
or a joint committee of two or more local authorities. (Broadcasting Act 1981,
(1981 c.68) s.4(6)).
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I. 5

STRUCTURE AND AUTONOMY

The key question is structure and the resolution of competing pressures. Again,
the language of independence and accountability has different meanings from
one society to another. But everywhere, there is this tension: how to
demonstrate accountability while striving for independence.
As indicated throughout, “independence” is one of the most important
attributes of public service broadcasting. But independence from whom? And
how does one have accountability consistent with independence? Most
important for this section, how does one establish a structure that has
“independence” and accountability. There is no clear answer to this problem.
Almost every society has had difficulties approaching this question.
World Radio and Television Council,
Public Broadcasting, Why? How?, 2000

Reconciling Freedom and Responsibility
How can the necessary independence of public broadcasting from government
and its equally necessary accountability be reconciled? The question is
complex. British researcher Nicholas Garnham sums up the matter as follows:
The search for an answer to the paradox of how to combine
freedom for broadcasters from undesirable state control, while
at the same time ensuring the necessary level of desirable
political accountability. [...] In practice, of course, this circle
cannot be squared, so that any structure and practice of
1
accountability has to be a balance between the two.
It is in this context that the arm’s-length principle comes into its own and
should serve as a guide for organizing the public broadcasting and its
relationship with government.
1

Nicolas Garnham, quoted in UNESCO, Public Service Broadcasting: The Challenge of the
Twenty-first Century, Paris, UNESCO (Reports and Papers on Mass Communication, No. 111),
1997, p. 64.

27

Chapter I

(1)

Organization of Public Broadcasting

The first way of ensuring that public broadcasting has enough autonomy is to
distinguish, in its administrative structure, between two levels of management:
day-to-day business, on the one hand, and general policies and long-term
decisions, on the other hand.
The board of directors is usually responsible for general policies. For
example, it approves the budget and policies of the public broadcaster, and
appoints its executive officers. The chief executive officer is responsible for the
management of day-to-day business, whether it relates to human or material
resources or programming decisions. To avoid political interference with the
day-to-day affairs of public broadcasting, the CEO is accountable only to the
board of directors. The latter usually reports on general activities to political
authorities. In a certain way, the board of directors and its chairman act as a
buffer between the CEO and the government. In Australia, the Board of
Directors of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) even has an
obligation to preserve the independence and integrity of the public broadcaster.
(2)

Accountability

While it is difficult to conceive an ideal system applicable everywhere, because
of the difference in political culture from one country to another, there are a
various means to provide public broadcasting with a degree of independence
from government, while ensuring that it accounts for its actions. The goal is to
make the relationship between public broadcasting and government as
transparent as possible and discourage any attempt by government to interfere.
In theory, the public broadcaster should be accountable only to
Parliament, not to the executive branch, at regular—usually annual—intervals.
Public representatives should be able to evaluate, in the light of the annual
report submitted by the public broadcaster, its general performance and use of
public funds over that period. In practice, we know that in most cases, public
broadcasting officials maintain contact with the executive branch, if only through
representatives of the department responsible to Parliament for the public
broadcaster. However, if these informal contacts become too frequent, they are
contrary to the spirit of “arm’s-length management” and liable to undermine the
credibility of public broadcasting.
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Many countries also have a body responsible for regulating and
supervising broadcasting activities. Given a mandate by the legislator to
manage and supervise all or part of the broadcasting and telecommunications
system, this body can also be another buffer between government and the
public broadcaster. Indeed, it may be responsible for evaluating the public
broadcaster's fulfilment of its mandate. Such is the case in Canada, where the
regulating body issues the public broadcaster's licences and peppers its
decisions with various comments on the way the public broadcaster should
discharge its functions. Such is also the case in France, where the Conseil
supérieur de l’audiovisuel evaluates, in its annual report, how the public
networks have fulfilled the obligations incumbent upon them under the law or
their terms of reference.
Some public broadcasters have also innovated these past few years to
try and create closer bonds with their publics. In Canada, for example, the
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) has created the position of
ombudsman. Citizens can thus make their viewpoints known to the ombudsman
and submit their criticisms of the public broadcaster, in the journalistic field. It is
a particularly interesting means for the public broadcaster to discharge its
responsibility to the public.
A final remark is called for. We must avoid, above all, making the public
broadcaster accountable to too many bodies. This could become
embarrassing—instructions might contradict each other—and prompt the public
broadcaster, in trying to satisfy everyone, to no longer account for anything.
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I. 6

A Model Public Service Broadcasting Law

The following portion of a “model statute” drafted for the European Broadcasting
Union is included to highlight the problem of the” model” statute which is usually
helpful, but can rarely claim to be applicable in all circumstances. Each aspect
of a model statute on independence and structure (who appoints a Board, who
appoints a Director, who can remove them, how representative should they be)
is subject to inquiry and criticism.
“Model Public Service Broadcasting Law” by Dr. Werner Rumphorst, 1998

(Articles 10–14, Sections Dealing with Organization of Boards)

*

Article 10 - The Organs of PSBO
The organs of PSBO shall be:
•
•
•

The Broadcasting Council
The Board of Administration
The Director General.

Article 11 - The Broadcasting Council
§1 The Broadcasting Council shall represent the interests of the general public
with regard to programming.
§2 The Broadcasting Council shall be composed of twelve members, coming as
far as possible from different groups comprising the civil society.
§3 The Council members shall be elected by (the Lower Chamber of)
Parliament, with a three-quarters majority, following a public hearing with
potential nominees.
*

Online [July 2001] Available: http://www.bild.net/model_law.htm.
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§4 Each member is appointed for a fixed period of six years. However, as
regards the initial composition of the Council, four members shall be nominated
for a period of two years, four members for a period of four years and four
members for a period of six years.
§5 The starting point for the initial periods shall be the date of the constituent
meeting of the Council. Re-appointment of a member of the Council at the end
of his or her term of office is possible.
§6 Members of the Council may not belong to or work for the national
government or the PSBO itself, or be members of parliament.
§7 Members of the Council may not be revoked during their term of office.
However, if for whatever reason a member is incapable of performing his or her
duties, or if he or she has not attended Council meetings for a period exceeding
six months, the member in question shall be revoked and be replaced by
another person who shall finish the revoked member's remaining term of office.
The provisions of §§3 and 6 above shall apply.
§8 The Council shall elect its own Chairman.
§9 The Council shall set up its own Rules of Procedure.
§10 Except where otherwise provided herein, the Council shall take decisions
on the basis of the majority of the votes of members present. Where voting is
equal, the vote of the Chairman shall be decisive.
§11 The Council shall meet at least once every two months. It shall also meet in
extraordinary session whenever at least three of its members request a
meeting.
§12 The Director General and the Chairman of the Board of Administration shall
be entitled to participate in Council meetings, except where the Council
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excludes them for particular reasons. Directors and other staff members or third
parties may be invited to attend for particular reasons.
§13 Members of the Council shall not receive financial remuneration for their
work. However, they shall be entitled to a free radio and TV set and yearly
global compensation for their expenses amounting to one half-month's salary of
the Director General.
§14 The Broadcasting Council shall
1. appoint the Director General, with the vote of at least eight of its
members in favour,
2. approve the appointment of the Directors and the Editors-inChief for radio and for television proposed by the Director
General. Unless at least six members of the Council vote
against, or if no vote has been taken within three months of
notification by the Director General, such appointments shall be
taken as approved,
3. appoint the members of the Board of Administration, with the
vote of at least seven of its members in favour,
4. adopt PSBO's Statutes, after consultation with the Director
General and the Board of Administration. The Statutes shall, in
particular, lay down the internal organization of PSBO in more
detail. They should also define the responsibilities of the
programming staff,
5. adopt PSBO's Bye-laws, after consultation with the Director
General and the Board of Administration. The Bye-laws shall, in
particular, regulate the matters expressly identified in this Law,
as well as any other matters requiring detailed internal
regulation of a binding nature,
6. advise the Director General on general programming matters
and assist in carrying out programming responsibilities,
7. monitor observance of PSBO's programming responsibilities
as laid down in this Law. It may declare, stating its reasons in
writing, that certain broadcasts violate programming principles
laid down in this Law, and may instruct the Director General,
after hearing his or her position, to discontinue such violation or
to ensure that no further violation occurs. The Council may not
review individual programmes prior to their broadcast.
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§15 The conclusion of contracts concerning programming which commit PSBO
to a total payment exceeding ..... shall require the Council's prior consent.
Article 12 - The Board of Administration
§1 The Board of Administration shall supervise the business affairs of PSBO,
both internal and external, with the exception of matters relating to
programming.
§2 It shall be composed of seven members. They shall be experts in matters of
administration and finance and may not in the exercise of their function
represent the interests of third parties.
§3 The Board members shall not belong to or work for the government or the
PSBO itself, or be members of parliament or members of the Broadcasting
Council.
§4 The Board members shall be appointed for a four-year period.
Reappointment for a maximum of two further periods shall be possible.
§5 If for whatever reason a Board member is incapable of performing his or her
duties, or if he or she has not attended Board meetings for a period exceeding
three months and if at least seven members of the Broadcasting Council are
convinced that he or she will not resume his or her activity within a reasonable
period of time, the Broadcasting Council shall revoke him or her and replace
him or her by another person who shall finish the revoked member's remaining
term of office. The provisions of §2 above and of Article 11§14(c) shall apply.
§6 The Board shall elect its own Chairman and set up its own Rules of
Procedure.
§7 The Board shall lay down binding Rules on financial matters, in consultation
with the Director General.
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§8 The Board shall take decisions with the majority of the members present.
Where voting is equal, the vote of the Chairman shall be decisive.
§9 The Board shall meet in principle at least once per month. It shall also meet
in extraordinary session whenever at least two of its members request a
meeting.
§10 Members of the Board shall receive yearly global compensation of their
expenses amounting to one month's salary of the Director General.
§11 The Board shall
1. represent PSBO in all dealings with the Director General
2. conclude the service contract with the Director General
3. advise the Director General on business matters not related to
programming
4. approve PSBO's budgets and yearly accounts.
§12 The Board's consent shall be necessary for
1. the conclusion of service contracts with the Directors and any
other employees whose salary exceeds the highest class of the
staff salary scale
2. the conclusion of trade union agreements
3. the acquisition and sale of companies or of shares therein
4. the acquisition, sale and mortgaging of property
5. the taking-up of bank credits and the granting of financial
guarantees and securities
6. the conclusion of contracts concerning investments, other than
in programming, if the total amount to be paid by PSBO
exceeds ...
7. the expenditure of any money not provided for in the approved
budgets.
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Article 13 - The Director General
§1 The Director General shall have final responsibility for programming and
shall ensure that programmes are consistent with the programming principles
laid down in this Law and do not violate any other laws.
§2 The Director General shall manage PSBO independently and shall be
responsible for all its operations and activities.
§3 The Director General shall represent PSBO both in court and out of court.
§4 The Director General shall be appointed for a five-year term. Reappointment is possible. As long as no successor has been appointed after the
expiration of his or her term, the Director General shall continue in office if he or
she is prepared to do so; otherwise, his or her functions shall be taken over by
the Deputy.
§5 The Director General shall not be a member of parliament.
§6 The Director General may not be dismissed unless at least eight members of
the Broadcasting Council decide to replace him or her by another person on
whom they have agreed. In such a case, that other person shall finish the
dismissed Director General's remaining term of office.
§7 The Director General shall appoint one of the Directors as his or her Deputy,
for a period not exceeding his or her own mandate.
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I. 7

TECHNOLOGY AND THE FUTURE

World Radio and Television Council,
Public Broadcasting, Why? How?

Public Broadcasting in the Digital Era
The public broadcasting model has survived these past few years in an
audiovisual universe otherwise dominated by commercial broadcasting. But the
broadcasting world is changing quickly, very quickly. Will the multiplication of
commercial services lead to audience fragmentation endangering generalinterest public broadcasting, in that this fragmentation drives down ratings to
such an extent that there is no longer any point in maintaining it? Should public
broadcasters create specialty services, knowing their raison d'être is to serve
the general public and not only particular audiences? Should they abandon
certain types of programs, given the abundance of similar programs in these
areas? Should they offer Internet services?
All these issues can finally be summed up in a single question: What is
the place of public broadcasting in the digital era? The digital environment
forces us to think not only of public broadcasting, but of all broadcasting, in a
different light. The technical limits imposed on broadcasting in another era (the
scarcity of frequencies for over-the-air broadcasting, in particular) no longer
exist. Government intervention in broadcasting, therefore, can no longer be
justified on technical grounds. To be sure, this raises questions about the future
of regulation in this sector. It is already difficult to oblige commercial
broadcasters to discharge certain public-service obligations. The convergence
of broadcasting, telecommunications and Internet brought about by digitalization
will in no way ease this situation, quite the contrary. In the field of
telecommunications as on the Internet, we are instead seeing deregulation for
the former and a reluctance to regulate the latter. If, as one might think, it is
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becoming increasingly difficult to regulate digital broadcasting services, the best
way to ensure that public-service objectives are maintained will be the existence
of a public body responsible for carrying out these missions.
The real questions that need to be asked, therefore, are the following:
Does digitalization raise questions about the need for a universal service
addressing people as citizens rather than consumers? Does digitalization
eliminate the possibility of having broadcasting services different from the
myriad commercial services on the market? Will it supersede the need for a
public forum in which all are invited to take part, regardless of social status or
purchasing power? Will the individualization of audiovisual consumption that
digitalization permits and the fragmentation it causes result in individuals losing
interest in services that enable them to maintain a sense of belonging to a
political community, to perceive themselves as citizens?
Unless we answer yes to all these questions, it is quite obvious that
digitalization will not be an impediment to the maintenance of public
broadcasting, quite the opposite. The democratic and egalitarian objectives
inherent in it can still be invoked as justification. Thus, to the question of the
future usefulness of public broadcasting, we can repeat Werner Rumphorst's
answer:
[...] the future of public service broadcasting follows on from its
mission, from its role within and for civil society. The more
diversification and individualization of information sources there
is, the more audiences become fragmented, the more important
it will be to maintain at least one strong service which performs
the function of a national point of reference and of national
2
identification, and the role of the market place for opinion.
The challenge of the years to come, for public broadcasting, is to evolve
and to adapt to the digital era the principles underlying its existence. Thus, the
vast majority of public television stations already have a foothold in the world of
specialty channels and Internet. What they need to do is to use these new
technologies to improve and complement their public-service mission. They

2

Werner Rumphorst, Model Public Service Broadcasting Law with Introductory Note and
Explanatory Comment, 1998, p. 6, (unpublished).
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must proceed with caution, choosing sectors that follow logically from their
raison d’être. In Germany, for example, public stations have created two theme
channels to complement their basic offering: a news and documentary channel
and a children's channel. These channels are fully consistent with a publicservice mission.
On the other hand, the public broadcaster must not forget, as the
French Senate Report points out, quoting sociologist Dominique Wolton, that its
calling is really to create “social links.” “Tomorrow,” Wolton writes, ”generalinterest media, in a multimedia universe, interactive and cluttered with networks,
will have an even more important role than yesterday, because they will be one
of the few links in the individualist mass society. The objective of generalinterest television is to continue to share something in a strongly hierarchical,
3
individualist society.”

3
Dominique Wolton, quoted in Sénat (France), L’audiovisuel public en danger. Rapport
d’information fait au nom de la commission des Finances, du contrôle budgétaire et des comptes
économiques de la Nation sur le financement de l’audiovisuel public public [Public broadcasting at
risk. Report on financing of public broadcasting]; par Claude Belot, Paris, (Les rapports du Sénat, no
162), 1999-2000, p. 31.
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I. 8

CONCLUDING OVERVIEW

“Public Service Broadcasting: The Challenges of the 21st Century,” by
Marc Raboy, Winter 1999–2000
Broadcasting is a field of activity, which deserves just as much attention as
education or health care and which should be organized to take into account the
public interest. This does not mean that everything to do with broadcasting
should fall exclusively within the public sector, but it is as an overall system that
the place of public service radio and television needs to be considered. Against
the present background of globalization, public service broadcasting has a more
essential role to play than ever before.
The contemporary media scene is characterized by a rapid increase in
services, an explosion of new technologies, the disappearance of national
frontiers, and the merchandising of program content. In this situation, where
everything is increasingly dictated by market imperatives, public service radio
and television is becoming an oasis, a constant, a guarantor of quality, and as
everyone knows, it is besieged on every side, threatened and called into
question. So what sort of future does it have?
The surveys regularly carried out by analysts all emphasize the
obstacles in the way of public service broadcasting. But inasmuch as we can
legitimize and revalue its mission, these obstacles begin to appear less
daunting. Where legitimacy is concerned, the inclusion in the 1997 Amsterdam
Treaty of a European Protocol in favor of public service broadcasting was an
important point of principle. Not only did this declaration demonstrate the power
of politicians to resist commercial pressures, it was also the only concrete
example to date of a cultural exception to the new rules of deregulation that are
being applied by transnational authorities. It is no coincidence that this has
occurred in the public service broadcasting sector. The declaration adopted by
the conference of ministers of the Council of Europe on media policy, held in
Prague in December 1994, was another step in the same direction. In its
declaration, the Council of Europe identified the safeguarding of well-funded
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public broadcasting institutions as essential to the health of the media in a
democratic society.
A Democratic Space
The declaration then adopted includes a mission statement in nine points, which
broadly restates the European outlook on the objectives of public-service
broadcasting. This outlook remains valid, apart from the slight changes that now
need to be made if it is to meet the specific challenges we are facing today. The
fact is that public service broadcasting is the only factor contradicting the
received wisdom that the mass media are now destined to march to the beat of
the market drum. Apart from some noble local experiments of a marginal
nature, there are no other media whose main vocation is to help build a
democratic public space. Formerly restricted to the internal territory of nation
states, the notion of public space, like many others, is currently being
repositioned in a global context. It is already possible to speak of a
transnational, or global, public space, in which the public service media can and
must play a role equivalent to the one they played during the glorious, but now
superseded, period of national monopolies.
Transnational
In a system, which is inevitably influenced by market forces, an important place
should be reserved for institutions, which promote the cultural development on
which the quality of public and democratic life depends. As an increasingly
transnational political system emerges, we should even be thinking of
establishing new cross-frontier media, founded on new transnational, or even
global, bodies. Experiments such as TV5 and ARTE represent tentative steps in
this direction. As the focus of political decision-making shifts from the national to
the transnational sphere, there is a need for forums for democratic debate and
cultural exchange, which correspond to this new situation.
Consumers?
Some people will say that, in society as we have it today, this kind of talk is a
pipe dream. But is the idea of public service media any more radical than that of
a press free of authoritarian state control, or of orderly management of scarce
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frequencies, or the notion of deregulation of the air waves? Two main currents
have in fact shaped the history of the media: technological development, and
the political will to steer the broadcasting system in accordance with a collective
vision of the future of society. The present heralding of the demise of public
service radio and television stems more from neo-liberal ideology than from any
objective reality. Having said this, its resurrection will not be accomplished
unless the issue is placed high on the political agenda, and without massive
support from the audiences that public service radio and television is supposed
to be serving.
What should the mission of public service broadcasting be? By what
means, with what type of content and with what resources should it aim to fulfill
its mandate? We need to make a clear distinction between public service and
commercial broadcasting. What is the motivating force, what is the priority, on
what should the emphasis be put when difficult choices have to be made? For
example, what should be given special treatment when programming schedules
are drawn up? Symbolically, how does one behave to demonstrate the
conviction that one's audience consists of citizens rather than consumers?
These are difficult questions to answer in a context where public service
broadcasters are in competition with their private sector rivals for commercial
revenues. To free public service institutions from market pressures is therefore
the essential condition for them to be able to fulfill their mandate. So where will
the funding come from? All the studies so far conducted show that the license
fee remains the best way of ensuring funding which is adequate and relatively
free of political constraints. However, in many specific national contexts, the
license fee is not enough. Either it has never been effectively established, or
citizens already overburdened with taxes oppose it, or quite simply it does not
yield sufficient funds to meet all the requirements of top-class programming.
An Audacious Proposal
This leads to the inevitable conclusion that only the taxing of the private sector
will enable the public sector to flourish and fulfill its mission. This solution was
suggested by, among others, the World Commission on Culture and
Development, which in its 1995 report defined the airwaves as belonging to the
world's indivisible common heritage.
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If we recognise that the media system as a whole constitutes a public
service, the taxing of commercial enterprises which profit from this sector is
justified. This may seem an audacious proposal, but it is no more audacious
than suggesting that businesses should contribute a proportion of their profits to
the public purse for the benefit of all sorts of activities regarded as essential by
society. A modus vivendi would have to be negotiated, whereby market forces
are allowed free play in part of the sector, in exchange for the reserving of
substantial areas for public service broadcasting. Eliminating public service
broadcasters as competitors for commercial revenues would make it possible to
generate funds to ensure their survival out of the profits of the commercial
interests involved. These funds would come mainly from the distribution sectors,
where operating costs are relatively stable and controllable, and profit margins
are, to say the least, respectable. Public service broadcasters could then
concentrate on distinctive programming. They could rediscover their mission of
being at the cutting edge where innovation and quality are concerned. A
dynamic public service sector would have a beneficial influence on the system
as a whole by demonstrating the very best of which broadcasting is capable and
raising public expectations. Public service broadcasting should also show
leadership in developing the new non-commercial services made possible by
new technology and the emergence of audiences not restricted to a particular
national constituency. This implies a new, transnational mode of organization.
Finally, we need to recognize that the future of public service radio and
television is no longer being determined at the national level, but now depends
on the on-going debate being conducted by organizations such as UNESCO,
the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the World Trade
Organization (WTO). It is there that the fate of culture—and of the media, which
are its prime vehicles—is now being decided.
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CHAPTER II
THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE
COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND
TRENDS IN PUBLIC SERVICE
BROADCASTING
It is impossible to cover all trends within Europe in the area of public service
broadcasting. In this section, we shall deal with several themes identified in
Chapter I, themes that will be of increasing relevance to transition societies.
First, there is the Treaty of Amsterdam, thought to be a charter reaffirming
dedication to public service principles. The Treaty of Amsterdam is, however,
about more than high-minded commitments. It concerns federalism within
Europe and the right, as well as the responsibility, of each state to develop, in
its own way, a public service broadcasting system that contributes to goals and
principles of the kind articulated in Chapter I.
Second, we examine questions of financing. Issues concerning funding
and competition are extremely important at present. We look at a recent EBU
document and a survey of financing systems in a variety of states. Third, we
include materials on ideas of conditionality and accession: how European
institutions set standards, in the audio-visual sector, for progress by various
states toward membership in the community. Fourth, we look at a growing issue
of importance: the use of principles of competition law to adjust the relationship
between public service broadcasters and their private competitors (who,
themselves, may have public service responsibilities). While the Treaty of
Amsterdam concerns the duties to fund a public service broadcaster, the Treaty
of Rome presents limitations. Finally, we look at issues of convergence, and the
future of public service broadcasting in a digital age
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II. 1 THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AND THE
VALIDATION OF PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING
The Treaty of Amsterdam is often considered a “charter” of reaffirmance for
public service broadcasting in Europe. It must, however, be read carefully and
understood in relation to the arguments about competition fervent in Europe. In
one sense, the Treaty of Amsterdam is a call for a strong public service system.
But the document is also closely related to questions of financing described
below. In Europe, under the Treaty of Rome, there is an assault on public
service broadcasters, arguing that they unfairly compete against private and
independent broadcasters. The attack is based on the idea that public service
broadcasters are heavily subsidized and that, as with other aspects of
European competition, subsidies can lead to unfair competition. Does the
Treaty of Amsterdam solve the problem—the problem of declining government
support for public service broadcasting—that it was designed to address?
The Treaty of Amsterdam is also interesting because of its commitment
to federalism: the notion that the particular structure of public service
broadcasting is up to each Member State. Thus, one may consider whether the
Treaty establishes a general standard for Member-State performance.
In the second document,” The Public Service Broadcasting Remit:
Today and Tomorrow,” issued on 29 April 1998 (DAJ/ew/mp), the European
Broadcasting Union seeks to describe what the Treaty of Amsterdam means. It
addresses the difficult problem of the breadth of the remit of a public service
broadcasting entity so that it can be immunized from the charge of unfairly
competing with private broadcasters.
Protocol on the System of Public Broadcasting in the Member States,
Draft Treaty of Amsterdam, Council of the European Union, Brussels,
August 1997
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,
CONSIDERING that the system of public broadcasting in the Member States is
directly related to the democratic, social and cultural needs of each society and
to the need to preserve media pluralism,
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HAVE AGREED upon the following interpretative provisions, which shall be
annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community,
The provisions of this Treaty shall be without prejudice to the competence of
Member
States to provide for the funding of public service broadcasting in so far as such
funding is granted to broadcasting organizations for the fulfilment of the public
service remit as conferred, defined and organized by each Member State, and
that such funding does not affect trading conditions and competition in the
Community to an extent which would be contrary to the common interest, while
the realization of the remit of that public service shall be taken into account.
The Public Service Broadcasting Remit: Today and Tomorrow, European
*
Broadcasting Union, 29 April, 1998
In the preamble to the Amsterdam Protocol, the Member States of the
European Union consider "that the system of public broadcasting in the Member
States is directly related to the democratic, social and cultural needs of each
society and to the need to preserve media pluralism". This express recognition
of the role of public broadcasting in a Protocol to the Treaty on European Union
is not merely an echo of the 1996 European Parliament Resolution on the role
of public service television in a multimedia society; it enshrines the essence of
this Resolution in a binding text which has the same legal force as the Treaty
articles themselves.
How could the democratic, social and cultural needs of society, and the
need to preserve media pluralism, be served by a marginalized broadcasting
organization catering only for cultural elites or other minority interest groups and
essentially concentrating on those types of programmes which—for
understandable economic reasons—the commercial broadcasting sector will not
provide? To fulfil their role, public broadcasting organizations need to be a
major force on the national audiovisual scene, and they must cater for all
sections and groups of society, through, in particular, quality mass-appeal
programming.
*

Online [August 2001] Available: http://www.ebu.ch/leg_public_service.pdf.
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Public service programming obligations cannot possibly be reduced to a
clearly-defined result which anyone could deliver. They are not quantifiable.
Furthermore, the cost of programmes of identical duration within a given
programme category (sport, films, magazines, etc.) tends to vary considerably,
and so does quality and the degree of relevance of programming to civil society.
Therefore, public service programming obligations cannot be performed by
commercial broadcasting organizations, which—quite legitimately—are guided
by commercial logic. In contrast, as not-for-profit organizations, public
broadcasting organizations will—by definition—strive to meet the public
programming remit as best they can with the various financial resources at their
disposal. Without them, the "merit good" quality programming for all sections of
society would not be provided, since the market itself cannot and will not
produce it.
The Amsterdam Protocol wisely makes do with a reference to the public
broadcasting remit "as conferred, defined and organized by each Member
State". This recognizes the fact that public service broadcasting is defined and
organized quite differently from one Member State to another. Far from
requiring even so much as a minimum standard or level of definition of public
broadcasting, the Protocol definitely does not prescribe that there must be
"clearly defined public service obligations". Member States are perfectly free, for
instance, to define the public broadcasting remit in a broad general manner by
making a global reference to quality programming for all sections of the
population, responding to the democratic, social and cultural needs of society
(to repeat the terms used in the preamble to the Protocol). Furthermore, there
can be no question of singling out specific public service obligations (implying
that the rest of the public broadcaster's programming is not covered by the
public broadcasting remit). The entire range of a public broadcasting
organization's programme output constitutes public broadcasting, even if a
cahier des charges or other such regulation may expressly highlight certain
elements as an absolute must in the public broadcaster's overall programming.
Fully consistent with this, the Protocol itself uses not the plural ("obligations")
but the singular (remit in English, mission in French, Auftrag in German) when
referring to the mandate of a public broadcasting organization.
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II. 2 FUNDING: TREATY OF ROME, COMPETITION
AND TRANSPARENCY
We start this difficult and puzzling problem of competition between public
service broadcasters and private counterparts with excerpts from a
Communication from the European Commission. The Commission noted that, in
the 1970s, the big national public service broadcasters, for the first time, faced
major competition as governments licensed competitors. But now a tension was
created, one that persists to this day and faces all transition societies from the
outset:
While opening the market to competition, Member States
considered that public service broadcasting ought to be
maintained, as a way to ensure the coverage of a number of
areas and the satisfaction of needs that the private operators
would not necessarily have fulfilled to the optimal extent.
There would be private entities that would expand their market share,
leaving problems for the public service broadcaster. If the PSB tried to
reprogram to compete more effectively with the new entrants, a different cry
would be raised. Thus, as the Commission said:
The increased competition, together with the presence of Statefunded operators, has also led to growing concerns for a level
playing field, which have been brought to the Commission’s
attention by private operators. The vast majority of the
complaints allege infringements of Article 87 of the EC Treaty in
relation to the public funding schemes established in favour of
public service broadcasters.
The Commission Communication first looks at the applicability of the
Treaty of Rome and then, remarkably, suggested ways in which the “public
service remit” could be more clearly identified so that problems of competition
and subsidy would be avoided.
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Communication from the Commission on the Application of State Aid
Rules to Public Service Broadcasting: Excerpts, Press Release: 233—Nr:
*
9755/01, Luxembourg, 21 June, 2001
[…]
3. THE LEGAL CONTEXT
14. The application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting has to take
into account a large set of different elements. The EC Treaty includes Articles
87 and 88 on State aid and Article 86, paragraph 2, on the application of
competition rules to services of general economic interest….
[…]
5. APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE 87(1)
5.1. State aid character of State financing of public service broadcasters.
19. Article 87 (1) states: “Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid
granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever
which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain
undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, insofar as it affects trade
between Member States, be incompatible with the common market”.
20. The purpose of the State intervention is not determinative for the
assessment of its State aid content under Article 87(1), but only its effects.
State financing to public service broadcasters is normally to be regarded as
State aid, as it fulfils the above mentioned criteria. Public service broadcasters
are normally financed out of the State budget or through a levy on TV set
holders. In some specific circumstances the State makes capital injections or
debt cancellations in favour of public service broadcasters. All these financial
measures are attributable to the public authorities and involve the transfer of
State resources. Moreover, and to the extent these measures are provided in

*

Online [August 2001] Available: http://europa.eu.int/comm/avpolicy/c2361.htm;
http://www.ifj.org/working/issues/broadcasting/ecaid.pdf
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breach of the market economy investor test, they may favour only certain
broadcasters and thereby distort competition.
21. As the Court of Justice has observed: “When aid granted by the State or
through State resources strengthens the position of an undertaking compared
with other undertakings competing in intra-Community trade the latter must be
regarded as affected by that aid”. Thus, State financing of public service
broadcasters generally affects trade between Member States. This is clearly the
case for the acquisition and the sale of program rights, which often takes place
at an international level. Also
advertising, for those public broadcasters that are allowed to sell advertising
space, has a cross border effect, especially for homogeneous linguistic areas
across national boundaries. Moreover, the ownership structure of commercial
broadcasters may extend to more than one Member State.
22. According to the jurisprudence of the Court 12 , any State finance
transferred to a certain undertaking—also when covering net extra costs of
public service obligations—has to be considered as State aid (provided that all
the conditions for the application of Article 87(1) EC are fulfilled).
[…]
6. ASSESSMENT OF THE COMPATIBILITY OF STATE AID
UNDER ARTICLES 87(2) AND 87(3)
28. State aid to public broadcasters must be examined by the Commission to
determine whether or not it can be found compatible with the common
market….
29. State aid to public service broadcasters will have to be assessed according
to its specific purposes and effects. For example, a State may be willing to grant
an aid to facilitate the restructuring of the public service broadcaster; if this is
the case, the aid will be assessed according to the rules laid down in the
Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in
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difficulty 16; and if the conditions set there are met, then the aid can be
declared compatible on the basis of Article 87(3)(c) of the Treaty.
30. According to Article 151 of the Treaty, the Community shall take cultural
aspects into account in its action under other provisions of this Treaty, in
particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures. …As
stated by the Commission in its KinderKanal/Phoenix decision, educational and
democratic needs of a Member State’s society have to be considered as distinct
from the promotion of culture 17. Also the Protocol distinguishes among
cultural, social and democratic needs of each society.
31. State aid to public service broadcasters often does not differentiate between
these three needs mentioned in the Protocol. Therefore, unless a Member State
provides for a separate definition and a separate funding in relation to State aid
to only promote culture, such aid can generally not be approved under Article
87(3)(d). It can normally be assessed, however, on the basis of Article 86(2)
referring to services of general economic interest. In any event, whatever the
legal base for assessing compatibility, the substantive analysis would be
conducted by the Commission on the basis of the same criteria, namely those
set out in this Communication.
[…]
7.1. DEFINITION OF PUBLIC SERVICE REMIT AND ENTRUSTMENT
37. In order to fulfil conditions (i) and (ii) indicated above, and thereby allowing
the Commission to carry out its tasks under Article 86(2), the Member State has
to:
•
•
•

define certain tasks as public service;
entrust a certain undertaking(s) with the fulfilment of such tasks by
means of an official act;
define and implement a control system able to ensure that the public
service mandate is fulfilled by the entrusted undertaking(s) according to
the prescribed conditions.
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38. The definition of the public service mandate is within the competence of
Member States, which can decide at national, regional or local level. A “wide”
definition, entrusting a given broadcaster with the task of providing a balanced
and varied programming in accordance with the remit, is to be considered, in
accordance with the interpretative provisions of the Protocol, as legitimate
under Article 86(2), as aiming at ensuring the fulfilment of the democratic, social
and cultural needs of the society and the guaranteeing of pluralism, by
preserving a certain level of audience for public broadcasters.
39. In the context of a balanced and varied programming, it is not for the
Commission to decide whether a programme is to be provided by the market or
as service of general economic interest. However, according to the Treaty,
including the interpretative provisions of the Protocol, the competence of the
Member States in defining public service remits in broadcasting has to be
considered as limited to those tasks which are related to public broadcasting
systems, and should not include other activities which are not necessary to the
accomplishment of that mission.
[…]
43. In practice, when assessing actual cases, the Commission would therefore
1
examine:
•
•
•
•

whether an official definition of the public service remit exists;
whether this definition does not extend the scope of the public service
remit to include activities that cannot constitute public service activities
20 ;
whether a given undertaking has been entrusted, by means of an
official act, with the performance of that remit;
whether a control mechanism, by means of an independent body,
exists, in order to ensure that the public service mandate is actually
performed by the entrusted undertaking.

[…]
1

The Commission’s purpose in obtaining clear definition was so that it would be “transparent”
whether the state was subsidizing programs that competed with the private sector.
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55. If the broadcasting undertaking only fulfils public service activities, no
separation of accounts is necessary. However, if it also competes directly with
private companies
in non public service activities this must be done on an equal footing, i.e. on a
correct
cost-covering basis.
56. In the presence of both a public service remit and non public service
activities, and in the absence of analytical accounting systems, which clearly
and precisely separate non public service from public service activities on the
basis of a proper cost allocation, it is difficult to assess whether the State funds
are simply limited to offset the extra-costs of the public service and are not used
to cross-subsidise the firm’s non public service activities. A public service
broadcaster might in fact take advantage of the State aid to finance its non
public service activities. Under these circumstances the State would in fact not
only compensate the extra costs of the public service obligation but also fund
some non public service activities. Therefore it is necessary to carefully
examine the effects of the aid in order to assess whether it affects competition
and the development of trade to an extent contrary to the common interest.
The Public Service Broadcasting Remit: Today and Tomorrow, European
*
Broadcasting Union, 29 April, 1998
In this document, The European Broadcasting Union (DAJ/ew/mp, cited above),
addresses the funding issue.
Licence fee funding, together with more or less limited revenue from other
sources (such as programme sales, advertising or sponsorship), provides public
broadcasting organizations in the large majority of European countries with the
necessary means to accomplish their mission. Since it serves exclusively the
fulfilment of the remit conferred upon a not-for-profit organization, rather than
assisting that organization to compete with others, with the ultimate purpose of
generating profits, it may seriously be wondered how this unique method of
funding could possibly be referred to as "aid" (within the meaning of Article 92 of
the EC Treaty). Nevertheless, even assuming that under special circumstances
licence fee funding paid directly by viewers and listeners to the public
*

Online [August 2001] Available: http://www.ebu.ch/leg_public_service.pdf
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broadcaster could be regarded as "aid", the Protocol expressly prescribes that
even where, furthermore, such funding should be found to affect trading
conditions and competition in the Community to an extent which would be
contrary to the common interest, such a finding could not be definitive without
the realization of the public service remit having first been taken into account. In
other words, the "common interest" is conditioned by the need to fulfil the given
public service remit.
To provide additional understanding of these complicated competition
questions, we include a statement by the Association of European Radios, a
Europe-wide trade body representing the interests of private commercial radio,
as to its concerns about “unfair” competition from public radio. One
consequence is a demand for “transparency” an accounting system that will
allow competitors to determine whether a public service broadcaster is receiving
a subsidy that violates or might violate European competition policy.
Association of European Radios Policy Statement Concerning the
*
Financial Transparency and Role of Public Broadcasters, 7 July, 2000

IV. The Situation in Some European countries: Unfair Practices
European private radio has long been calling for a level playing-field for private
and public radios and has requested greater transparency of the finances of
public broadcasting. Problems with public broadcasters differ in nature from
country to country. Some concrete examples follow.
France
In France, the public broadcaster Radio France has just announced its intention
to present to the CSA a new plan (so called the "plan bleu") that proposes a
complete restructuring of its networks. The plan foresees the abandonment of
stations such as FIP and the launch of two new national networks, which will
change the radio landscape in France dramatically.
The first network will offer music programmes targeted at adults with
content absolutely similar to that already offered by private stations such as
*

http://www.aereurope.org/submissions/pdfs/AER_PSPR_07072000.pdf
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RFM, Nostalgie, Chérie FM or RTL 2. The second network will target young
audiences (le Mouv’) and offer a music programme comparable to the private
stations’ product—Fun, NRJ, Skyrock for example. This is not sensible use of
public funds.
French private radios have shown their opposition to this project. It
jeopardises the existing balance and pluralism in the French radio panorama
and contradicts the mission of the public broadcaster as it is expressed in its
"cahier des charges". Radio France should continue offering the complementary
and distinctive services that have justified up until now its public funding.
Citizens will gain nothing from having Radio France reproducing private radios’
programmes.
Radio France should not be allowed to change its formats and outputs
at will, while private radios must adhere to particular formats.
Germany
In Germany, private radios find it difficult to compete with public broadcasters
due to public radios’ advantages and their structural complexity, which lacks
real financial control. The financial statements presented by public broadcasters
ARD and ZDF to the KEF (the Commission responsible for establishing the
financial needs of public broadcasters) are not clear particularly regarding the
outsourcing of private subsidiary companies that carry out different activities
(i.e. marketing, advertising, licensing, etc.) for public broadcasters. These
companies are partly funded by the State; therefore the KEF should be able to
evaluate how they are funded.
There are other problems in Germany, such as the expansion of public
broadcasters into multimedia services without any relation to their public service
remit, but the main problem remains the lack of transparency in the public
broadcasters’ accounts.
Italy
In Italy, the public broadcaster RAI has taken the decision to carry out
commercial activities while maintaining its privileges of public entity. A holding
has been created to break up the different activities in different companies that
will compete in the open market. For example, RAI Way is the new carrier
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company that is in charge of network operations. They are advertising its
forthcoming privatisation (only up to 49% of total stake) and, while maintaining
their public service’s privileges, are offering services in open competition with
private companies. In particular, RAI Way benefits from frequencies,
transmitters and infrastructure usage for an indefinite period of time, while
private operators have limited licences.
This situation becomes more serious because there are no systems of
control. Concerning the development of digital radio, a complaint was presented
to the Communications Authority by private radios, which denounced that RAI
had used public funds allocated for this purpose to develop other services,
without respecting the contract that had been signed with the Italian
government. The Communications Authority has declared itself non-competent
for ruling this case and has sent the dossier back to the Ministry for
Communications. Since the Ministry is owner of the public broadcaster and at
the same time is responsible for its public funding, its ruling on the case does
not offer to private radios any guarantee of either observance of competition
rules or a transparent use of public funds.
This situation is blocking the development of digital radio, in which
Italian private radios are investing very large funds.
Sweden
In Sweden, radio regulation clearly favours public broadcasters. Sveriges Radio
(SR) dominate the Swedish market, while private broadcasters have been
restricted from creating ad hoc networks.
The Netherlands
In the Netherlands, public radios (5 national channels) are granted the best
frequencies covering up to 100% of the national territory while commercial
radios are only awarded frequencies to cover 70%. Furthermore, public
terrestrial frequencies are planned on a different basis to commercial radio
frequencies. The result is that public radios use many more frequencies than
necessary. If public radio was planned on the same basis as commercial radio
then at least two more national frequency packages could be made available for
commercial use. The Dutch government has decided to auction all frequencies
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to commercial operators, while public radios will get the best frequencies for
free. For T-DAB (Digital Audio Broadcasting), public radio as the only user gets
frequencies for free with national coverage and with more space than they need
for their five channels. Commercial radio again faces auctions and can only bid
for regional rather than national frequencies.
Public radios in the Netherlands carry advertising. Public broadcasters
are "double funded"; experts know that the amount of advertising revenues they
get is enough to cover at least the costs of the five public radio channels. These
costs are not transparent and an insight of these costs is refused. The sales
organisation of the Dutch public radio (STER) is the most dominant agent in the
market with a share of 41% (on advertising). That market share and the fact that
only public radio can offer national coverage to advertisers allows public radio to
set the price for radio advertising in the market. Commercial radio can only
follow the STER and ask for lower prices.
United Kingdom
In the UK, the publicly funded broadcasters’ services are paid for by licence fee
without commercial funding. This is good. However, the BBC is the only UK
media company that is allowed to have national radio, national television, local
radio and magazine publishing interests. This gives it a well-promoted,
dominant brand that the highly regulated, terrestrially transmitted commercial
sector cannot match. The BBC is self-regulated and can change its formats and
outputs at will. The commercial sector is independently regulated and must
adhere to particular formats. BBC Radio has been able to change one of its five
national channels from serving older listeners to one serving younger listeners
without any constraints. This has proved disadvantageous to the commercial
sector, which does not have these freedoms.
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II. 3

ACCESSION AND EVALUATION

One of the important questions for the institutions of the European Union has
been the “progress” various countries are making to meeting standards for entry
or recognition. This document indicates how the European Parliament and the
European Commission assesses the progress of particular countries in Central
and Eastern Europe.
The European Parliament in the Enlargement Process: “Briefing No 47:
Audiovisual Policy: applicant countries and the community acquis,”
*
Secretariat Working Party Task Force "Enlargement"
POSITIONS OF THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ON THE
PROGRESS MADE BY THE APPLICANT COUNTRIES IN THE
INCORPORATION OF THE AUDIO-VISUAL ACQUIS
1
1.1

European Parliament
General Assessment

The Parliament has made several statements on the enlargement and
the audiovisual sector. It considers the incorporation of the audiovisual acquis
by the applicant countries as being of “paramount importance”. The Parliament
stressed that “it attaches to progress in particular [...] areas, while
acknowledging that improved respect for human rights and democratic
principles is a continuing challenge for both current and future EU Member
States: [...] the right to free speech, and the freedom of the media”. In order to
implement strategies of integration of the Central and Eastern European
countries, the Parliament urges the Commission to draw its “attention to the
enormous potential of modern telecommunications technology in a
comprehensive communication strategy with the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe and urges the Commission to cooperate with those countries in
its development and ensure that it can promote culture and a responsible
*

Online [August 2001] http://www.europarl.eu.int/enlargement/briefings/47a2_en.htm,

http://www.europarl.eu.int/enlargement/briefings/pdf/47a1_en.pdf

57

CHAPTER II

approach to information;” It also emphasises the need to give urgent practical
and financial support to promote “free and independent media in order to
eliminate material problems faced by the media in the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe, as these problems could promote lasting dependence on
government and thus prevent full development of a democratic order.”
1.2

Hungary

The Hungarian audiovisual landscape has undergone many changes since
1989. Hungary is one of the best-equipped of the East European countries to
guarantee the freedom of expression. Therefore the European Commission in
1997 presented a proposal concerning Hungary's participation in the MEDIA II
programme. The Committee on Culture delayed the adoption of this proposal
for several months, waiting for Hungary to bring its legislation on media into
closer alignment with Community legislation. In its resolution of 8 December
1998 Parliament stated that Hungary had made some progress in the field but it
found that much still remained to be done before harmonised legislation could
be applied to all enterprises in the audiovisual sector. It therefore approved the
Commission's proposal subject to the following conditions: establishment of a
timetable for the adjustment of Hungarian legislation to European Provisions
and for the adoption of the body of EU audiovisual legislation, particularly with
regard to the status of the broadcasting organisations and the programming of
European Works.
1.3

Cyprus

In 1998 the European Commission presented a proposal concerning Cyprus'
participation in the MEDIA II programme. The European Parliament approved
this proposal on 15 September and emphasised that consideration of Cypriot
projects accorded with the desire of the European Union to promote the
audiovisual sector in all its cultural diversity.
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2
2.1

European Commission
Pre-accession strategy

The Community has adopted a pre-accession strategy for preparing the process
of legislative alignment with the candidate countries. This strategy consists of
the analysis of the legal and economic status quo, and is developed on grounds
of far-reaching and mixed Association Agreements concluded between the
candidate countries and the Community, which entered into force between 1994
and 1997. One of the sectors covered by these agreements is the audiovisual
sector, with specific reference to transfrontier television. The agreements
require the Parties to "co-ordinate and where appropriate harmonise their
policies concerning the regulation of cross-border broadcasting, technical norms
in the audiovisual field, and the promotion of European audiovisual technology".
To monitor the implementation of the agreements, the Commission
since 1997 carries out regular evaluations on the progress made by each
candidate country concerning reaching the EU standard. These evaluations are
known as the Regular Reports. The last such evaluation by the European
Commission was carried out in 1999, and the situation of the incorporation of
the acquis in each applicant country was recorded in the Regular Reports as
follows:
2.2

Bulgaria

Significant progress has been made by Bulgaria with respect to alignment with
the Television without Frontiers Directive. In July 1998 the Law on
Telecommunications was adopted and in November 1998, the Radio and
Television Law was adopted. Moreover, in March 1999 the Council of Europe
Convention on Transfrontier Television was ratified. Consequently, the
audiovisual legal framework in Bulgaria is very closely aligned with the
Television Without Frontiers Directive, though some minor problems need to be
addressed. Administrative and implementation structures (National Council for
Radio and Television) are in place, though it is too soon (following the adoption
of the Radio and Television Law) to know if the body carries out its work
effectively.
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2.3

Cyprus

Cypriot broadcasting legislation is largely in line with the audiovisual acquis,
although full alignment will require some amendments to the existing legislation.
Administrative and implementation structures (Cyprus Radio-Television
Authority and the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation) are in place and work
effectively. These structures are in the process of being strengthened.
2.4

Czech Republic

In its 1997 Opinion, the European Commission already noticed the
discrepancies between the audio-visual legal system of the Czech Republic and
the Union standards. The 1998 Regular Report reported the limitation of
progress made in this field. While some developments have taken place since
1998 (elaboration of draft broadcasting legislation), no significant progress has
been made with respect to the adoption of the audiovisual acquis (Television
without Frontiers Directive). Czech broadcasting legislation is not in conformity
with Community legislation in this field and there is a need to amend and align it
with the acquis. As the Accession Partnership identified alignment with the
audiovisual acquis as a medium term priority this is an urgent need. While
administrative and implementation structures (Council of the Czech Republic for
Broadcasting) are in place, there will be a need to ensure that this body is
empowered with proper monitoring and sanctioning powers.
2.5

Estonia

In its 1997 Opinion, the Commission expected Estonia to meet the EU
requirements in the medium term. Like other East European Countries, the
audiovisual sector had suffered major upheavals since the end of the 80s. The
1994 Law on Broadcasting was deficient regarding requirements of freedom of
reception, advertising rules and promotion of European products.
Some progress has been made by Estonia since, notably the signing of
the Council of Europe Convention on Transfrontier Television in February 1999
(ratification will follow), and the entry into force of the Act to Regulate the
Dissemination of Works, which Contain Pornography or Promote Violence or
Cruelty in 1998. However, Estonian broadcasting legislation is not yet in full
conformity with Commission legislation, and since the Accession Partnership
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identified alignment with the audiovisual acquis as a medium term priority, there
is an urgent need to align the existing legislation with the acquis. Administrative
and implementation structures are in place (Ministry of Culture) and work
effectively within the confines of the existing legislation.
2.6

Hungary

Hungary has made considerable efforts since 1990 to meet the Union
requirements. The 1996 Law on Radio and Television dismantled the State
monopoly on information and created a regulatory body. However, no significant
progress has been made with respect to the adoption of the audiovisual acquis.
Hungarian broadcasting legislation is not yet in full conformity with Community
legislation in this field and there is a need to amend and align it with the acquis.
Administrative and implementation structures (ORTC) are in place and work
effectively, within the confines of the existing legislation.
2.7

Latvia

The 1997 Commission’s Opinion considered it possible for Latvia to reach the
EU standard in the medium term considering the efforts made for the
harmonisation of legislation. Deficiencies were noticed concerning the freedom
of reception, promotion of European products and the advertisement rules. The
government began to tackle some of those problems in 1997.
In November 1998 the Law on Radio and Television entered into force.
This new law brings Latvian broadcasting legislation closer to the audiovisual
acquis. However, further amendments need to be introduced in order for the law
to be fully aligned with the acquis. Administrative and implementation structures
(National Radio and Television Council) are in place and work effectively.
2.8

Lithuania

The lack of information available made it difficult for the Commission to assess
the level of incorporation of the acquis in the Lithuanian legislation. Despite this
uncertainty, the Commission was able to judge in 1997 that the legal system,
encompassing a 1990 Law on the Press and Mass Media and the 1995 Law on
the Licensing of Postal and Telecommunication, was unable to guarantee the
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minimum requirements of the community (freedom of reception, promotion of
European products, advertising and sponsorship rules, protection of minors...).
While some developments have taken place since 1998 (elaboration of
draft broadcasting legislation), no significant progress has been made with
respect to the adoption of the audiovisual acquis (Television Without Frontiers
Directive). Lithuanian broadcasting legislation is not yet in conformity with
Community legislation in this field. As the Accession Partnership identified
alignment with the audiovisual acquis as a medium term priority, there is an
urgent need to amend and align the existing legislation with the acquis.
The Radio and Television Commission (est. 1996) continues to work
effectively within the limit of existing legislation. However, its technical, financial
and human resources are rather limited, and a more acquis-oriented approach
to implementation will be developed during 1999/2000 under the PHARE SEIL
project.
2.9

Malta

Thanks to the 1991 Broadcasting Act, Malta’s audiovisual legislation is broadly
in line with the EU acquis in this sector. The audiovisual sector grew rapidly
during the last few years through the licensing of new private channels and the
introduction of 52 channels on cable. The Broadcasting Authority carries out
implementation and enforcement of audiovisual legislation, and is a dynamic
body. It has been an active member of the European Broadcasting Union and of
the Commonwealth Broadcasting Association for many years. The authority is
also a member of the European Institute for the Media and a founder member of
the EPRA--the European Platform of Regulatory Authorities--that was set up
during a conference held in Malta in 1995.
Maltese broadcasting legislation shares common features with the
audiovisual acquis, but it is not yet in full conformity with it. There is, therefore, a
need to amend and align the existing legislation with the acquis in the field.
Administrative and implementation structures are in place and work effectively
within the confines of the existing legislation.
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2.10 Poland
While some developments have taken place since 1998 (elaboration of draft
broadcasting legislation), no significant progress has been made with respect to
the adoption of the audiovisual acquis (Television Without Frontiers Directive).
Polish broadcasting legislation is not yet in conformity with Community
legislation in this field.
2.11 Romania
In its Opinion of July 1997, the European Commission expressed the view that,
provided necessary structural adjustments of the industry were made, as well
as sustained efforts to change legislation, Romania, should be able to meet EU
requirements in the medium term. The November 1998 Report confirms the
Commission's initial evaluation and notes that some progress has been made,
notably the adoption of a number of compulsory norms by the National
Audiovisual Council (NAC) and the creation of a number of
administrative/implementation structures under the aegis of the NAC. However,
Romanian broadcasting legislation is not yet in full conformity with Community
legislation in this field and there is an urgent need to amend and align it further
with the aqcuis.
2.12 Slovak Republic
In 1997, Slovakia had already made important progress in the harmonisation of
its audiovisual legislation to reach European standards. The 1991 Slovak
Television Act and Radio and Broadcasting Act dismantled the State’s
monopoly on the production of film and television and created a regulatory
body, the Television Broadcasting Council. However, no significant progress
has been made with respect to the adoption of the audiovisual aqcuis
(Television without Frontiers Directive) since 1998. Slovak broadcasting
legislation is not in conformity with Community legislation in this field and there
is an urgent need to amend and align it further with the acquis. Administrative
and implementation structures (Council of the Slovak Republic for Radio and
Television Broadcasting) are in place and work effectively within the confines of
the existing legislation.
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2.13 Slovenia
While in 1997 the Commission expected Slovenia to meet the requirements in
the medium term, this country did not progress substantially in the incorporation
of the acquis. The November 1999 report states that the Slovenian legislation is
still incompatible with the Community standards, although some developments
have taken place (elaboration of draft broadcasting legislation). The
administrative and implementation structures (National Broadcasting Council)
are in place and work effectively within the confines of the existing legislation.
The Council's monitoring powers are rather weak and should be strengthened
in any new legislation.
2.14 Conclusion
Altogether, the audiovisual sector of the applicant countries has experienced
deep upheavals since the end of the 80s, preventing them from adapting their
legislation rapidly to the European acquis. Several countries have made
important efforts to harmonise their legislation and implement the new rules.
However, it is unlikely that all of them will be able to meet EU requirements in
the short term. In the communication concerning "Principles and Guidelines for
the Community's Audiovisual Policy in the digital age" (Com(99) 657) the
Commission states its particularly attentive to transposition by applicant
countries of the Broadcasting Directive. The Commission also plans to protect
the audiovisual industries of applicant states and will assess, for each of them,
how appropriate it is to implement specific measures in pre-accession
instruments.
Guidelines on the Guarantee of the Independence of Public Service
Broadcasting: Recommendation No. R (96) 10 of the Committee of
Ministers to Member States, Council of Europe
In the evaluation and assessment phase, one important question is
independence of public service broadcasters, as we have indicated throughout
these materials. This is an excerpt document of the Council of Europe
reaffirming such standards.
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I. General provisions
The legal framework governing public service broadcasting organisations
should clearly stipulate their editorial independence and institutional autonomy,
especially in areas such as:
• the definition of programme schedules;
• the conception and production of programmes;
• the editing and presentation of news and current affairs programmes;
• the organisation of the activities of the service;
• recruitment, employment and staff management within the service;
• the purchase, hire, sale and use of goods and services;
• the management of financial resources;
• the preparation and execution of the budget;
• the negotiation, preparation and signature of legal acts relating to the
operation of the service;
• the representation of the service in legal proceedings as well as with
respect to third parties.
The provisions relating to the responsibility and supervision of public
service broadcasting organisations and their statutory organs should be clearly
defined in the governing legal framework.
The programming activities of public service broadcasting organisations
shall not be subject to any form of censorship. No a priori control of the activities
of public service broadcasting organisations shall be exercised by external
persons or bodies except in exceptional cases provided for by law.
II. Boards of management of public service broadcasting organisations
1. Competences
The legal framework governing public service broadcasting organisations
should stipulate that their boards of management are solely responsible for the
day-to-day operation of their organisation.
2. Status
The rules governing the status of the boards of management of public service
broadcasting organisations, especially their membership, should be defined in a
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manner that avoids placing the boards at risk of any political or other
interference.
These rules should, in particular, stipulate that the members of boards
of management or persons assuming such functions in an individual capacity:
•
•

•

exercise their functions strictly in the interests of the public service
broadcasting organisation which they represent and manage;
may not, directly or indirectly, exercise functions, receive payment or
hold interests in enterprises or other organisations in media or mediarelated sectors where this would lead to a conflict of interest with the
management functions which they exercise in their public service
broadcasting organisation;
may not receive any mandate or take instructions from any person or
body whatsoever other than the bodies or individuals responsible for
the supervision of the public service broadcasting organisation in
question, subject to exceptional cases provided for by law.

3. Responsibilities
Subject to their accountability to the courts for the exercise of their
competences in cases provided for by law, the boards of management of public
service broadcasting organisations, or individuals assuming such functions in
an individual capacity, should only be accountable for the exercise of their
functions to the supervisory body of their public service broadcasting
organisation.
Any decision taken by the aforementioned supervisory bodies against
members of the boards of management of public service broadcasting
organisations or persons assuming such functions in an individual capacity for
breach of their duties and obligations should be duly reasoned and subject to
appeal to the competent courts.
III. Supervisory bodies of public service broadcasting organisations
1. Competences
The legal framework governing public service broadcasting organisations
should define clearly and precisely the competences of their supervisory bodies.
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The supervisory bodies of public service broadcasting organisations
should not exercise any a priori control over programming.

2. Status
The rules governing the status of the supervisory bodies of public service
broadcasting organisations, especially their membership, should be defined in a
way, which avoids placing the bodies at risk of political or other interference.
These rules should, in particular, guarantee that the members of the
supervisory bodies:
•
•
•
•

•

•

are appointed in an open and pluralistic manner;
represent collectively the interests of society in general;
may not receive any mandate or take any instructions from any person
or body other than the one which appointed them, subject to any
contrary provisions prescribed by law in exceptional cases;
may not be dismissed, suspended or replaced during their term of office
by any person or body other than the one which appointed them, except
where the supervisory body has duly certified that they are incapable of
or have been prevented from exercising their functions;
may not, directly or indirectly, exercise functions, receive payment or
hold interests in enterprises or other organisations in media or mediarelated sectors where this would lead to a conflict of interest with their
functions within the supervisory body.
Rules on the payment of members of the supervisory bodies of public
service broadcasting organisations should be defined in a clear and
open manner by the texts governing these bodies.

IV. Staff of public service broadcasting organisations
The recruitment, promotion and transfer as well as the rights and obligations of
the staff of public service broadcasting organisations should not depend on
origin, sex, opinions or political, philosophical or religious beliefs or trade union
membership. The staff of public service broadcasting organisations should be
guaranteed without discrimination the right to take part in trade union activities
and to strike, subject to any restrictions laid down by law to guarantee the
continuity of the public service or other legitimate reasons.
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The legal framework governing public service broadcasting
organisations should clearly stipulate that the staff of these organisations may
not take any instructions whatsoever from individuals or bodies outside the
organisation employing them without the agreement of the board of
management of the organisation, subject to the competences of the supervisory
bodies.
V. Funding of public service broadcasting organisations
The rules governing the funding of public service broadcasting organisations
should be based on the principle that member states undertake to maintain and,
where necessary, establish an appropriate, secure and transparent funding
framework which guarantees public service broadcasting organisations the
means necessary to accomplish their missions.
The following principles should apply in cases where the funding of a
public service broadcasting organisation is based either entirely or in part on a
regular or exceptional contribution from the state budget or on a licence fee:
•

•

•

•
•

the decision-making power of authorities external to the public service
broadcasting organisation in question regarding its funding should not
be used to exert, directly or indirectly, any influence over the editorial
independence and institutional autonomy of the organisation;
the level of the contribution or licence fee should be fixed after
consultation with the public service broadcasting organisation
concerned, taking account of trends in the costs of its activities, and in a
way which allows the organisation to carry out fully its various missions;
payment of the contribution or licence fee should be made in a way
which guarantees the continuity of the activities of the public service
broadcasting organisation and which allows it to engage in long-term
planning;
the use of the contribution or licence fee by the public service
broadcasting organisation should respect the principle of independence
and autonomy mentioned in guideline No. 1;
where the contribution or licence fee revenue has to be shared among
several public service broadcasting organisations, this should be done
in a way, which satisfies in an equitable manner the needs of each
organisation.
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The rules on the financial supervision of public service broadcasting
organisations should not prejudice their independence in programming matters
as stated in guideline No. 1.

VI. The programming policy of public service broadcasting organisations
The legal framework governing public service broadcasting organisations
should clearly stipulate that they shall ensure that news programmes fairly
present facts and events and encourage the free formation of opinions.
The cases in which public service broadcasting organisations may be
compelled to broadcast official messages, declarations or communications, or
to report on the acts or decisions of public authorities, or to grant airtime to such
authorities, should be confined to exceptional circumstances expressly laid
down in laws or regulations. Any official announcements should be clearly
described as such and should be broadcast under the sole responsibility of the
commissioning authority.
VII. Access by public service broadcasting organisations
to new communications technologies
Public service broadcasting organisations should be able to exploit new
communications technologies and, where authorised, to develop new services
based on such technologies in order to fulfil in an independent manner their
missions as defined by law.
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II.4 PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING IN A DIGITAL
AGE
In 1997, the European Commission produced a "green paper" on issues related
to technological "convergence" in communication. The paper represented a
further step in the realisation of an Information Society in Europe. It examined
policy issues relating to the broad infrastructure of telecommunications, media
and information technology sectors.
Green Paper on the Convergence of the Telecommunications, Media and
Information Technology Sectors, and the Implications for Regulation,
Towards an Information Society, European Commission, Brussels,
*
Belgium, 3 December 1997
Chapter IV: Regulatory implications
IV. 3 Meeting public interest objectives
[…]
The need for public interest objectives to be clearly defined
Universal service obligations in general ensure the universal availability of
defined services at an affordable price, whilst the public service mission of
broadcasters extends beyond issues of universal availability and price and lays
down conditions relating to the content of the services provided. Against this
background the starting point for any analysis of public interest objectives in the
light of convergence must be the need to define public interest objectives so
that market actors have a clear idea of the obligations with which they must
comply. Some consider that such an assessment is also essential in order to
gauge whether these objectives remain valid in the face of the evolving
*

Online [August 2001] Available: http://www.ecommerce.gov/green.htm
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communications and media environment, whilst others argue that the objectives
remain valid and only the way in which they are satisfied may evolve. In either
case, a proper assessment seems to require a clear identification of underlying
objectives.
In the case of certain objectives in the different sectors, specific
obligations have been placed on one or more operator to guarantee these
objectives. This is the case with universal service carriers in the
telecommunications sector or broadcasters who have been given a public
service mission. In the telecommunications case, the cost of those obligations
may, where they represent an unfair burden for the operator concerned, be
shared with other market players.
Some argue that given that such a framework exists within
telecommunications, the absence of a similar framework for the public service
mission in broadcasting will deter companies wishing to operate on an
integrated basis or favour the position of those entering the telecommunications
market from the media side. Others respond that convergence does not
challenge the existence of different approaches, given the underlying objectives
are quite different. They further argue that it is simply not possible to cost
obligations relating to the public service mission in any meaningful way, and
that comparisons with the experience of telecoms are unhelpful in this regard.
A further issue is who might in future be able to fulfil a public service
mission or offer universal service? Obligations have traditionally fallen on a
single designated organisation, (though that is now changing in the case of
universal service in some Member States). However, the possibility of offering
voice telephony services over a computer or a television, or the ability to use
the Internet to read, watch or listen to broadcasters' programming illustrates the
possibility that new platforms may play a role in meeting such obligations. The
question arises as to whether this is an additional reason for such obligations to
be properly identified.
Additionally, the issue is whether existing frameworks should be
changed in order to create a coherent framework for both public and private
broadcasting organisations, for example so that different organisations are
allowed to bid to undertake such obligations, including organisations from
outside the traditional sector. Where specific support in the form of industry or
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even public funding is available for the provision of such services, the issue
arises, inter alia, as to whether that mechanism would need to be open to any
organisation willing to be designated as fulfilling public interest obligations.
Content-Related Objectives
Convergence is already leading to a reassessment of approaches to the means
of implementing objectives regarding content. This has already been the case
with approaches to harmful and illegal content on the Internet. At its most basic,
the central issue is not the validity of particular rules but whether the impact of
technology on particular services requires a reassessment of the means of
achieving the objectives in question.
Essentially this is an application of the principle of proportionality, which
means that current approaches must be assessed in the light of the specific
characteristics of the service concerned. This means that there does not have
to be a single standard applicable to the same content whatever the channel
used for distribution. Instead, different standards might apply. For example, it is
likely that the controls applied to advertising on a free-to-air broadcast would be
considered inappropriate, if applied to a pay-TV programme or an Internet
service, because of the specific characteristics of the service concerned.
The Role of Public Service Broadcasting
The public service mission entrusted to public service broadcasters is
recognised as of cultural importance and the organisations with responsibilities
in this regard are entitled to appropriate funding, subject to compatibility with the
rules of the Treaty. The recent Protocol on public broadcasting attached to the
Amsterdam Treaty confirms this point.
Convergence may however enable many more sources of audiovisual
information to be accessed by viewers. Public authorities will need to monitor on
a continuing basis the extent to which desired policy objectives are being
achieved by normal market activity, including the impact of other media, and
whether, as a consequence, regulatory obligations placed on broadcasters may
be lightened.
Traditional public broadcasters will need to reappraise their role in the
convergent environment. On the one hand, their market share is likely to
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diminish as users face an increasing choice in a market already near to
saturation in terms of the individual potential for consumption of audiovisual
services within a 24-hour day. Moreover, escalating prices for premium content
could subject them to budgetary pressures that might outstrip the capabilities of
existing funding mechanisms. The issue will be whether public broadcasters
can continue to have access to attractive content in the face of fierce
competition for the acquisition of programme rights, within the constraints of
their existing funding mechanisms. Many are preparing to exploit their
reputation and their customers' "brand loyalty" to compete with new paytelevision broadcasters.
On the other hand, technological convergence offers public
broadcasters a range of new possibilities, in terms of both activities and
potential avenues to viewers and listeners. This can enhance their current role
and provide valuable new sources of revenue alongside current funding. The
regulatory framework should allow broadcasters to take advantage of these new
opportunities. It should also permit them to benefit from economies of scale and
scope where these also bring benefits for the consumer. However, if state funds
intended to support a public broadcaster in fulfilling its public service mission
were used to leverage and cross-subsidise these new activities or the use of
new technological platforms, such as the Internet, then such practices would be
subject to the Treaty rules on competition and on the freedom to provide
services.
The future of public service television in a multi-channel digital age,
Committee on Culture, Youth, Education and the Media, Draftswoman: Ms
*
Carole Tongue, September 1996
In 1996, a special committee of the European Parliament also asked
questions about the future of public service broadcasting in the new
technological context. We include an excerpt from the Tongue Report, as it is
commonly known after its principal author.

*

Online [August 2001] Available: http://www.poptel.org.uk/carole-tongue/index2.html
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The future of public service television in a multi-channel digital age

Will there still be a need for public service broadcasting in the future?
Public service broadcasting is under attack. Gone is its monopoly of the
airwaves and unquestioned public mandate. Its future is being threatened by
new technologies and by some governments eager to privatise this key public
sector.
A recent article in the Economist went straight to the point: “Increasingly
Public Service Broadcasters will have to compete with hundreds of new
television channels. As they erode their audience, they will inevitably erode their
legitimacy. The world which has allowed Public Service Broadcasting to flourish
is disappearing. Can Public Service Broadcasters survive?”
Public service broadcasters in Europe face similar challenges.
•

They formerly enjoyed protected environments and are now faced
with unprecedented levels of competition from new channels; Will
there still be a need for PSB when dozens of new channels are
available to meet viewer`s needs and interests?

•

Will the new technologies, for example digital, not offer many more
opportunities to broadcast? Will the future not be more like print
publishing: the big commercial channels will continue to supply the
mass market but an increasing number of newcomers will set up to
serve minority tastes?

•

Broadcasting is a key sector of the economy, central to an
expanding audiovisual industry, which relies heavily on public
service broadcasting investment.

•

The television audience is now shared with more channels. For
example the BBC`s share of national TV audience has already
changed to 44%, from 50% in 1989. Looking at the sector as a
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whole, the audience share of public service broadcasters in the
European Union moved from an average of 82 per cent in 1984, to
57 per cent in 1990 and 46 cent in 1994.
•

Adapting to declining audiences by complementing commercial
schedules would lead public service broadcasters into a cultural
ghetto, but fighting decline may mean scheduling similar
programmes to their commercial competitors.

•

Does public financing of public service broadcasting constitute a
distortion of the market? Should public service broadcasters
operate like a true public service augmenting the market by only
providing the programme genres which are less commercially
attractive?

Commercial broadcasters, cable and satellite channels, competing with
each other for revenue in an increasingly competitive environment are bound to
follow the safest commercial strategy. Commercial television is now almost
entirely about profits. Its main duty is to the shareholders and to the advertisers.
Commercial stations can take few risks. This drives them towards popular
programming which generates the highest viewing for every commercial break.
These terrestrial cable and satellite operators are very good at
supplying high rating programmes and they do invest in popular drama, but its
content range is small. For example, there is a growing proliferation of police
and hospital thrillers with less drama on other themes. Commercial channels
are less interested in programme types which can only produce low-to-medium
sized ratings. Regulation is, therefore, important to establish and enforce
requirements for minimum standards as companies will increasingly do no more
than the bare minimum. Their business is to raise the greatest revenue from
advertisers and the maximum dividend for shareholders. They will rarely have a
motive for putting say, risky and innovative documentaries in prime time
television. From the viewer’s perspective this represents real market failure.
Although all of us enjoy the most popular programmes for much of the
time, very few of us want them all the time. Research shows that, by and large,
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the public wants to spend two thirds of the time watching undemanding
entertaining fare but wants to watch something more challenging for the other
one third. Commercial television schedules are prepared to achieve volume and
in so doing the range of programmes is severely restricted. Programmes which
are likely to deliver smaller audiences, however good, and however highly
valued by those viewers are not commissioned (except in the case of Channel 4
TV with a special mandate to do so).
Public service broadcasters therefore have a crucial function to
discharge. Free from commercial pressure, they are free to address the full
range of audience interests, not just those which are commercially the most
attractive. They spend their revenues to provide budgets for programmes which
extend the range of viewing choice. In addition to high quality popular
programmes for mass audiences they fund many innovative, risky and
challenging programmes which inherently appeal to smaller audiences. The
crucial fact is that the viewers of these "minority" programmes are not some
exceptional elite. They are the same people as those who watch the soaps. We
all want wider choice at some point of the viewing week and public service
broadcasting is providing these programmes.
Universal access in the information society
Our society is divided into those who can pay and those who cannot pay for
new services – which is why public service broadcasters have a crucial role.
Citizens must have access to a wide range of high quality services, impartial
information and news, to educational programming, to diverse cultural
programming -- and their choice should not be narrowed by market
fragmentation, which the new services will bring. The EU must legislate to
ensure that broadcasts that are provided free at the point-of-use continue to be
available free on both cable and satellite in the future. This EU legislation
should place "obligations" on cable and satellite operators to provide freeaccess for public broadcasting programmes.
New technologies will also allow public service broadcasterss to fulfil
their public service remit to higher standards. For example, the BBC is already
investing in new educational CD-Roms, and ARD and ZDF are planning to
launch specialised channels—a children's channel, a parliamentary channel
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and an education channel. Public service broadcasters are well placed to take
the lead in the development of the Information Society because public service
broadcasters have extensive experience of programme making, and the richest
programme libraries and are the main investors in audio-visual production in
Europe. The figures speak for themselves. As non profit-making institutions, all
revenues are reinvested in programme materials and development.
The BBC alone invests 1.3 billion ECU in new programming each year,
more than the total spending in the European film industry. In 1994, European
public service broadcasters (excluding Greece and Luxembourg) spent 7.62
billion ECU on original programming, 168 million ECU on co-productions and
954 million ECU on commissioned productions—totalling a massive 8.742
billion ECU. Public service broadcasters will clearly be the key provider of
quality content on the information superhighway, enhancing our cultural
heritage and strengthening our audiovisual industry.
What about the impact of digital television?
Some argue that the current failure of commercial television to supply a
wider range of output will be remedied by new technology. New channels, they
say, will find new niche markets. This is what has happened with the magazine
market over the past 20 years and has led to many propounding what the
broadcasting consultant Peter Ibbotsen calls the “bookshop fallacy” – the idea
that that multi-channel television will provide the "bookshop of the air" in which
the public can browse among a plethora of titles to find the publication of their
choice. In the same vein, they say, commercial television will blossom and will
succeed by constantly adding new choices for the viewer, thus making the
present role of public service broadcasters entirely redundant as viewers
become their own schedulers from diverse material transmitted on hundreds of
channels.
This will not happen for two reasons. First, the cost of entry, that is
setting up a television channel, is much greater than going into print. And
secondly, the running costs are also vastly different from print: any television
channel consumes material at a frightening rate and even the cheapest
programming costs thousands an hour. The problem is compounded by the
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facts that viewers are used to getting TV very cheaply and that the amount of
viewing time is saturated and cannot conceivably increase.
To fund the bookshop of the air, to give new minority channels a
realistic expectation of a profit from much smaller audiences in a fragmenting
market, the public would have to pay much more for the privilege. As Ibbotsen
says, "The bottom line is that digital technology is unlikely to produce a
cornucopia of new choices for viewers. The "bookshop" is an illusion, because it
is neither commercially attractive, nor does it fit with the public's habits or
expectations". Given the general desire for mixed programming, the best
vehicles for carrying minority interests are likely to remain public service
broadcasting channels or closely regulated commercial channels, where
programmes of all kinds can be found, for example Channel 4 in Britain.
Regulation
How do you ensure that public service broadcasters deliver a wide range of
programmes fulfilling their mandate; are held accountable for the service they
provide; while also safeguarding their independence and provide training?
An effective and efficient regulatory framework will remain key for
securing the continued existence of public service broadcasters within the
European Union. As John Birt, the director-general of the BBC, puts it,
"Broadcasting needs a constant pressure towards good quality. In the past this
has come from public service broadcasters. By setting standards and taking
risks, public service broadcasters limit any tendency among commercial
broadcasters to focus on the lowest common denominator.
At the same time, commercial channels providing popular entertainment
channels and niche services constantly challenge the public service offering.
This will also be needed in the future". It is in the interest of all public service
broadcasters to promote the forms of regulation which will enable broadcasters
to make good the market failure unavoidable in untrammelled commercial
broadcasting environments.
Most countries have some form of legal framework governing quality
and standards but these do vary. Legislative safeguards are essential to guard
against government or parliamentary intervention in the public service
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broadcasting sector and to ensure effective editorial independence.
Broadcasting and broadcasters must be accountable for several reasons:
• To ensure that the character and content of broadcasting services
reflect the needs and desires of the audience
• To ensure that broadcasters perform their important social and
political role
• To ensure that there are means for independent adjudication of,
and redress for, users complaints.
Equally important is training. Traditionally public service broadcasters
have provided a very wide range of production and technical training which
immediately benefitted the broadcasters and ultimately the entire film and TV
production sector. In the future, public service broadcasters must maintain and
build on this commitment to quality training—a strong production base is
dependent on excellent training within broadcasting institutions.
We must not be fooled by promises of diversity and choice that
hundreds of channels will bring. Particularly worrying is the possibility that these
new channels could be dominated by a few very powerful global players under
the guise of unfettered operation of market forces. The Writers Guild of America
recently commissioned a report which predicted that, by the end of the century,
the world`s media could be controlled by just four organisations. If unrestricted
competition leads to a restriction in either the quality or range of products
available then intervention is clearly justified in the public interest. In European
Union terms this must mean an intelligent and flexible interpretation of
competition rules, not a rigorous adherence to ideological purity.
The same approach should also apply to the rules governing mergers in
the audio-visual and telecoms sector. Public service broadcasters should not be
covered by any future European Union directive on media concentration and
pluralism. However, to the extent that public service broadcasters enter into
commercial joint ventures with private undertakings, such commercial
subsidiaries should fall within the scope of media concentration rules.
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Policy Issues
Over the coming months we face important broadcasting policy decisions that
will have significant implications for broadcasters, in particular public service
broadcasters.
•
•
•
•

The extent of future restrictions upon cross-media ownership
Future development of the information society
Protection of copyright
Regulatory framework for the development of new audiovisual services,
such as video-on-demand

These policy issues arise within a broadcasting environment which is
changing rapidly, principally because of the pace of technological change.
Given how all pervasive technological this will be, we must build upon the
comparative advantage of our public service broadcasting rather than abandon
it. Europe should, moreover, recognise the strength of its tradition of public
service broadcasting. Arguments for its continued support remain strong:
•
•
•

•

To provide a service aimed at society at large
To provide services which answer a different set of criteria than simply
the need to make profits for shareholders
In small countries, particularly those with minority languages, public
service broadcasting may continue to be the only source to broadcast a
range of programming for the population at large, as commercial
broadcasters will not provide for these small markets.
Freed from short-term concerns about maximising audience ratings,
public service broadcasting can be an innovator in programme making,
enriching the culture of the nation.

Conclusions
Over the coming decade public service broadcasting will become more not less
important. Firstly, it will not be replaced by dozens of viable minority interest
services. Secondly, it will remain a major engine of providing budgets for new
rather than recycled or bought-in programmes. Thirdly, as commercial
competition intensifies and mainstream commercial channels become more
similar in their mass market appeal, it will provide the best method of
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maintaining the widest range of accessible choice for the public. I believe that
public service broadcasting will continue to command the attention of the
majority of viewers and listeners in the future. To ensure that this will happen,
however, public service broadcasters must through regulation ensure that they
are:
• Objective and independent
• Providing diversity, choice and accurate and balanced news and
current affairs programmes which are key building blocks of modern
citizenship
• Representing public opinion
• Accountable to their public
• Politically and financially independent
• Giving all homes access to the best of national and European culture
and entertainment
• Providing programmes which satisfy the needs of all the population
• Providing programmes which are innovative, informative, educational
and entertaining
• Helping build knowledge and opening up opportunities through
education and factual programmes
• Providing programmes which the market will not produce because they
are high risk in the commercial market place
• Leading the development of new audiovisual services and funded to
develop new technologies
• Leading in the transition to digital terrestrial broadcasting
• Able to draw on consistent and stable funding.
• Playing to their strengths, their universality, their professional skills and
their considerable resources.
To conclude, Michael Grade, Chief Executive of Channel 4 Television,
has eloquently summed up today`s reality: “A division is clearly growing
between channels whose primary purpose is public service, and those which
are obviously businesses seeking to maximise profits. For the former the
ambition is to succeed in innovation, in refreshing the pool of home grown
programmes, in accurately reflecting and stimulating the public mood and
taste... Perhaps the best medicine is to make sure that the public service
broadcasters, those who put the public interest first, those who are committed to
sustaining a creative, non-derivative production base, are properly supported,
properly sustained and properly funded. We are heading towards an exciting
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but uncertain future. … In the end, the public interest will remain very much the
same as it is now: a right to free and fair communication, to choice, to unbiased
news and to enjoy the highest standard of output—in all genres—that our native
talent can produce."
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II.5

CONCLUDING OVERVIEW

We close with an excerpt of an essay by Werner Rumphorst addressing many
of the questions included in this chapter. The present article is a condensed
version of a paper presented at a Baltic media experts' meeting in Vilnius,
Lithuania 31 January 1998.
“Public Service Broadcasting: No End to the Misunderstandings?,” by Dr.
Werner Rumphorst, 1998
[A]t the 4th European Ministerial Conference on Mass Media Policy (Prague,
7.–8. 12. 1994) participating States agreed that public service broadcasters
must provide, through their programming, a reference point for all members of
the public and a factor for social cohesion and integration of all individuals,
groups and communities; that they must provide a forum for public discussion in
which as broad a spectrum as possible of views and opinions can be
expressed; that they must develop pluralistic, innovatory and varied
programming which meets high ethical and quality standards, and that they
must not sacrifice the pursuit of quality to market forces, etc. Participating
States furthermore undertook to maintain and, where necessary, establish an
appropriate and secure funding framework, which guarantees public service
broadcasters the means necessary to accomplish their missions.
Three years later, the 5th European Ministerial Conference on Mass
Media Policy (Thessaloniki, 11 – 12 12. 1997) expressly reaffirmed the content
and the importance of the Prague Resolution, "stressing the continuing
importance of public service broadcasting, as an essential factor of pluralistic
communication accessible to everyone and hence of social cohesion, in this
new environment" (viz. in the information society).
Similar language to that employed in the Prague Resolution was used
by the European Parliament in its Resolution on the role of public service
television in a multimedia society (19. 9. 1996). Public service broadcasters
themselves could hardly have drafted a more forceful document in support of
their own cause.

83

CHAPTER II

More recently still, in agreeing on the celebrated Protocol on the
System of Public Broadcasting in the Member States, the Members of the
European Union considered in a preamble "that the system of public
broadcasting in the Member States is directly related to the democratic, social
and cultural needs of each society and to the need to preserve media
pluralism". How could these needs possibly be served by a marginalized public
broadcaster (such as PBS in the United States)? Public service broadcasting
needs to be a major force on the national audiovisual scene in order to fulfil this
important role and to serve as "a reference point for all members of the public
and a factor for social cohesion and integration of all individuals, groups and
communities" (to quote once again the Prague Resolution). Or, in the words of
the European Parliament Resolution, "public service broadcasting is a
fundamental player in the public sphere with a remit (i.a.) to offer a wide range
of quality production in all genres to the whole population".
Nevertheless, in spite of these clear statements, even the recent EC
Commission Green Paper on convergence raises the question of whether
commercial organizations should not be given the possibility to bid to undertake
public service broadcasting obligations, which are publicly funded. After all, one
might argue, since publicly subsidized universal service obligations in the
telecommunications sector are provided by commercial organizations, why
should the same not also be possible in the broadcasting sector?
Such reasoning might even draw support from other sectors, which
were also traditionally operated as public services: electricity, gas or water
supply, postal services, or public transport in scarcely-populated areas.
Whenever it would not make commercial sense to supply an individual house or
small settlement with any of these services, the universal service notion comes
into operation. Everybody should have access to these basic services. Where
necessary, public subsidies (from whatever source) must ensure that a defined
minimum service is provided in such cases.
All these services, including telecommunication services, have one key
element in common: there is a concrete, precisely defined result to be achieved.
A given house must be linked to the nearest available connection point for
water, gas, electricity or the telephone. All houses in a given village must be
provided with a regular (precisely defined) mail service. Another village, small
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town or suburb must have a regular public bus service, with the entire route,
each stop and the daily schedule precisely defined. Once the result is clear, it is
obvious that different companies may be able to deliver that result at different
costs. Hence the current practice of tendering for such publicly-subsidized
services.
In stark contrast, with one "exception" (viz. technical coverage, which is
in fact a universal service obligation) all the characteristic features of public
service broadcasting, as recalled in the above-quoted Prague Resolution and
the Resolution of the European Parliament, cannot possibly boil down to a
clearly-defined result which anyone could deliver and which could therefore be
the subject of tenders. "Reference point for all members of the public", "factor
for social cohesion and integration of all individuals, groups and communities",
"forum for public discussion", "as broad a spectrum as possible", "pluralistic,
innovatory and varied programming", "high ethical and quality standards", "of
interest to a wide public while being attentive to the needs of minority groups",
"reflect the different philosophical ideas and religious beliefs in society" (to
quote only some of the typical components of the public service mission
highlighted in the Prague Resolution, and repeated in substance in the
European Parliament Resolution); all these are non-quantifiable, non-definable
aims. As a not-for-profit organization, a public service broadcasting organization
will, by definition, strive to meet those goals as best it can with the various
financial resources at its disposal.
To demonstrate how ludicrous it would be to try to quantify certain
public service missions, let us assume that the cahier des charges of a public
broadcasting organization prescribes that the programme service has to include
a minimum of, for example, one major evening news bulletin per day lasting at
least 15 minutes, religious programming of at least 60 minutes per week, one
symphony concert or opera/operetta per month, one theatrical play every two
months, three hours of sports programming per week, one programme per
week lasting at least 25 minutes devoted to the environment, another one of the
same length devoted to women's issues, to education, to children, and so on,
and that for each category the (approximate) time-slot is likewise prescribed.
How could tenders for even that kind of "public broadcasting service" be made
in any meaningful way? Nothing would—or could—be said of the quality of the
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programming, even if it were prescribed that, say, 50% of all such programming
must be produced and/or commissioned by the broadcasting organization itself.
The cost of programmes of identical duration within a given category (sport,
films, magazines, etc.) tends to vary considerably, in extreme cases by up to
several thousand per cent. There is similar—non-measurable—variety in
programme quality, as well as in the degree of relevance of programming to the
civil
society.
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C HAPTER III
CHALLENGES TO THE PUBLIC
SERVICE BROADCASTING
R E M I T: T H E U N I T E D
KINGDOM, GERMANY AND
CANADA
In this chapter, we take the great themes—funding, governance structure, the
nature and meaning of public service—and focus on two European systems,
those of the United Kingdom and of Germany. Of course, we cannot present a
comprehensive view of any of these systems in the space available. Volumes
have been written and can be written about each of them. The purpose here is
to deploy comments and materials that help in understanding the context of
those systems, and especially the conceptual strains and limitations they are
now facing. We introduce an additional important point: the distribution of public
service obligations to private broadcasters as well as the historic centralized
public service broadcaster. These models, as embodied in the history of public
service broadcasting in Germany and the UK, are significant and instructive. But
they are not only models for adoration. Each system is interesting not only
because of what has been achieved, but also because of current experiences in
adapting to new technologies and market forces.
We conclude with a brief section touching the same issues in Canada—
a country where public broadcasting has never enjoyed a monopoly but has a
long history as an instrument of public policy used to promote values such as
cultural diversity and national sovereignty. Many of the issues related to national
identity and state-building, present in transition societies, have emerged starkly
there. Problems of pluralism, of dealing with the overwhelming influences of
globalisation, of coping with extensive competition for audience, of the need for

87

Chapter III

cultural subsidies—all these are present in Canada, rendering it an important
exemplar.
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III.1 PURPOSES OF PUBLIC SERVICE
BROADCASTING

GERMANY

“The Mission of Public Service Broadcasters” by Bernd Holznagel, 2000
Whether we like it or not, the media world is in a state of upheaval, and the
extent, duration and goals of this transformation cannot be estimated precisely.
New digital technology, with new possibilities for transmission and reproduction,
will profoundly change the television industry, its programming and audience
behaviours.
In Germany, more than 30 channels are currently financed through
license fees and advertising, and it may be expected that in the near future
there will be an additional 100 to 150 services for which the viewer will have to
pay extra. Special interest channels will complement what public service and
commercial generalist channels provide. All this will redefine viewing habits.
The broadcasters will bundle their services in programme bouquets. Electronic
programme guides (EPGs) will enable viewers to have access to an enhanced
variety of programming. Only providers who at this stage already have
successful, popular brands affiliated with their services will be able to succeed
in this multichannel environment. New technologies will also facilitate the
launching of new media services. One example is the worldwide distribution of
on-line offers available over the Internet. In the long run, the technology for
broadcasting and for new media services will converge, and may one day even
partly replace one another.
Not for the first time in the history of broadcasting, technology has
become the motor for changes in the fields of regulation, programme making
and the use made of television by the viewer. But public service broadcasters
(PSB) cannot simply let themselves be driven by technology. Public service
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broadcasters have their own understanding of how to implement their mission,
defined by the law, and achieve their specific programming goals.
The Public Broadcasters’ Specific Functional Remit. In Western
Europe, the obligation to provide a balanced and pluralistic program offer has
often been derived from the national Constitutions. The French Conseil
Constitutionnel and the Italian Corte Costituzionale, for example, argue that
pluralism in the media sector is an "objectif de valeur constitutionnelle” or a
"fondamentale valore costituzionale". They also stress the important role of PSB
to fulfil this legal obligation. The German Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) requires PBS to be the "fundamental provider"
(Grundversorgung) of broadcast programming. Only "as long and so far" as
PSB efficiently accomplishes this assigned role, according to the Court, can it
be justified not to require the same range of programming diversity from private
broadcasters. Therefore, PSB is entitled to have its existence and future
development guaranteed. This entitlement includes, for example, sufficient
financing. The framework for the functional remit of each of the broadcasting
organizations is, for example in Italy, Spain or Germany, defined by the national
legislator. A more specific description of PBS tasks can often be found in
governmental regulation like the French Cahier des Charges or the British
Royal Charter. In most cases, the establishment of guidelines for the ongoing
fulfilment of these obligations and for programme development comes within the
remit of the self-governing bodies of each broadcaster.
The specific functional remit of German Public Broadcasters covers
basically eight dimensions. They may serve as a typical example for the mission
of European PBS:
•
•
•

Information remit: PBS has a duty to convey objective information as a
basis for the free forming of opinions. Coverage, therefore, has to be
comprehensive, truthful and factual.
Guiding role: as a source of independent and unbiased information,
PBS provide reliable, credible reference points and, consequently,
guidance for a free forming of opinion.
Role of forum: PBS has to ensure that all relevant opinions on a
particular subject receive a hearing. They have to offer a forum for
public discussion in which the relevant social groups can participate.
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•
•
•
•

•

Integration role: PBS should aim for mutual understanding and, thus,
foster social cohesion.
Benchmark: PBS has the obligation to provide guiding, high-quality and
innovative programming. In this way they set standards.
Cultural mission. PBS programming has to reflect Germany's cultural
diversity and the events taking place in all the Länder.
Mission to produce: appropriate fulfilment of the respective obligations
cannot be guaranteed by the mere acquisition of foreign productions.
Because of that, PBS has a mission to produce independently and
creatively.
Innovative role. PBS is encouraged to take an innovative lead in testing
and using new technology and new services in the broadcasting sector.

THE UNITED KINGDOM

“BBC Evidence to the License Fee Review Panel,” 1 March, 1999
1. The core question is what society needs and expects from the BBC entering
the 21st Century? Evidence from recent consultations and debate suggests a
range of purposes:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

a civilising force
a benchmark for quality and innovation
support for democratic debate (news and information)
the investment engine for high-quality domestic content
cultural ‘glue’ for the nation
educational impact
creating an information society for the many not the few.

2. The UK has a good broadcasting ecology. But as services multiply
and competition increases (from multi-channel to on-demand), so government’s
ability to ‘regulate for quality’ diminishes. A strong and influential BBC will be
more necessary than ever as a benchmark for quality and help to maintain that
ecology. But this requires a BBC able to hold significant reach, share and
breadth.
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3. Technological change and globalisation pose significant long-term
challenges but also offer major opportunities. The challenges arise from
fragmentation as audiences consume their media in different ways, whether
multi-channel or on-demand.
Distribution costs rise as distribution methods multiply and new media
and devices come on stream (e.g. online; mobile devices); the need for good
quality, UK—originated content increases as major international corporations
offer global values and culture through imported content. The cost of high value
content will rise, driven both by relative scarcity and the increasing revenues,
which pay TV operators, can use in acquiring such content. In 1992 the
commercial TV sector had twice the BBC’s TV revenues; now the figure is four
times; by Charter renewal it is likely to be eight times BBC TV revenues.
4. Over time, the commercial networks are likely to follow the emerging
American pattern: investing in a popular, but relatively narrow, range of good
quality programmes. This will be expensive (e.g. the cost of each ER episode in
the US has jumped from $3m to $13m). Even network broadcasters will begin to
rely for a significant proportion of their revenues on exploitation in the pay
market. This will inevitably feed back into their scheduling and production
decisions on the network channels themselves. The BBC, on the other hand,
will continue to focus on providing the widest possible range of high-quality
programming free-to-air. It will continue to be the production and training
powerhouse for Britain’s broadcasting industry. The BBC is also ahead of the
game in establishing a successful range of subscription channels in the UK and
around the world, to extract and return to licence fee payers the full secondary
value of their investment. New technology brings major opportunities for public
service broadcasting: interactivity offers much greater richness and a closer
relationship between audiences and the BBC. New channels and new media
(e.g. online) offer new ways for the BBC to meet audience needs for distinctive
content.
5. The BBC needs to retain an attractive shop window in its network
channels. These will cater for the significant part of the population, which has
not yet embraced digital as well as providing a way in to the wider range of
services for those who have. They will continue to inform, to entertain and to
educate; not least to educate audiences into the benefits of and participation in
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the knowledge revolution which digital is making possible. These network
channels will continue to be the investment engine for high quality/high value
content for all. They will provide the core of the content which, at low marginal
cost, audiences will be able to access through new media and new devices to
obtain greater depth, richness and convenience. It is that combination of strong
networks and value added public services, which will enable the BBC to deliver
the values society wants from its media in the 21st Century. It is that strength of
the BBC’s domestic operations which allows the BBC to be an effective global
broadcaster.
“Public Service Broadcasting, from National Culture to Multiculturalism”
by Paddy Scannell, 1997
Public service broadcasting in Britain has developed in three broad periods,
each of which can be shown to have a core characteristic: first as national, then
as popular, and finally as pluralistic. All three characteristics are present in the
make-up of the mix of services currently available to British listeners and
viewers. Each has modified and been modified by the others. They stand out as
distinctive strands woven into the fabric of broadcasting today. They colour
attitudes within the industry, in politics, and among the public.
Popularity
Popular television continues to be at the heart of debates about broadcasting
and, in particular, the strategies of the BBC and ITV toward the national
television audiences. The question of "quality," and what it means in respect to
broadcasting, has been periodically debated since the introduction of
commercial broadcasting, but it recurred with a new vigour in the early 1990s.
The BBC, unsure how to play its cards in the period of debate and
discussion about its own future in the run-up to the renewal of its charter and
licence in 1996, appeared at first to contemplate a strategy of vacating the
centre and withdrawing to the cultural high ground, leaving popular
programming to the commercial sector (BBC, 1992). This would have been a
folly indeed, and it was soon modified. Even so, in its most recent mission
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statement, the BBC acknowledges the difficulties in the "quality versus
popularity" debate (BBC, 1995: 25).
The struggle for the centre ground—an inevitable consequence of any
competitive system—will continue. It is right and proper that nationally
networked television services should have, as a core concern, the production of
popular, entertaining programmes. Equally, it is proper for a public service
broadcaster to have to balance this commitment against other commitments to
the national audience—especially the preservation of a genuinely diverse, wideranging mix of programme material in channel output.
Public Service Broadcasting and Multiculturalism
Pluralism was the word used in the mid-1970s to catch and respond to the
changing nature of the times. Today, it is more accurately caught by
"multiculturalism." It is a new kind of "identity" politics whose struggle is not so
much against the market or the state as against prevailing social attitudes that
marginalize particular groups by denying, refusing, or failing to recognize their
claims to identity as women, as non-white, as gay, etc. Charles Taylor has
called it "the politics of recognition". Multiculturalism poses the question as to
whether the notion of a shared national culture is any longer meaningful. Can
the BBC, for instance, continue to summon up notions of the British people and
a British way of life in any meaningful way?
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III.2

PROGRAM CONTENT

GERMANY

“German Broadcast Regulation: A Model for a New First Amendment?,” by
*
Uli Widmaier, 1998

Content Regulation of Private Broadcasting
In its 1991 decision, the Constitutional Court upheld a state law that defined the
substantive parameters for private broadcasters in the state of NorthrhineWestphalia. These provisions are interesting and worthy of full citation. The
government-created list of values that must be honored by private broadcasters
constitutes an official espousal of a certain perspective on what is desirable for
society and democracy. By ruling that the following provisions regulating private
broadcasting in Northrhine-Westphalia were constitutional, the Court essentially
endorsed a governmentally created ethics of human interaction:
§ 11. Programming Mission.
[Broadcast is] a medium of and factor in the process of the free
formation of opinion and thus is of concern to the general public; in this way
broadcasters fulfill a public function. Broadcast programs . . . must contribute to
comprehensive information and free individual and public opinion formation.
Broadcast programs must serve education, counseling, and entertainment; they
must fulfill the cultural task of broadcast. Every broadcast channel must devote
attention to public events in Northrhine-Westphalia.

*

footnotes omitted
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§ 12. Basic Tenets of Programming.
(1) All broadcast programs must conform to the constitutional order.
The provisions of the general laws and the laws for the protection of personal
honor must be respected.
(2) Broadcast programs must respect the dignity of the human being.
They ought to contribute to a strengthening of the respect for life, liberty,
physical inviolateness, and the faith and opinion of others. The moral and
religious convictions of the population, as well as marriage and family, must be
respected. Broadcast programs ought to foster understanding among nations,
they ought to admonish people to pursue peace and social justice, they ought to
defend the democratic freedoms, they ought to contribute to equality between
men and women, they ought to be committed to the truth. No broadcast
program may take into account only one-sided and isolated opinions. No
broadcast program may serve, in a one-sided fashion, one party, one group,
one interest, one denomination, or one world view.
(3) In fulfilling its mission, every station's overall offering must express
the diversity of opinions as broadly and completely as possible. The significant
political, ideological, and social forces and groups must be represented in every
station's overall offering. Every station's overall offering must provide
appropriate time for the treatment of controversial themes of general
significance.
(4) Informational programs must respect recognized journalistic
principles. News must be general, independent, and rational. Before they are
aired, news programs must be checked concerning their content, origin, and
truth, as far as the circumstances allow. Commentaries must be separated from
the news in a clear fashion, and they must be labeled as such, giving the name
of their authors.
These legislative enactments are more than politically correct
sermonizing. The state makes decisions as to what values should be espoused
on all private broadcasting; competing or conflicting standpoints are explicitly
excluded and outlawed. Section 12(2) is a dramatic infringement on editorial
freedom and an attempt by the state to control the messages of a whole
medium. What is surprising about this list of demands is not its general tenor—

96

Public Service Broadcasting in Transition: A Documentary Reader

its labored inoffensiveness in favor of freedom, democracy, objectivity, truth,
diversity, and family values—but its specificity. Private broadcasters must
respect human dignity, the ethical and religious convictions of others, and the
institutions of marriage and family. They must contribute to international
understanding and to equal rights between men and women. They may not run
a single program that espouses only one viewpoint.
But what about those who do not respect marriage, family, and the
religious convictions of the majority, viewing an appeal to these institutions and
beliefs to be ideological warfare on their non-traditional lifestyles? Those who
find the expression "social justice" to be an emotional rallying cry of "bleedingheart" liberals, a cry that may lead to ill-considered legislation with dangerous
unintended consequences and that must be kept in check by cool economic
reasoning? Those who believe that broadcasting extreme viewpoints grabs
people's attention and stimulates opponents to put forth their best arguments?
Those who seek radical political change and thus wish to challenge the
"constitutional order"? Thus, the gay activist, the hard-core libertarian, the
political commentator with a strongly partisan agenda, or the socialist is
systematically discriminated against in the name of liberal democratic
inclusiveness.
The law demands that broadcast programming be committed to
tolerance and respect for others, balance of viewpoint, and objectivity. Partiality
and one-sidedness are unlawful and, ultimately, unconstitutional. This plainly
creates the danger that broadcasters will avoid controversial programming and
prevent strongly one-sided views from being expressed on the air. After all, any
station that allows a program to take a strong stance on one side of an issue
might, by adversaries of that stance, be accused of failing to meet the legal
requirements of breadth, completeness, and balance. Perhaps in order to
forestall this problem, the law includes a requirement that controversial themes
be appropriately covered. But this provision calls only for "appropriate"
coverage of "controversial" topics of "general" interest, without defining these
terms. The controversy coverage requirement can thus be expected to be
virtually meaningless.
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THE UNITED KINGDOM

“ZAPPED: Why public service TV has to change,” Excerpts from a Speech
by Mark Thompson, director of BBC Television, at the Banff festival in
*
June 2000

The Explosion of Choice
Greater choice, which many public broadcasters argued was unnecessary or
even against the public interest, is being seized by viewers with enthusiasm and
appreciation. We've done some research in Britain in the past few weeks,
looking at the way in which viewers consume digital television, and in particular,
how they use the EPG, the electronic programme guide. We spent time in
people's homes, talking to them about how they used television now and
watching them navigate their EPGs. And the basic finding is that most of them
either like it or love it. They feel it puts them—not the broadcaster—in control.
As one man said to us: 'it's in a totally different league, so far apart it's
unbelievable'. And, although many families still turn to the terrestrial channels
for blockbuster programmes—the big soaps like Eastenders or Coronation
Street or other favourite programmes from comedies like dinnerladies to some
of our new lifestyle/entertainment hybrids like Groundforce—we came across
quite a few households who are excluding terrestrial TV altogether.
We're also beginning to see early audience research about TiVO, the
first home storage device to market in the US. Again, this is a technology, which
puts viewers in charge of their own viewing. As you may know, TiVO enables
viewers to record up to 30 hours of TV on a hard disk, presenting the recorded
programmes again on an EPG. You can command the box to record your
favourite shows automatically; you can skip commercials; you can even 'pause'
a live baseball or soccer game. Within a few weeks of getting the box, many of
the admittedly small number of households studied so far were watching the
majority of their television off the box rather than off the air. We think that a

*

Online [August 2001] Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/info/news/news245.htm.
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significant number are now not watching off-air at all. And the users report that
they are now enjoying TV more than they used to.
So what do developments like the EPG and home storage mean for
public service broadcasters? I think they radicalise many of the issues that have
been brewing for years.
In the first decades of choice and competition, I suspect that many
public broadcasters thought that the impact of commercial competition was
going to be limited to crude audience numbers. Yes, the public service channels
would lose share, but because commercial broadcasters were bound to go for
lowest common denominator programming, there was a good chance that much
of the public service remit could remain almost unchanged: there would still be
a need for all those kinds of programmes which realistically the market would
never provide; as well as the need to serve all those audiences who wouldn't be
satisfied by one-size-fits-all mass market television.
But of course, as the universe of commercial TV expanded, it diversified
and segmented. In Britain on ITV, soap commercials gave way to car adverts,
and suddenly ITV started commissioning large numbers of the programmes that
the buyers of Rovers and Volvos wanted to watch; high quality film dramas, for
example, which had once been substantially the preserve of the BBC. All over
the world, channels began to target specific audiences: the young, so loved by
advertisers; older, documentary-watching men; ethnic minorities; and so on.
In fact, many public broadcasters have ridden the storm of competition
pretty well so far, particularly those like the BBC and the big German systems,
who enjoy substantial public funding. Public broadcasters with more limited
funding—PBS and I guess the CBC would both be examples—face difficult
choices even to maintain their existing niches. Perhaps the current debate
about the regional news in Canada is an example of that. But digital television
changes the argument for every public service broadcaster, no matter how
resilient.
Thinking the Unthinkable
Take the mixed schedule. The BBC has argued for many years that one of the
things that makes us different from our commercial competitors is the sheer
range of programmes in our schedule. Each year we report to Parliament how
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many different kinds of programmes we show on our main channels: this past
year, for example, we showed 14 different genres on BBC ONE and BBC TWO
in peak-time. Now, I believe that commissioning a truly broad range of
programmes, including less popular genres like the arts, music, religion, current
affairs, as well the popular ones, really is an article of faith for a public
broadcaster. The question is whether, in the world of the EPG and TiVO, it will
still make sense to place them all on a single channel. The whole point of the
EPG is to enable viewers to assemble their own mix. The channels and contentclusters which are likely to be most useful to them are ones, not necessarily
showing a single genre, but certainly with a pretty clear proposition or flavour:
clear strong colours, in other words, from which viewers can mix their own
palette. Now, I don't think it would be right (or possible) to move overnight from
our traditional mixed schedules into fully genre-based or attitudinally-focused
channels, but I believe that unless we start the journey soon, we risk becoming
irrelevant.
So we are looking hard at the shape of the two networks which are
seen by both analogue and digital viewers, BBC ONE and BBC TWO, as well
as at our newer digital channels, especially BBC CHOICE which we launched
as a younger-focused entertainment channel and BBC KNOWLEDGE which
was launched as a factual and learning channel.
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III. 3 STRUCTURE AND INDEPENDENCE

GERMANY

“The Regulation of Broadcasting,” by Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, 1997

The Supervision of Broadcasting
For the purpose of monitoring the legal requirements of the public broadcasters,
the broadcasting laws have provided for two special internal organs, the
Broadcasting Council (Rundfunkrat) and the Administrative Council
(Verwaltungsrat). The Broadcasting Council's main tasks are to ensure
pluralism by monitoring independence and diversity in programming; the
Administrative Council is to ensure that the administration and financial
management comply with the regulations. Since supervision is thus
accomplished "internally"—by an organ of the broadcaster itself—there is no
need for an additional "external" supervisory body for public broadcasting.
In spite of political affinities, public broadcasting is, on the whole,
marked by political balance and a relatively high degree of journalistic
independence. Proponents of political interests have a relatively insignificant
amount of influence on daily programming. Because the Broadcasting Council's
control over programming is restricted to exceptional cases, journalists are left
to orient their work according to their own professional and ethical values. At the
same time, however, even control measures that are limited to exceptional
cases have an effect on day-to-day work, since they help to define the zone of
"permissible" activities and thereby prompt or even provoke anticipatory
compliance. The government's supervisory competence helps to promote
informal respect for government interests, and influence generally tends to be
exercised in informal interactions.
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“German Broadcast Regulation: A Model for a New First Amendment?” by
*
Uli Widmaier, 1998
The following state law regulating the composition of a supervisory and
decision-making board that controls licensing and programming of private
broadcasters meets the Constitutional Court's requirements of guaranteeing a
fostering of the values of Article 5.1. The law provides:
§ 55.
Composition of the broadcast commission, time in office of its
members. The broadcast commission consists of 41 members. Women are to
be appropriately taken into account in the selection of members .... Eleven
members are elected by the state parliament ....Eighteen members are selected
from among the following organizations [one member from each category]:
1. Protestants,
2. Catholics,
3. Jews
4. and 5 members of various unions,
6. state employees,
7. employers,
8. manual workers and farmers,
9. professionals,
10. town and regional administrators,
11. people active in charities,
12. athletes,
13. consumers,
14. environmentalists,
15. young people,
16. homeland and folkloristic organizations,
17. the handicapped,
18. family or women's groups.
One member is selected from the resident aliens . . . . Eleven further
members are selected from the areas of publishing, culture, art and science, as
follows:
*

Footnotes omitted.
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1. a writer who is a member of the union for printing and paper,
2. a member of the broadcast-film union or of the organization of
theater actors,
3. a musician,
4. a journalist,
5. a film or broadcast entrepreneur,
6. a sculptor,
7. a person who works in higher education,
8. an education administrator,
9. a newspaper publisher,
10. a member of the German Society for Media Pedagogy and
Communication Culture,
11. someone active in public interest broadcasting or local
broadcasting.
The forty-one people selected under the law are responsible for
ensuring that all relevant political and social positions and groups are
appropriately represented in the overall programming of private broadcast. In
the process of upholding the law and accepting its strong focus on organized
interests, the Constitutional Court explained that the legislature used the
organizations named in the lists as proxies for representative social interests.
The members of these organizations are not supposed to act in a partisan
manner in favor of their specific organizations; rather, they are supposed to act
as guardians of the public interest who contribute their specific experiences
without engaging in interest politicking.
Northrhine-Westphalia's broadcast law was challenged in court. The
challenge issued from the political right, specifically, from Christian Democratic
(CDU/CSU) members of the German parliament. Among many other flaws the
CDU/CSU found in the law, the conservative plaintiffs challenged what they felt
was essentially an overrepresentation of liberal groups, in the contemporary
American sense, and a concomitant underrepresentation of conservative
groups. The plaintiffs claimed in particular that the total absence of
"Vertriebene" ("Expelled People") among the members of the broadcast
commission was evidently unconstitutional. These Vertriebene are ethnic
Germans, and their descendants, who lived in what was formerly Eastern
Prussia, Silesia, the Sudetenland, and similar territories and who, at the end of
World War II, fled from the advancing Red Army into what later became the
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Federal Republic of Germany. The Vertriebene were and are a powerful
conservative voice in German politics. Not many conservative politicians have
dared to affront this extremely vocal and well-connected group--which explains
its substantial influence on conservative policy in post-war (West) Germany.
At any rate, the state government of Northrhine-Westphalia did not
include the Vertriebene in its broadcast diversity list. Rejecting the conservative
plaintiffs' argument that the exclusion violated the diversity requirement under
the freedom of broadcast, as well as the equal protection provision of the Basic
Law (Article 3), the Constitutional Court stated:
The exclusion of the Vertriebene organizations in the broadcast
commission does not violate [the equal protection provision or
the freedom of broadcast]. Rather, the legislature was
permitted to assume that, 45 years after the end of the war, the
Vertriebene are integrated into the society of the Federal
Republic. Most of the Vertriebene are not distinguishable
anymore by their financial situation. Rather, they are distinct
from other social groups only by virtue of their geographic origin
and the cultural peculiarities associated therewith. With respect
to the second and third generation of Vertriebene, their
expulsion and loss of homeland recede, as a rule, into the
background to such a degree that there is no factual basis for
differentiating them [as a distinct group].

UNITED KINGDOM

“British Television,” by Jay G. Blumler,

*

Three organisations have been central in the governance of British television.
First, government responsibility for broadcasting is lodged with [Department of
Culture, Media and Sport, formerly] the Department of the National Heritage
(succeeding the Home Office in 1992, which had previously taken over from the
Postmaster General). This appoints the members of all regulatory bodies,
*

Online [August 2001] Available: http://www.mbcnet.org/ETV/B/htmlB/britishtelev/britishtelev.htm
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oversees policy development (sometimes jointly with the Department of Trade
and Industry), and initiates legislation and debates in Parliament.
Second, a Board of 12 Governors is required to direct the British
Broadcasting Corporation in the public interest. The BBC is a large organisation
of approximately 25,000 employees and a £2 billion annual income, the bulk of
which comes from a licence fee that is levied on every household with a
television set. Fixed by negotiation between the BBC and the government, the
level of the fee has broadly kept pace with the retail price index since the mid1980s. The BBC's obligations are outlined in a Charter and Agreement, the
present terms of which will run until 2006 (although BBC finance will be
reviewed in 2001). For the first time, these spell out in some detail both its
public service programming role and the Governors' supervisory duties as well
as authorising BBC involvement in commercial activities. The Governors
appoint the BBC Director-General and, in consultation with him, other members
of a Board of Management. Traditionally, Management decided most matters of
BBC policy and programming with the Governors serving more as a sounding
board and ultimate authorizer, commenting only after the fact on individual
broadcasts of which they approved or disapproved. From the 1970s, however,
the Governors became increasingly active and in the late 1980s were even a
spur for fundamental organisational reform.
Third, all advertising-financed television is under the jurisdiction of the
Independent Television Commission (known in previous incarnations as the
Independent Broadcasting Authority and the Independent Television Authority).
Its writ runs over Independent Television, a federal grouping of 15 regionallybased companies, plus companies of national news and breakfast television,
which jointly schedule the nationally networked portion of Channel 3; Channel 4,
a non-profit "publisher-broadcaster" (commissioning and scheduling but not
making programs), which is legally required to be innovative and to cater for
different interests and tastes from those served by Channel 3; Channel 5, a new
terrestrial service that will cover approximately two thirds of the country from
1997; and cable and satellite services originating in the U.K. The ITC will
eventually be responsible as well for any channels of digital terrestrial television
that may be introduced.
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The ITC's duties are set out in the Broadcasting Act of 1990 [now
superseded], and its 12 Members are appointed by the government. The main
tasks are to franchise the commercial television companies by a process of first
tendering for and then auctioning the licences and to enforce the licence
conditions thereafter. The act posits a "quality threshold", which all applying
companies must cross before being admitted to the auction itself, at which the
highest bidder would normally be the winner. Since 1993, when the new
Channel 3 licensees took over, the ITC has been a relatively resolute regulator,
holding the companies to their obligations (through directives, warnings and
fines as necessary) and annually reporting on their programming performance.
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III. 4 PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING AND PUBLIC
SERVICE OBLIGATIONS OF PRIVATE BROADCASTERS
Most discussions—in the post-Soviet era—have been about the transformation
of “state” broadcasters into public service broadcasters, with adequate funding
and structural immunity from direct political control. But there is another debate
as well: should private and commercial broadcasters have public service
obligations? More than that, what public service obligations require a national
broadcaster along BBC lines, and what public service obligations, if any, can be
distributed among private competitors?
In Germany, this question has been decided, consistently, by the
German Constitutional Court. In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, the
courts have had nothing to do with this issue, and it has been decided as a
matter of government policy, usually on the basis of the report of a distinguished
Commission.
GERMANY

“German Broadcast Regulation: A Model for a New First Amendment?,” by
*
Uli Widmaier, 1998
The [German Constitutional] Court mentioned three rationales that justified a
special treatment for broadcast. These three rationales were: (1) the potentially
dangerous power and influence of broadcast; (2) spectrum scarcity; and (3)
economic scarcity. Rationales two and three are lifted directly from the 1961
opinion; the Court does not elaborate on them any further. The first rationale,
concerning the dangerous power of broadcast, had not appeared in the earlier
decision. The Court used this argument aggressively for the purpose of
foreclosing any constitutional presumption in favor of a laissez-faire regime of
broadcast, holding that such a regime would be unconstitutional. Specifically,
the Court stated:
*

Footnotes omitted.
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Not least due to the developments of television technology,
broadcast has become one of the most powerful means of
communication, as well as one of the most powerful mass
media. Because of its far-reaching effects and potentials, as
well as because of the danger of misuse for the purpose of
exercising one-sided influence over public opinion, broadcast
cannot be given over to the free play of forces.
In 1981, the Court addressed broadcast issues for the third time in its
history. In that decision, the Constitutional Court held that private broadcasting
was in principle constitutional and thus opened the door for a subsequent
expansion of private, commercially financed television.
After the 1981 decision, freedom of broadcast shared few similarities
with the traditional freedom of the press, in terms of the right to be free from
government regulation and intrusion. Freedom of broadcast became a
subordinate interest in the service of a greater good, namely, helping the public
to form opinions:
The freedom of broadcast is primarily a freedom . . . in service
of the freedom of opinion formation. Under the conditions of
modern mass communication, the freedom of broadcast
constitutes a necessary supplementation and reinforcement of
the freedom of opinion formation; the freedom of broadcast
serves the task of guaranteeing free and comprehensive
opinion formation through broadcast.
The Court thus dismissed the libertarian approach and held that the
Basic Law required legislative supervision of broadcast. Explaining the new
doctrine, the Court briefly mentioned the classic interpretation of freedom of
expression as a guarantee of freedom from state interference, but then
explained why this interpretation cannot be controlling for broadcast:
The free individual and public formation of opinion by means of
broadcast demands first that broadcast be free from domination
and intrusion of the state. In this way, the freedom of broadcast,
like the classical libertarian rights, is defensive in its meaning.
However, the value to be pursued is not yet guaranteed by
freedom from state interference. Mere freedom from state
interference does by itself not mean that free and
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comprehensive opinion formation through broadcast becomes
possible; this task cannot be accomplished through a merely
negative constitutional structure. Rather, what is needed is a
positive order that ensures that the multiplicity of existing
opinions is expressed through broadcast in the greatest
possible breadth and completeness, and that thereby
comprehensive information is offered. In order to accomplish
this, substantive, organizational and procedural regulations are
necessary that are designed according to the task of the
freedom of broadcast and are therefore able to accomplish that
which Article 5.1 of the Basic Law is supposed to guarantee.
This passage sums up the Court's modern position on the issue of
freedom of broadcast. Laissez-faire is decisively rejected, state regulation is
embraced. The result is a highly complex and surprisingly intrusive
constitutional jurisprudence that necessitates an examination of the details of
state legislation to ensure that every facet of the legislation does indeed serve
public opinion formation.
In the next broadcast opinion, its fourth overall, the Court provided a
more elaborate articulation of the constitutionality of private broadcasting. While
affirming the constitutional permissibility of private broadcasting, the Court held
that, if a state legislature decides to allow private broadcasting, it must
sufficiently regulate the private broadcasters:
The legislature, however, is free to choose other structures as
long as it guarantees through appropriate regulations that the
totality of the domestic broadcast offerings in fact essentially
corresponds to the existing diversity of opinions. If the
legislature wishes to create and maintain freedom of broadcast
through external ("externally pluralistic") diversification, then
even this solution does not make the need to secure the
freedom through law and regulation superfluous.
In order for the lack of internal regulation of private broadcasters to be
constitutionally acceptable, the public broadcast stations must first guarantee a
so-called "basic service" of broadcasting. Basic service entails the "classic task"
of broadcast, consisting of its role in the formation of opinion and of political will,
but also going beyond entertainment and reporting of current affairs to include
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the "cultural responsibility" of broadcast. Basic service is that type of
programming that the private stations cannot deliver due to their market
orientation.
Once basic service is guaranteed, a legislature may relax its regulation
of private broadcasters. Relying, in a very limited fashion, on the diversification
among stations to provide the requisite breadth and plurality of opinions
constitutes somewhat of a departure from the Court's previous iron control over
all of broadcast and the Court's insistence on an a priori guarantee, through
legislation, of a constitutionally acceptable end result. The Court conceded that
its ruling constituted somewhat of a departure from its earlier holdings
concerning the unacceptability of any imbalances in private broadcasting. The
Court acknowledged, however, that a perfectly balanced broadcast offering is
neither achievable nor exactly definable. Given this built in indeterminacy, minor
and insignificant imbalances arising within private broadcasting are acceptable,
as long as the overall legislative regime is designed constantly to optimize
balance and pluralism. Thus, a legislature opting for the externally pluralistic
system must design a set of laws that allows the enforcement of a basic
standard of evenly balanced pluralism. As the Court emphasized in a 1991
decision, Article 5 is violated if this standard is not satisfactorily provided:
As a serving freedom, [the freedom of broadcast] is granted not
primarily in the interest of broadcasters, but rather in the
interest of free individual and public opinion formation. The
legislature is, therefore, under a duty to structure the broadcast
system in such a way as to guarantee that this goal is reached.
The Court continued:
The Basic Law does not prescribe models for the structure of
broadcast, but only a goal: the freedom of broadcast. Broadcast
must be able to fulfill its task of serving free individual and
public opinion formation. This task is independent of any
specific [organizational] model. Every from of broadcast
organization that makes the accomplishment of this task
possible is constitutional.
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The legislature may choose a broadcast model in which with the public
stations provide basic service, while the private stations operate under a less
stringent regulatory regime. The legislature, however, is not obligated to do so.
If it desires, the legislature can choose an internally pluralistic structure and
regulate all relevant features of each private broadcaster.
UNITED KINGDOM

Public Service Broadcasting and Regional Broadcasting
Vision for the Future, 2001
This is a Response to the Government White Paper, A New Future for
Communications (2001) by an NGO specially assembled for the commenting on
the government’s broadcasting policy.
1. Public Service Broadcasting in the New Communications Context
1.2 Public service broadcasting has been about the accessibility of
good quality broadcasting and ensuring universal access, maintaining diversity
and plurality and securing quality. Public service broadcasters must be willing to
deliver these qualities regardless of their commercial viability. The Peacock
Committee reported a consensus among public service broadcasters on the
duty to "inform, entertain and educate" and on the principle of geographical
universality.
1.3 However, there is grave doubt about the willingness of television
companies to continue to provide the present level of service in the areas of
public service broadcasting and regional broadcasting. Many producers have
concerns that the increasing market pressures will threaten quality public
service broadcasting. Existing regulatory bodies such as the Independent
Television Commission (ITC) have had difficulty in attempting to sustain even
light-touch regulation in the face of commercial pressure. This is in part because
some of the reasons that justify regulation in the past no longer exist, or are not
seen as desirable in the new era.
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1.4 Broadcasting is undergoing a profound revolution. Digital
technology now permits many more channels to be carried, both by traditional
terrestrial transmitters and by satellite. As technology surrounding the Internet
improves, moving pictures can be accessed via simple phone lines. The
distinction between radio, television and internet has become less clear. The
potential for change and greatly increased choice is now with us, but there
remains uncertainty as to what kind of change will result from the combination
of finance, technology, and consumer demand.
1.5 Digital technology has allowed the establishment of a plethora of
new channels, all competing for audience attention. Some would argue that
when technical restrictions are gone there will be opportunity for the market to
deliver what people want, unfettered by regulation. But these restrictions have
not yet gone. Most of the population, for reasons of availability, choice or cost,
or a combination of these, still receives only four or five channels via the
analogue terrestrial network of transmitters. When digital reception is a reality
for everyone, there are issues of competition to be addressed, for example the
commercial advantage of existing channels in having established themselves,
and the power of carriers, cable and satellite, who are also owners of individual
channels.
2. The White Paper
2.1 Amid this climate of change and uncertainty, the Government
published a White Paper in December 2000: A New Future for
Communications. For the first time, it is not a broadcasting white paper but a
communications white paper. It argues that: It is vital that government has a
clear policy framework for this rapidly developing sector, which will be so central
to our economy, democratic life, culture, entertainment and education. (1.1.23)
2.2 The Government in its White Paper makes the following general
points:
•
•
•

Our world is changing and communications are central to this change;
We want to ensure the widest possible access to a choice of diverse
communications and services of the highest quality;
We will make sure that people can continue to receive much-loved
broadcasting channels;
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•

We will strengthen the regional dimension to UK broadcasting and
continue to support the independent production sector, as well as
consider new plans for community media.

2.3 Because the boundaries of the broadcasting industry are not so
clearly defined as they once were there is a huge difference from the way most
of us have perceived broadcasting up until now. The framework for which the
White Paper argues would have very strict guidelines and be able to be
implemented. Thus rather than try to combine existing regulators the
Government proposes the radical measure of creating, as the White Paper puts
it:
a single regulatory body for the communications and media
industries—an Office of Communication (OFCOM)—which will
cover telecommunications, television and radio. Its remit will
cover both content and communications network. It will promote
competition and manage spectrum. (1.3.6) This new body,
however, will not cover the BBC who will still be regulated by a
Board of Governors, albeit with reduced power.
2.4 With the huge changes taking place and with the end of spectrum
scarcity, some people are suggesting that the end of public service
broadcasting is imminent, simply because of the competition in a vibrant
market. However the existing terrestrial channels have public service
obligations laid upon them in return for the privileges granted to them. In the
case of the BBC the privilege of the license fee and in the case of ITV, Channel
4 and 5 the limited spectrum available for transmission has limited the number
of channels. Although digital and cable and eventually the Internet will provide
opportunities for transmission of many more channels, these terrestrial
channels remain uniquely privileged in competitive terms in having access to
analogue spectrum. Therefore their public service obligations remain.
2.5 The White Paper insists that: Public service broadcasting will
continue to have a key role to play in the digital future, potentially an even more
important rule than it has now. However the way public service broadcasting is
regulated and delivered by the broadcasters will have to change to reflect the
new conditions in which they operate.
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2.6 The new structure of regulation, it is proposed, would allow
broadcasting to adapt quickly and efficiently to change, and clearly backs the
maintenance of the PSB statutory commitment for quality, variety and levels of
PSB. OFCOM is expected to ensure that it will be possible for all channels to
carry the entire range of public service broadcasting.
2.7 The White Paper assures us that: We will give OFCOM powers to
ensure that public service broadcasting channels are given due prominence on
devices such as electronic programme guides and that access to them is easy.
Accessibility to public service channels, however, is also vital. If the viewer
cannot access them easily they will not watch. The broadcasters may use this
as lack of public interest and in turn use this as an argument for dispensing with
them altogether. This accessibility includes the issue of the listings of public
service channels and whether this should be by genre as well as by channel.
These arrangements would refer to the channels already mentioned but [the
Government] will retain the right to add new public digital services to this list,
where we consider that these are essential for full social inclusion. (3.5.1)
2.8 The key elements, therefore, of the proposed regulatory framework
are:
•
•
•

to create a system which allows flexibility for public service
broadcasters
to maintain mixed, varied and high quality schedules, and
to ensure a level playing field for different broadcasters who have
different aims and objectives and funding sources.

The White Paper sees this mixture as a national treasure. By having a
mixture of publicly owned, publicly regulated and purely commercial
broadcasters, the UK has in many ways had the best of both worlds. The
competition from commercial broadcasters has been a spur to innovation and
serving consumers. The public service broadcasters have provided a guarantee
and benchmark of quality for the rest of the market, halting any slide towards
lowest common denominator content. That mixed ecology of broadcasting is
worth fostering, indeed is essential for the digital world. (5.3.12)
2.9 The White Paper retains a commitment: to ensuring that public
service TV channels are available to everyone, as now, free at the point of
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consumption, both before and after the switchover to digital television. Because
more than 99% of the population has access to most television channels, the
Government wants to maintain that kind of service and will work actively to
ensure that everyone has easy access, either free at the point of delivery or at
an affordable price. (3.2.1) […]
[…]
4.2 The White Paper promises that: We will maintain and extend
obligations to secure the carriage of public service channels over cable and
satellite. But perhaps it is more important to define what is meant by PSB. Do
cable and satellite providers mean the same as the Government does? This
issue will be especially important after the switchover to digital as many people
with digital will want all services through the set top box they have without
needing additional equipment for terrestrial signals. For this reason cable and
satellite operators will also deliver PSB.
4.3 Not only is the range of programmes available important, viewers
and listeners should have a choice of providers for these services. Digital
technology makes this plurality much easier and gives rise to competition
between providers. This, it is hoped, will encourage innovative investment
leading to the excellent delivery of services that society requires. However,
without a regulatory oversight, investment may only be made in the more
popular programmes and therefore the full diverse service, which we now enjoy
would not be available.
4.4 The Committee urges that a measure of public service should be a
channel's willingness to use as a criterion for scheduling not just ratings or
share but reach, for reach is about valuing the viewer. Factual, including
religious, programmes may not always achieve the ratings of a soap, but there
is clear evidence that their reach is significant. The audience will not be well
served if such programmes are squeezed to the margins of both budget and
schedule. In many ways the BBC World Service, to which there are to be no
changes in existing arrangements, is an excellent example of quality where
reach, rather than ratings, must be a measure of its success.
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4.5 While not being complacent about the future of public service
broadcasting, the fact remains that it has been a major and valued part of UK
broadcasting for all of broadcasting's life. Developments that have already
taken place with the multi-channel revolution have made improvements,
especially in the areas of films, sport and news. And PSB has proved thus far to
be the best way of making original UK programmes that people want to see.
The White Paper notes that the public service broadcasters still command
61.6% of the total audience in multi-channel homes and 70% in peak time.
4.6 These programmes are the basis of much of the programming for
digital channels, as these television and radio programmes are what
economists call "public goods". Once a programme has been completed extra
copies are virtually free and with access virtually free at the point of use, the
programme can be repeated many times without increasing cost. The public
interest is best served and access not restricted by continuing the practice of
everyone paying for television through advertising or the licence fee.
4.7 But if the economic argument holds good so does the democratic
one. Public Service Broadcasting ensures that the interests of all viewers are
taken into account and we should not tolerate a market that results in exclusion.
This means ensuring that the best programmes remain available to the
maximum number of people.
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III. 5 THE EXAMPLE OF CANADA
We turn briefly to Canada as a counterpoint to the British and German models.
We do so, as indicated, because of the special problems faced in Canada that
should be of relevance to transition societies. We emphasize, in these excerpts,
the significant problem of identifying the main characteristics of the public
service ideal and the structural and financial difficulties of maintaining it.
“The Hybridization of Public Broadcasting,” by Marc Raboy, 1997
All broadcasting in Canada, according to the Canadian Broadcasting Act, is
declared to be "a public service essential to the maintenance and enhancement
of national identity and cultural sovereignty" (Canada 1991: art. 3). By virtue of
this legislation, Canadian broadcasting is deemed to be a single system
comprising public, private and community elements. It is to be effectively owned
and controlled by Canadians (foreign ownership is restricted to 20 percent in
any single broadcasting undertaking), is to make maximum use of Canadian
creative and other resources, and is to serve the needs and interests and reflect
the circumstances and aspirations, of Canadian men, women and children.
These circumstances include equal rights, linguistic duality, the multicultural and
multiracial nature of Canadian society, as well as the special place of aboriginal
peoples within that society. In the event of conflicting interest between public
and private sector elements of the system, the objectives of the public sector
are supposed to prevail. Overseeing and implementing all of this is an
independent public authority for the regulation and supervision of the Canadian
broadcasting system, the CRTC.
But the gap between policy and practice is such that the promise of
public broadcasting in Canada has more often than not been a pious wish. The
history of Canadian broadcasting is intimately tied to the political sociology of
twentieth century Canada, and its present circumstances provide a suitable
snapshot of the cultural politics of a middle-sized liberal democracy with a
relatively developed economy as it faces the challenges of globalization in the
third millennium.
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Canadian broadcasting, from the 1930s through the 1950s, developed
as a "hybrid" of the commercial and public-service-monopoly systems, as
private commercial radio and national public radio evolved side by side.
Television was introduced first as a public monopoly and then, after 1960,
according to a similar "mixed" (public-private) model.
As the broadcasting system became more complex, and as it became
clear that different types of broadcasting enterprises had to co-exist within this
single system, a major change came with the introduction of an independent
agency for the regulation of all broadcasting activity. First introduced in 1958,
the role of the regulator became extremely important in the 1970s and 1980s,
as the system had to deal with new technologies as well as a range of
economic and political challenges. Today, it is known as the Canadian RadioTelevision and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), and is responsible,
as the name implies, for all telecommunication as well as broadcasting activity
in Canada. In 1995, its main concern was charting the new regulatory
requirements indicated by the convergence of broadcasting and
telecommunication technologies in the emergence of the new communication
environment popularly known as the information highway (CRTC 1995).
As a hybrid system, there are two ways to look at the developments in
Canadian broadcasting over the past fifteen years. On the one hand, there has
been a definite shift toward privatization of conventional public broadcasting, as
commercial and budgetary pressures on the CBC force it to adopt a posture
increasingly resembling that of the private sector, as its production activities are
farmed out to privately owned independent companies, and as public funding
which used to go to the CBC is diverted to subsidizing private broadcasters via
a broadcast program development fund (Telefilm Canada). On the other hand,
these developments can be seen as a "publicization" of the private sector,
insofar as that sector has become increasingly reliant on public funding and
public policy measures, not only through such mechanisms as the Telefilm fund,
but also various CRTC regulations and the protection afforded Canadian
cultural industries under the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Accord, the North
American Free Trade Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade.
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So, as the multichannel environment continues to expand, as the
relationship between audiovisual product and distribution system takes on a
new shape and form, and as the policy apparatus redefines its role under the
guise of adapting to the so-called information highway, the question of the
future of public broadcasting has to be properly repositioned.
The Broadcasting Act is not naive when it describes all of Canadian
broadcasting as a public service, but the system governed by the act has been
inconsistent and, at times, incoherent, in operationalizing that description. The
most striking example of this inconsistency is still the chasm between
Parliament's mandate to the CBC and the government's refusal to provide the
resources the CBC needs in order to do its job. But there are more. Community
broadcasting (in television) has as its only institutional base the obligation of
cable companies to provide a community access channel. Educational
broadcasting has become a viable complement to public and private
broadcasting in some parts of the country, in spite of the fact that its structure
has more to do with the bizarre peculiarities of the Canadian political system
than the public service requirements of broadcasting. The policy discourse
continues to emphasize access—the core element of any public service—but
concrete developments and innovations are increasingly tied to some variant of
the consumer model, where the quality of service is invariably tied to the ability
to pay.
“A Public Purpose” in Making our Voices Heard, Canada, Mandate Review
*
Committee, 1996
Parliament created the CBC, the National Film Board and Telefilm to give
Canadians a stronger voice in their own country. Since then, the world around
us has changed significantly, but this basic public purpose remains.
Today, a number of Canadian cultural industries, including broadcasting
and the independent production sector in television, are flourishing. Ironically,
the very success we have had in using public policy tools to create these
industries has led some to conclude that it is now time for governments to
*

Online [August 2001] Available:
http://www.canadianheritage.gc.ca/culture/brdcstng/pubs/juneau/Page-en.htm.
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withdraw and to let the marketplace take over—to compete on strictly
commercial terms for the hearts and minds of Canadians.
This is a dangerously wrongheaded conclusion: we still have a small
and fragmented audience bordering the world’s largest entertainment market;
we still have enormous difficulty financing indigenous film and television
production domestically; we still have a limited number of Canadian feature
films and Canadian dramas available for Canadian consumption; and we still
have fundamental problems communicating across 5,000 miles of scattered
population centres.
The facts speak for themselves. We own radio and television networks,
but in English Canada most of the stories available to us are American. We own
one of the most elaborate and sophisticated cable systems in the world. But
only about 14% of all the fiction it carries in English Canada is Canadian.
Almost all our film theatres are foreign owned, and about 95% of the films
shown in English or in French are foreign. Most of the large film distribution
companies operating in Canada are under American control, and they earn 85%
of all the revenue from distribution to movie theatres. We have developed a
feature film and television production industry, but a good deal of its product is
created specifically for the American market, without reflecting a Canadian
reality.
The bottom line is that the vast majority of all the entertainment offered
on Canadian television and theatre screens is American and this is unlikely to
change. Many Americans are worried about what television and radio offer to
them and to their children. At least their programming does not originate in a
foreign country.
A major public policy question facing Canadians today is how to ensure
that the communications systems of the near future, particularly the information
highway, meet Canadian goals and not become what American radio
threatened to be for Canada in the thirties.
We must ask ourselves realistically where the content provided on the
information highway will come from. It will not come from the technology itself,
that is from the hardware. It was always clear that regulatory systems by
themselves would not be sufficient to stimulate the production of sufficient
Canadian content for our needs in both languages. We think, as indeed does
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the Canadian Content and Culture Working Group, that regulatory systems are
still needed. But these will still be insufficient. Creative, productive institutions,
whose mission is serving the social and cultural needs of Canadian citizens, will
be more indispensable than ever.
We need Canadian programs and films to enable our citizens to
understand one another, to develop a national and community consciousness,
to help us shape our own solutions to social and political problems, and to
inspire the imagination of our children and express their hopes.
The issues facing Canada today—issues of civic understanding, of
tolerance and acceptance, of diverse cultural development, of national pride
and confidence, and of our reputation in the world—are only exacerbated if so
many of our entertainment and cultural products are either imported from other
countries, or imitate another country’s stories and formats for commercial
reasons.
A stable democracy presupposes respect and understanding, a sharing
of views and a common political language. Citizens need to appreciate one
another and to enjoy what they have in common. They need to join in shared
celebration of heroes and accomplishments, and to accept and respect the
differences that exist. Understanding and tolerance are basic values that
societies must work on constantly; they are not given. Like liberty, they are a
prize that must be won by constant effort.
Our national cultural institutions, like those of most western
democracies, are also based on a long standing recognition and belief in
freedom of expression. No social understanding can endure and develop
without expression, which is free of commercial or political constraints. The
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, the National Film Board, and Telefilm, and
others like the Canada Council, have been symbols of a well-established
national policy, and of a respect for freedom of expression and unfettered
commentary. This approach has been based on the profound conviction that it
is the wisest policy in the long run. It represents such a force that it is worth
putting up with the risk that some may abuse it. This is one of the most
important virtues that a country can take pride in.
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Canada, “Broadcasting Act”, article 3., Excerpt from Canada’s
*
Broadcasting Act, Statutes of Canada, Chapter B-9.01 [1991, c.11]

Broadcasting Policy for Canada
[Declaration]
3.
(1). It is hereby declared as the broadcasting policy for Canada that
(a). the Canadian broadcasting system shall be effectively
owned and controlled by Canadians;
(b). the Canadian broadcasting system, operating primarily in
the English and French languages and comprising public,
private and community elements, makes use of radio
frequencies that are public property and provides, through
its programming, a public service essential to the
maintenance and enhancement of national identity and
cultural sovereignty;
(c). English and French language broadcasting, while sharing
common aspects, operate under different conditions and
may have different requirements;
(d). the Canadian broadcasting system should
(i). serve to safeguard, enrich and strengthen the
cultural, political, social and economic fabric of
Canada,
(ii). encourage the development of Canadian
expression by providing a wide range of
programming that reflects Canadian attitudes,
opinions, ideas, values and artistic creativity,
by displaying Canadian talent in entertainment
programming and by offering information and
analysis concerning Canada and other
countries from a Canadian point of view,
(iii). through its programming and the employment
opportunities arising out of its operations, serve
the needs and interests, and reflect the
circumstances and aspirations, of Canadian
men, women and children, including equal
rights, the linguistic duality and multicultural
*

Online [August 2001] Available: http://www.crtc.gc.ca/ENG/LEGAL/BROAD.HTM.

122

Public Service Broadcasting in Transition: A Documentary Reader

(e).
(f).

(g).
(h).
(i).

(j).

and multiracial nature of Canadian society and
the special place of aboriginal peoples within
that society, and
(iv). be readily adaptable to scientific and
technological change;
each element of the Canadian broadcasting system shall
contribute in an appropriate manner to the creation and
presentation of Canadian programming;
each broadcasting undertaking shall make maximum use,
and in no case less than predominant use, of Canadian
creative and other resources in the creation and
presentation of programming, unless the nature of the
service provided by the undertaking, such as specialized
content or format or the use of languages other than
French and English, renders that use impracticable, in
which case the undertaking shall make the greatest
practicable use of those resources;
the programming originated by broadcasting undertakings
should be of high standard;
all persons who are licensed to carry on broadcasting
undertakings have a responsibility for the programs they
broadcast;
the programming provided by the Canadian broadcasting
system should
(i). be varied and comprehensive, providing a
balance of information, enlightenment and
entertainment for men, women and children of
all ages, interests and tastes,
(ii). be drawn from local, regional, national and
international sources,
(iii). include educational and community programs,
(iv). provide a reasonable opportunity for the public
to be exposed to the expression of differing
views on matters of public concern, and
(v). include a significant contribution from the
Canadian independent production sector;
educational programming, particularly where provided
through the facilities of an independent educational
authority, is an integral part of the Canadian broadcasting
system;
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(k). a range of broadcasting services in English and in French
shall be extended to all Canadians as resources become
available;
(l). the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, as the national
public broadcaster, should provide radio and television
services incorporating a wide range of programming that
informs, enlightens and entertains;
(m).the programming provided by the Corporation should
(i). be predominantly and distinctively Canadian,
(ii). reflect Canada and its regions to national and
regional audiences, while serving the special
needs of those regions,
(iii). actively contribute to the flow and exchange of
cultural expression,
(iv). be in English and in French, reflecting the
different needs and circumstances of each
official language community, including the
particular needs and circumstances of English
and French linguistic minorities,
(v). strive to be of equivalent quality in English and
in French,
(vi). contribute to shared national consciousness
and identity,
(vii). be made available throughout Canada by the
most appropriate and efficient means and as
resources become available for the purpose,
and
(viii). reflect the multicultural and multiracial nature
of Canada;
(n). where any conflict arises between the objectives of the
Corporation set out in paragraphs (l) and (m) and the
interests of any other broadcasting undertaking of the
Canadian broadcasting system, it shall be resolved in the
public interest, and where the public interest would be
equally served by resolving the conflict in favour of either, it
shall be resolved in favour of the objectives set out in
paragraphs (l) and (m);
(o). programming that reflects the aboriginal cultures of Canada
should be provided within the Canadian broadcasting
system as resources become available for the purpose;
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(p). programming accessible by disabled persons should be
provided within the Canadian broadcasting system as
resources become available for the purpose;
(q). without limiting any obligation of a broadcasting
undertaking to provide the programming contemplated by
paragraph (i), alternative television programming services
in English and in French should be provided where
necessary to ensure that the full range of programming
contemplated by that paragraph is made available through
the Canadian broadcasting system;
(r). the programming provided by alternative television
programming services should
(i). be innovative and be complementary to the
programming provided for mass audiences,
(ii). cater to tastes and interests not adequately
provided for by the programming provided for
mass audiences, and include programming
devoted to culture and the arts,
(iii). reflect Canada's regions and multicultural
nature,
(iv). as far as possible, be acquired rather than
produced by those services, and
(v). be made available throughout Canada by the
most cost-efficient means;
(s). private networks and programming undertakings should, to
an extent consistent with the financial and other resources
available to them,
(i). contribute significantly to the creation and
presentation of Canadian programming, and
(ii). be responsive to the evolving demands of the
public; and
(t). distribution undertakings
(i). should give priority to the carriage of Canadian
programming services and, in particular, to the
carriage of local Canadian stations,
(ii). should
provide
efficient
delivery
of
programming at affordable rates, using the
most effective technologies available at
reasonable cost,
(iii). should, where programming services are
supplied to them by broadcasting undertakings
pursuant to contractual arrangements, provide
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reasonable terms for the carriage, packaging
and retailing of those programming services,
and
(iv). may, where the Commission considers it
appropriate, originate programming, including
local programming, on such terms as are
conducive to the achievement of the objectives
of the broadcasting policy set out in this
subsection, and in particular provide access for
underserved linguistic and cultural minority
communities.
[Further declaration]
(2) It is further declared that the Canadian broadcasting system
constitutes a single system and that the objectives of the broadcasting policy
set out in subsection (1) can best be achieved by providing for the regulation
and supervision of the Canadian broadcasting system by a single independent
public authority.
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C HAPTER IV
T R A N S F O R M AT I O N S ,
TRANSITIONS, AND PUBLIC
SERVICE BROADCASTING
In this chapter, we turn specifically to several of the transition states to examine
some of the complexities of shifts from state broadcasting to public service
broadcasting. In reading these materials, one must ask what is the difference
between public service broadcasting in countries that have long democratic
traditions, and those where democracy is not yet established or more recently
achieved? It is easy to hold models up for admiration without recognizing the
conditions that underlie their existence. Public service broadcasting efforts in
transition societies have, in many ways, a much tougher set of tasks to
accomplish than do many of their counterparts. In a moment, virtually of
creation, they are called upon to perform a set of miracles: pulling society
together, helping establish community and democratic principles, assisting in
ensuring peace. Yet, in these very transition societies, public service
broadcasting organizations face a larger number of barriers: greater political
interference, a non-working economy (which makes the funding debate more
complicated), and historical and social traditions in which to root enterprises that
often differ from those that have developed over time in Western Europe.
Each transition state has had its own specific difficulties in making the
shift from highly controlled state broadcasting to autonomous and civil-society
oriented public service broadcasting. Starting with snapshots of these difficulties
of transition, we then turn to a small case study in statute drafting. The case
study involves Croatia, and the interplay between statute drafting at home and
review or scrutiny by the Council of Europe or other similar institutions. Not
enough is written about this now-frequent dialogue between those struggling to
define institutions within a transition and the model-builders or statutory experts
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brought from outside. The familiar areas of concern, structure, management,
and independence of funding here arise again.
We turn next to the phenomenon of “media wars,” a too common
aspect of the post-Soviet transitions. The intensity of these media wars—usually
between political parties or between branches of government—underscores the
importance of media (and public service broadcasting) in transitions. Different
versions existed in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Ukraine, Russia, almost
everywhere. We include excerpts here from the media battles in Hungary and
the Czech Republic to suggest the kinds of obstacles and political shifts that
developed.
Finally, in this chapter, we present short accounts of the evolution of
public service broadcasting in Poland, Uzbekistan, and Bosnia and
Herzegovina. In these accounts, we look at the relationship between democratic
society and free and independent broadcasting as well as a relatively new
modality: the use of public service broadcasting as part of peacekeeping.
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IV. 1 WHAT PROSPECTS FOR PUBLIC SERVICE
BROADCASTING IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
In this essay, The Enemy Within: Unexpected Barriers to the Development of
Public Service Broadcasting, by Karol Jakubowicz, Ph.D., the author examined
the problems of transformed roles that journalists faced as they moved from one
political system to another. His point may well be that for all the emphasis on
statutes and structures, deep political attitudes mean that the difficulties in
reaching a public service goal can be quite substantial even if all the proper
laws and appointment practices are in place. Jakubowicz draws examples from
the early days in many of the transitions when journalists were being weaned
from one system of operation to another. It is possible that the efforts to provide
training and development for a new generation of journalists has yielded a
greater commitment to modern professional standards.
“The Enemy Within: Unexpected Barriers to the Development of Public
Service Broadcasting” by Karol Jakubowicz, 1996

Creation of a broadcasting system capable of implementing “public service
requirements” as defined by the Council of Europe and of safeguarding its
impartiality and independence against political interference naturally requires
that its managers and staff share those values. That, in turn, requires in Central
and Eastern Europe a redefinition of journalism from advocacy, propagandaoriented to impartial-reporter or watchdog function, an autonomous professional
group serving the public and not the authorities or the owners of the media. That
has proved much more difficult than once expected because of the intense
politicization of the media and society. Many journalists regard freedom of
speech as freedom to express their own views or biases, or continue to define
themselves as "guardians" or "leaders" of society, called upon (by virtue of their
superior access to information and understanding of the situation) to be in the
forefront of political developments. The view of journalism as politics conducted by
other means dies hard.
[…]
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Another reason, to be found especially in less prosperous countries, is
the dire financial straits the media and journalists often find themselves in:
The circumstances, which prevail in Ukrainian media, and the
general economic situation in Ukraine as a whole, render the
widespread commercialization of editorial space likely.
Journalists are not highly paid, and their editors-in-chief face
enormous financial difficulties in running their media outlets; in
the printed press, for instance, the shortage of paper, inflation,
prohibitive newsprint prices, sharply falling circulation, and
requirement of advance payment for distribution and the small
advertising market are all factors which undermine the ability of
the media to be properly independent (‘The Ukrainian
Elections: A Monitoring Report’, 1994: 13).
[…]
The press system emerging in Central and Eastern Europe can be
described as a “pluralistic system of party-oriented newspapers”, with particular
newspapers committed to promoting a set of political interests or views. This
lends substance to Splichal's (1994) view that instead of media autonomy and
differentiation, what Central and Eastern Europe has so far seen is, by and
large, "Italianization of the media", i.e. development of a media system
traditionally associated with Italy, in which (i) the media are under strong state
control; (ii) the degree of media partisanship is strong; (iii) there is a strong
degree of integration of media and political elites; (and (iv) there is no
consolidated and shared professional ethic among media practitioners.
These tendencies are clearly visible also in public service broadcasting
in many Central and Eastern European countries. Even where, as in Poland,
there are effective guarantees of independence and outside interference, which
might disrupt impartiality is excluded, the political orientation and ambitions of
the management of some public service broadcasters lead to subordinating
programming to the pursuit of political goals.
On the other hand, continued political involvement of the media and
journalists personally slows down their professionalization and maintains a
situation in which journalists are unable to separate their political views from
their profession. This is a heritage of the past both in the "old guard" of
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journalists once employed by official media and in the "new guard" of those
once writing for dissident, underground media (who could be described as fitting
the Leninist definition of "journalists as mass propagandists, agitators an
organizers" even more than the other group).
[…]
Thus, many journalists regard freedom of speech as freedom to
express their own views or biases, or continue to define themselves as
"guardians" or "leaders" of society, called upon (by virtue of their superior
access to information and understanding of the situation) to be in the forefront
of political developments. The view of journalism as politics conducted by other
means dies hard.
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IV. 2 Variations in Appointment Processes to Regulatory
Boards and Management Bodies
Whatever the political difficulties, the processes that exist for appointment and
compelling resignation from key bodies remain important. Professor
Jakubowicz, in his writings, has made an effort to systematize the study of
public service broadcasting and broadcasting regulation generally. Here we
include two tables (from the essay above) that try to capture the techniques and
combinations that lead to greater or lesser degrees of control. The purpose of
our inclusion of the tables is to suggest a range of issues involving the structure
of regulatory bodies that arise from the appointment and dismissal process of
board members and management. Statutes change with surprising rapidity:
each state must be analysed for current approaches. Still, the very nature of
these processes is important because it was an instrumental part of the “media
wars” described later in this chapter.
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TABLE 1
Appointment of Governing/Supervisory Bodies of State/Public
Broadcasters
Government

1. Armenia
2. Bulgaria
3. Croatia
4. Czech Rep.
5. Estonia
6. Georgia
7. Hungary
8. Latvia
9. Lithuania
10. Macedonia
11. Poland
12. Romania
13. Russia
14. Slovakia
15. Slovenia
16. Ukraine

Parliament President

Regulatory
Auth.

Other

Yes
Does not apply (no such body is envisaged)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
1 member

8 members
Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes

-

-
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TABLE 2
Appointment of Top Management of Public/State Broadcaster
Government

1. Armenia
2. Bulgaria
3. Croatia
4. Czech Rep.
5. Estonia
6. Georgia
7. Hungary
8. Latvia
9. Lithuania
10. Macedonia
11. Poland
12. Russia
13. Romania
14. Slovak Rep.
15. Slovenia
16. Ukraine

Parliament President

Regulatory
Authority

Supervisory
Board

Yes
Yes
Yes
Appoints

Nominates
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Appoints

Nominates

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Appoints
Confirms

Nominates
Appoints
Yes
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IV. 3

Statutory Drafting and Review: the Croatian Example

We continue with a set of materials about statute drafting in Croatia. Throughout
the region, there have been episodes of law-creation, followed, often, by
periods of criticism and then trial and error in implementation. This section is
about HRT (Hrvatska Radiotelevizija), formerly a classic state broadcaster, its
content directly controlled by the government. For elements of democracy to
evolve, HRT had to change, structurally and, particularly in terms of its
relationship to government. In the period from 1999 to 2001, the Croatian
government, which itself underwent political change during the drafting,
organized several evolving drafts on structure and financing. Outside experts
from the Council of Europe and from a wide variety of sources, expressed their
views on the wisdom of the statutory solutions. At times, these views provoked
strong reactions from Croatian government officials. We, here, present excerpts
from the debate.
Report of the Council of Europe Expert Mission on the Draft Law
on HRT, Zagreb, Croatia, 26–27 June 2000
I.

Major Issues Raised by the Revision of the Law on HRT

A.

As to the Independence of HRT

The consultants welcomed the fact that the Croatian authorities intended to
transform HRT into a genuine independent public service broadcasting
organisation, in line with the relevant Council of Europe instruments (Resolution
on the future of public service broadcasting adopted at the 4th European
Ministerial Conference on Mass Media Policy and Recommendation No. R (96)
10 of the Committee of Ministers on the guarantee of the independence of
public service broadcasting) and the recommendations made in the course of
previous Council of Europe expert missions on the Law on HRT.
This being said, they noted that the draft was not entirely satisfactory on
the question of the independence of HRT as a number of provisions could give
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rise to political interference with its operation. While appreciating that there is no
infallible method for securing the independence of public service broadcasters,
they recalled that a number of minimum measures should be taken in order to
avoid such interference. In this respect, they reiterated their previous
recommendation that members of Government and Parliament should not be
allowed to become members not only of the HRT Board of Management but
also of the HRT Council.
Against this background, the experts noted that the first alternative
wording of Article 15 was more satisfactory than the second since, unlike the
latter, it would prevent not only State officials but also Parliamentarians from
becoming members of the HRT Council. This being said, it was suggested that
the term "State officials" should be replaced with "public officials", as the latter
term would be broader and encompass all types of persons holding public
functions, at both the national and local levels.
Furthermore, the consultants stressed that the possibility to replace the
members of the HRT Council and/or the Director of HRT before the expiry of
their normal term of office should be possible only in exceptional cases which
should be clearly and narrowly defined in the Law, so as to avoid the risk that
such power be misused on political grounds.
As regards the management organs of HRT, the consultants expressed
concern about the fact that the draft Law included too many structures which
would be involved in the operation of HRT (the Director, the Board of
Management and the Chief programme managers), as this might give rise to
conflicts of competence and diverging views which would run counter to the
need for effective management, and in particular rapid action or reaction vis-avis competing broadcasters from both within and outside Croatia.
As regards chief programme managers, concerns were in particular
expressed about the fact that, under Articles 26 and 27, they would be
responsible for deciding on the content of the programmes, as this decisionmaking power might run counter to the editorial policy as well as the business
and financial strategy defined by the Director. In this respect, it was noted that
possible conflicts between the chief programme managers and the Director of
HRT were to a certain extent already anticipated by the insertion of paragraph 2
in Article 26. It was recommended that, in order to avoid such conflicts, the
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question of the powers entrusted to chief programme managers be seriously
reconsidered.
Along the same lines, the consultants expressed serious doubts
concerning the role of the Board of Management vis-a-vis the Director, since
according to the second indent of Article 21, the Director of HRT would have the
power to "propose to the HRT Council the appointment and dismissal of the
members of the Board of Management". They underlined that, as a result of this
provision, the Board of Management would be completely under the control of
the Director and, therefore, would lose both its utility and credibility as a
management organ.
B.

As to the Financing of HRT

The consultants disagreed with the principle that, under Article 24, paragraph 1,
4th indent of the draft Law, the Board of Management of HRT would determine
the level of the licence fee to be paid by the public. They underlined that a
system whereby the management organs of HRT would decide on the level of
the resources which they would then spend would not be conducive to costeffective management, as they would not be required to make any efforts
towards that objective.
Against this background, they recommended that the decision-making
power concerning licence fee revenues should be entrusted to a body or
organisation which would be independent not only from HRT, in order to avoid
the above problem, but also from public authorities, in order to prevent any risk
of political interference (cf. Chapter A above).
It was suggested that such decision-making power could be entrusted
with the Telecommunications Council, provided its independence would be
adequately secured under the Telecommunications Act. Alternatively, an
independent committee comprised of experts specialising in audiovisual,
financial and accounting matters could be appointed with the task of
determining the level of the licence fee.
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Prime Minister Račan's Press Conference, February 5th 2001
The critical views of “outside experts” are often matched by opposition from
within. Often expertise is ignored or politely acknowledged. In the case of
Croatia, the Prime Minister expressed some regret for the comments of the
Council of Europe delegation. The process of criticism and comment resulted in
acceptance of many of the experts’ suggestions.
I can say that I believe that the law that will be adopted will be to a great
extent in line with these expectations and standards (existing in Europe and the
European Union), so as far as the selection of the Council or the body that
selects the management of the television and radio service. In this respect,
there will be no shortage of democracy in Croatia. You know that in all these
countries these bodies are selected by kings, presidents, parliaments and
governments, and sometimes not even parliaments but parliamentary
committees and so on. We are nevertheless committed to bringing into these
bodies representatives of interest groups in Croatia, especially if we adopt the
provision for 16 associations that have to provide representatives to the
Council.
I believe that Parliament will not pass a provision that states that the
licence fee for radio and television should be determined every year. I never
supported this idea. You know how budgetary debates are carried on, and this
could then lead to a variable situation. I am in favour of having a public radio
and television licence fee determined as a percentage of the average income in
Croatia. I think that the amendment proposes 1.5 per cent. If this is adopted,
then this objection is resolved (concerning the discretionary allocation of
finances for public radio and television on an annual basis, which I also think is
a valid objection)."
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Draft Law on Croatian Radio and Television (HRT), Zagreb, 11 May 2000
(Sections Dealing with Establishment of the HRT Council)
Article 14.
1. The HRT Council is established in order to ensure the influence of the
general public on radio and television programmes.
2. The HRT Council shall comprise 15 members.
3. Members of the HRT Council may be persons who are dedicated to
upholding the principles contained in Chapter II of this Law.
4. When electing members to the HRT Council, care must be taken to
ensure representation by sex, age and social standing.
Article 15.
1. Members of the HRT Council are appointed by the House of
Representative of the Croatian State Sabor on the basis of a public
competition conducted by the Committee for selection and
appointments of the House of Representative of the Croatian State
Sabor.
2. Representatives in the Croatian State Sabor, or state officials, cannot
become members of the HRT Council.
3. Employees of HRT cannot be appointed members of the HRT Council.
4. Persons employed by, or performing any kind of activity in, rival
companies, i.e. companies engaged in radio and television activates, or
who are members of their management or supervisory boards, or who
perform roles the performance of which could lead to a conflict of
interests, may not become members of the HRT Council.
Alternative to item 1) and 2).
1. Members of the HRT Council are appointed by the House of
Representatives of the Croatian State Sabor, by a two-thirds majority
vote of all representatives, at the recommendation of the Committee for
selections and appointments of the House of Representatives of the
Croatian State Sabor.
Competence of the HRT Council
Article 16.
The HRT Council performs the following:
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•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•

definition, in accordance with programming obligations and the
programming orientation of radio and television programmes, and
supervision of its implementation and assessment of its realisation;
gives consent to the proposal of a financial and business plan, as well
as its opinion on the annual report on HRT business operations;
gives consent to the level of radio and television licences, benefits and
modes of payment;
appoints and removes from office the HRT Director, following a public
competition in the case of appointment;
appoints and removes from office, at the recommendation of the HRT
Director, members of the Management Board;
appoints and removes from office, at the recommendation of the HRT
Director and based on the obtained opinion of the profession
(Programming Board), editors-in-chief of information programmes,
following a public competition in the case of appointment;
reconciles disputes between the HRT Management Board and the
Editor-in-Chief related to the production and broadcasting of
programmes;
submits regular reports on operations, at least once a year, to the
House of Representatives of the Croatian State Sabor.

Work of the HRT Council
Article 17.
1. The HRT Council operates publicly.
2. The HRT Council elects and removes the Council President.
3. The mandate of the President and of HRT Council members shall be
four years.
4. Exceptionally, the mandate of eight members of the first HRT Council
shall last for two years, with seven Council members being appointed
every second year.
5. The manner in which the HRT Council operates is defined by the Rules
of Procedure.
Article 18.
1. The HRT Council establishes the Programming Boards with a view to
ensuring effective monitoring and supervision of individual programmes.
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2. Tasks and method of operation of the Programming Boards are defined
in the Decision on the formation of the Boards, and in the Rules of
Procedure.
Law on Croatian Radio and Television (HRT), Zagreb, 26 February 2001
(Final)
Article 16.
(1) The HRT Council shall represent and protect the interests of the television
and radio public in terms of the production and supervision of the programme.
(2) The HRT Council shall have 25 members.
Article 17.
(1) One member each shall be appointed into the HRT Council, by:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Croatian Academy of Science and Arts,
Association of Universities,
Central Croatian Cultural and Publishing Society,
Croatian Emigration Institute,
Croatian Writers' Guild,
Croatian Journalists' Association,
Croatian Olympics Committee,
national minorities in the Republic of Croatia,
Catholic Church in the Republic of Croatia,
other religious communities in the Republic of Croatia,
trade union associations,
employers' associations,
film professional associations,
drama professional associations,
fine arts professional associations,
musical professional associations,
associations from the Homeland War,
pensioners' associations,
civil and ecological initiatives,
associations of consumers
youth associations,
peasants' associations.
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(2) The associations as per Paragraph 1 of this Article shall appoint their
representatives into the HRT Council pursuant to the procedure stipulated by
law and their statutes for the election of members of their management bodies.
(3) The Minister of Culture shall, upon the previously obtained opinion of the
Minister of Justice, Administration and Local Self-government, establish the
procedure, manner of election and appointment of representatives in the HRT
Council, who are appointed by two or more associations, by his decision.
(4) Three members from among the respectable non-party public officials shall
be appointed into the HRT Council by the Speaker of the Croatian Parliament,
with previously obtained opinion of a competent working body of the House of
Representatives, by the Prime Minister and by the President of the Republic of
Croatia.
(5) The HRT Council shall initiate the procedure of appointing the members of
the HRT Council by addressing a public invitation at least three months prior to
the expiration of mandate, compile the list of the appointed members, and
forward it to the Minister of Culture. The Minister of Culture shall by a decision
establish that the procedure of appointing the members of the HRT Council was
conducted in compliance with this Law.
(6) New members of the HRT Council must be appointed until the expiration of
the mandate of the HRT Council members from the prior composition.
(7) HRT Council shall be considered constituted once two thirds of the total
number of the HRT Council members have been appointed.
(8) The candidates for the HRT Council shall be respectable public officials,
who have distinguished themselves in the public life by advocating respect of
democratic principles and the rule of law, the construction and improvement of
the highest values of the constitutional system of the Republic of Croatia set
forth by the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, defense of human rights and
freedoms, as well as protection of freedom of expression.
(9) The members of the HRT Council may not be representatives in the
Croatian Parliament, nor other state officials.
(10) HRT employees may not be appointed to the HRT Council.
(11) The members of the HRT Council may not be the persons employed or
performing any other activity in rival firms, i.e. the firms performing the activity of
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radio and television broadcasting, the members of their management or
supervisory boards, or performing the tasks which could cause a conflict of
interests.
Article 18.
Mandate of a member of the HRT Council may cease before the expiration of
the term to which he was appointed:
•
•
•
•
•
•

at his own request,
by submitting the resignation,
by ceasing of the membership in the association that appointed him,
by revoking the association or leader of the state power body that
appointed him,
should he, by his work, severely, or on several occasions, violate the
law and other regulations, which refer to the work and performance of
activity of the HRT public institution,
in other cases stipulated by law and the Statute.
Article 19.

(1) The HRT Council shall:
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

in accordance with the programme obligations propose, approve,
monitor, evaluate and supervise the programme orientation of the radio
and television channels;
give prior opinion to the HRT Board of Management on appointing and
relieving of duty of the Director of HRT,
appoint and relieve of duty the Chief Programme Manager of the
Croatian Radio and Chief Programme Manager of the Croatian
Television, on the basis of public tenders, with prior consent of the HRT
Board of Management,
appoint and relieve of duty programme managers, upon the proposal of
the Chief Programme Manager,
give its prior opinion on the proposal of the financial and business plan,
give its prior opinion on the HRT Statute,
give its prior opinion on the Rule Book on Labour,
give its prior opinion on other general acts regulating the programme
issues,
establish the conditions and procedure for appointing the HRT Council
members, in accordance with the law and the Statute,
adopt the Standing Orders on its work,
perform other tasks in accordance with the law and the Statute.
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(2) The HRT Council shall regularly, and at least once a year, submit a report
on its work and implementation of the programme orientations of radio and
television channels to the House of Representatives of the Croatian Parliament.
(3) The HRT Council shall at least once a year inform the public on the
implementation of the programme orientations of radio and television channels.
Article 20.
(1) The work of the HRT Council shall be public.
(2) The HRT Council shall elect and recall the Chairman of the Council.
(3) The Chairman and the members of the HRT Council shall have a four-year
mandate.
Article 21.
(1) The HRT Council may establish Programme Councils as advisory bodies for
the purpose of monitoring and improving particular programmes.
(2) The tasks and manner of work of the Programme Councils shall be
established by the Decision on Establishment and the Standing Orders on the
HRT Council's work.

144

Public Service Broadcasting in Transition: A Documentary Reader

IV. 4 “MEDIA WARS”

IV. 4. 1 HUNGARY AND THE CONFLICT
OVER THE GOVERNING BOARD
Hungary, though advancing rapidly in the post-Soviet transition, has had its
share of “media wars,” a condition of intense infighting over control of the media
by the political parties. In an earlier stage, these conflicts involved the power of
the President of Hungary to appoint or remove the head of Hungarian
Television. In the excerpts which follow, based on a report of the International
Federation of Journalists, another, more recent episode is traced, involving the
composition of the ORTT, the National Radio and Television Board, and the
stalemate among political parties in appointing members to it.
As background, a news account in May, 2001 stated the following:
“Hungary's state-owned television is staring at a very clouded picture of late:
viewers deserting en masse, multi-million dollar losses, charges of political bias,
and to top it off a fraud investigation. Magyar Televizio (MTV) has been
struggling ever since 1996 when Hungary liberalised its media sector, allowing
two national commercial channels and a host of cable broadcasters to suck
away its audience. In five years the broadcaster has had nine presidents and its
viewing figures plunged to below 10 percent of national audience even at prime
time viewing slots… Even its spokesman admits the situation is dire. MTV "is in
a difficult situation," Ferenc Koeszegi said, "primarily due to the debts it piled up
over the past years." Before 1996 the state broadcaster had a monopoly on
terrestrial television, and a virtual monopoly overall, complemented by a satellite
state TV station set up in 1992 to serve ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring
countries. But after the arrival of private competitors it suffered hugely, hit both
by the commercial programming of the new broadcasters and its loss of
credibility as viewers realized its pro-government political bias compared to
private rivals.” (Eszter Szamado, Agence France Presse, May 25,2001).
The excerpt below comes from a report of a team sent by the IFJ, the
International Federation of Journalists, a non-government organization that has
been active in improving the status of journalism and the press in transition
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societies. This report deals with a long-standing debate over political control of
the Regulatory Board and charges that the government was controlling the
process of appointments through a problematic reading of the law.
Public Broadcasting in Hungary: Television on the Brink, Report of IFJ
*
Mission to Hungary, February 2001
István Szijártó, the Acting President of Hungarian Radio, was pessimistic about
the possibility of selection of a new President, given that there was no harmony
between the government-dominated presidium of the board and other trustees
elected from civil society groups. He said a new board of civil members would
st
be elected on April 1 by a lottery. If no new President were in place, the current
management would stay in place until then. As he had sensed, the political
deadlock at the top meant no new President was elected in March.
Within the leadership of the Radio station there is strong support for
revision of the media law in order to replace and reformulate the organisation of
Hungarian Radio and to bring order into its financial arrangements. The service
was hamstrung by limits on its activities—only 6 per cent of time is allowed for
advertising compared to around 15 per cent of time in the rest of Western
Europe, for instance.
… the independence of programme editors is an “increasingly difficult
issue” for the radio. The introduction of commercial broadcasting has led to a
severe “brain drain” of talent from the public stations. There is an urgent need
for training of new people. “In God’s truth we don’t know who to turn to in order
to have good supply of people”, said Szijártó. He said that money would have to
be spent on establishing a training unit to produce five to ten students a year for
the Radio service.
The management keeps out of editorial affairs leaving what is said, in
what format, and responsibility to correct mistakes to the editorial managers.
The management admitted there is no protective professional umbrella to
guarantee journalists’ rights, but said that feedback from employees suggested
the situation was not bad.

*

Online [August 2001] Available: http://www.ifj.org/publications/mission/hung.doc
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The Radio service does not, unsurprisingly, favour the creation of a
single audiovisual public broadcasting structure; the profound crisis in
Hungarian Television would almost certainly mean that radio would “lose out”.
The President of the Radio Board of Trustees Károly Szadai shared this
approach and stressed the nature of the deep professional crisis as a result of a
failure to generate new norms that are accepted in Western Europe. The radio
service was stronger than television and there was no wish to sell off real estate
as in television.
The management admits that there is no clear strategy for radio and
television in the country although there is a desperate need for rejuvenation of
the public service ideals in broadcasting and the modernization of equipment,
updating of programming and strengthening the skills and professional quality of
staff.
“The profession is in crisis and we need to start a debate for the future,”
said Szadai. “We must not let the political difficulties interfere with our mission.
In my view the business must let the political side lose when it comes to
controlling how we work.”
At Hungarian Television, the beleaguered President Lázlo Zsolt Szabó,
whose demise had been demanded, or predicted, by almost everyone the
mission talked to, was removed from office a few days after the visit.
He had risen to the President’s job at breathless pace: joining the
Television is 1993 as an economist and progressing rapidly through the ranks
from reporter, to financial and technical director, chief editor and finally, in May
1999 reaching the high office of acting President. The creation of truncated
boards of trustees had made his job “quite impossible”, he said.
The crisis in television was partly due to the inadequacies of the Media
Law, which had laid down rules about advertising revenue at a time when
Hungarian Television was still dominant in the market and did not consider the
impact of introducing two other terrestrial broadcasters in 1997. By 1998 public
television revenues had dropped considerably.
Of the Television’s 18.2 Billion Forints debt at the end of the previous
year, the government had written off 9.5 billion. Losses over previous years
were heavy—8.2 Billion Forints in 1998, 8.6 billion Forints in 1999, 9.12 Billion
Forints in 2000—a total deficit of around 26 billion Forints. The deficit was
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building up at the rate of around 25 million Forints a day (more than 80,000
US$).
The new competition from the private sector had also led to a dramatic
loss of audience. At the same time Hungarian Television lost talented people to
new competitors, which meant that inevitably “variable programmes would be
made”. At the same time, the management laid off 1,200 members of the
workforce—40 per cent of full time staff. Many of these people were reemployed on a freelance basis and were among those complaining that they
had not been paid for months. These were people that produce the content for
the vast majority of Hungarian Television programmes.
A plan to redevelop the existing television headquarters—by selling off
the site, renovating the property and paying rent in the future—would bring in
much needed cash in the short term. This would be used to pay the staff.
Lajos Bakó insisted that the Media Law, which does not empower the
board of trustees to manage the financial affairs or distribution of property
effectively, aggravates the problems of management of the Hungarian
Television. “The board of trustees cannot act like a normal company,” he said.
Amendments to the law are needed urgently, said Szabó, but that
requires a two-thirds majority in Parliament and at a political level there is
paralysis. The responsibility for a lack of progress in dealing with the television
crisis rested with politicians.
There had to be a new system of financing that tied the licence fee to a
percentage of the country’s gross domestic product and that avoided
government control of the purse strings. “If we want government to pay out of its
budget that will put the independence of the institution in peril”, he said. In fact,
the Government has been covering debts in recent years.
It was not surprising then, that according to a survey of consumers
public television is seen in people’s eyes as more representative of the
government side in its news and information coverage although the
management said that political coverage was roughly equal between
government and opposition.
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IFJ Conclusions and Recommendations
1. The mission believes that Hungarian public broadcasting, and public
television in particular, has been weakened to the point of destruction
because of political manipulation and willful neglect by the responsible
authorities.
2. The evidence of government interference in media affairs since 1998 is
compelling. We conclude that there has been a circle of improper political
influence, which threatens freedom of expression in Hungary.
3. We confirm that there has been a marked deterioration in quality of news
programmes at Hungarian Television and a perception of government
influence over content that has undoubtedly contributed to a catastrophic
collapse in public and professional confidence.
4. This perception has been reinforced by the failure of the Parliament and the
Government to resolve the crisis of unbalanced political management of the
public service radio and television system. It is intolerable and unacceptable
that the Government has exercised control over public television for two
years. There is, we believe, no place for politicians in the formal
administration of public broadcasting.
5. In the face of enormous debts Hungarian Television has been subject to
crisis management and severe cutbacks, including draconian cuts in
staffing and the disposal of vital property and technical assets. While
commercial rivals have taken advantage of a liberalised broadcasting
market, no steps have been taken to protect and enhance the special and
particular role of public service television in democratic society.
6. The journalists and other media staff at Hungarian Broadcasting have been
treated with contempt by management that has cynically delayed payments
of salary and fees, creating hardship and intolerable pressures on staff and
their families. The workforce has been driven to take strike action to secure
their rights.
7. The authorities have failed to provide any strategic vision or practical
programme to secure the future of public broadcasting. Instead, there has
been a drifting, aimless management, supervised by a complacent political
process.
8. Government complacency over the crisis at Hungarian Television is
symptomatic of failure to recognise the importance of public service media
in democratic society and demonstrates a deplorable lack of respect for the
need to uphold the principles of truth and impartiality in public broadcasting.
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This is contrary to the aspirations of Hungarian people and to the Hungarian
constitution.
9. In sum, the mission concludes that the actions of the governing coalition
call into question Hungary’s commitment to the basic principles of genuinely
independent public service broadcasting. As a result there is widespread
cynicism within Hungary over political interference in media and concern
abroad that is profoundly damaging to the reputation of Hungary. We
believe that current negotiations over Hungarian accession to the European
Union dealing with cultural and media matters are jeopardised by the crisis
in broadcasting.
10. The mission welcomes the revival of professional solidarity among
journalists and supports initiatives from unions and professional
associations and some political parties for urgent and radical reform of the
broadcasting landscape to end the current crisis.
11. Noting that some journalists have compromised themselves by serving the
interests of their political friends, we believe it is vital, if lasting reform of
broadcasting in the public sector is to succeed, that all media professionals
defend journalistic independence and resist political contamination of their
work.
12. The mission concludes that professionalism in the work of journalists is the
best defence of media from political interference and believes more support
should be given on all sides in Hungary to efforts by journalists to improve
levels of ethical conduct and to secure editorial independence.
Recommendations:
•

•

•

That the system of political appointments to the Boards of Trustees of
public media and the Commission of Radio and Television must be
abolished as soon as possible. It should be replaced by the introduction
of structures based wholly on civil society representation to ensure the
widest possible range of social interests and opinions;
That current political domination of “incomplete” Board of Trustees by
the Government must be ended forthwith. Interim structures should be
put in place while rules for a new system of administration are
formulated;
That a complete and urgent review of the public broadcasting system
should be carried out in order to:
• Ensure that public broadcasting in Hungary meets the
minimum standards for public service systems in Europe as
recommended by the Council of Europe (See Appendix Three).
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•
•
•
•
•

•

Establish new mechanisms, legal and otherwise, that will
eliminate pressure on public service media by political groups;
Review financing and funding arrangements for public
broadcasting and create appropriate levels of investment in
public service media in line with other countries of Europe;
Institute rules for transparency and accountability in financial
administration of public broadcasting;
Elaborate principles for internal pluralism and editorial
independence for journalists and media professionals.
That the IFJ Executive Committee should protest strongly to the
Government of Hungary, to the European Union and to the
Council of Europe about the current media crisis and the
mistreatment of journalists.
That the IFJ should seek urgently commitments from the
Hungarian authorities to
o

Defend public broadcasting

o

Prohibit interference in the work of media

o

Support systems of self-regulation in media

Put in place legal protection of the employment rights of
journalists and other media staff
That the IFJ should give its full support to journalists and media
staff within Hungary who are striving to resist political
interference. In particular, the IFJ should strengthen efforts to
promote professionalism by the journalists’ associations and
unions through projects to support self-regulation and training
of journalists.
That the IFJ Executive Committee, recognising the appalling
social conditions and treatment of journalists and media staff in
Hungarian broadcasting, should demand urgent reforms in the
structure of industrial relations to ensure that:
o

•

•

a)

There is full consultation with staff prior to changes
in employment or working conditions

b)

•

All contractual obligations by the management are
met promptly and that payments due to all staff, both
fully employed and freelance, are made immediately.
Finally, given the problems in Hungary and noting recent events in the
Czech Republic and Bulgaria, the IFJ and the European Federation of
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Journalists should launch a regional-wide initiative to strengthen
commitment to public broadcasting and professionalism in media.
IV. 4. 2 THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND THE
GOVERNANCE OF CT (CZECH TELEVISION)
The danger of politicisation of Czech Television through the appointment
process of its head has been a persistent problem, erupting, in late 2000 in a
much-noted strike by employees that gained international attention and caused
a change in the mode of selection, and had a domino-effect in the region,
including, at the least, Bulgaria and Hungary and fears that it would spread to
Poland. Again, we turn to an evaluation by the International Federation of
Journalists.
Striking News: Czech Television and the Struggle for Public Broadcasting,
Report of IFJ Mission to Czech Republic,
*
January 2001

Findings and Conclusions
1. The origins of this confrontation are themselves a matter of dispute.
Some argue that this was party-political wrangling with three distinct
players—on one side the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) led by Vaclav
Klaus, notoriously engaged in a privatisation project and reputedly
influencing events behind the scenes, on the other the so-called
4Coalition, a grouping of centre-right parties, led by the Freedom Union
and supported by President Vaclav Havel. In this scenario, the
Governing Social Democratic Party led by Prime Minister Milos Zeman
stood in the middle and, according to some commentators, was
1
“desperately split”.
2. On the other hand, the strikers themselves and their trade union, had
no doubt that while politicians wrestled for the moral high ground and
party advantage, their struggle was rooted in the country’s failure to
create a genuinely public service system of broadcasting. Their
demands—a new law and system of appointing the broadcasting
*

Online [July 2001] Available: http://www.ifj.org/publications/mission/czreport.doc. Footnotes
omitted.
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3.

4.

5.

6.

7.
8.

9.

administration, a full and transparent audit of financial affairs, and an
end to political interference in the Czech TV Council as its supervising
body—are a restatement of the fundamental principles of public
broadcasting.
To many journalists, and to the IFJ, this battle goes beyond local
political squabbling. It reflects a malaise widespread in the region: a
growing crisis of confidence in public media because, in spite of
superficial changes in rules, old-style interference by the political elite,
sustained by passivity on the part of journalists, continues to prevail.
The immediate origins of the strike lie in the nomination of a weak
Television Council, appointed through a process that was politically
flawed. Despite attempts by the TV Council to promote reform
(particularly in the financial administration of the station and its
newsroom operations) its actions lacked credibility and were interpreted
as politically motivated.
When it appeared that the General Director, Dusan Chmelicek, was not
going to carry out reforms, the Council dismissed him in the middle of
December 2000, initiating the chain of events that led to the crisis at the
station.
The flashpoint for the confrontation came with the Council’s
appointment of Jiri Hodac as his replacement. A so-called compromise
candidate, Hodac was already discredited within the station. His
appointment, made in extreme haste and in an increasingly badtempered political atmosphere, was subsequently repudiated by almost
all political groups, as well as by the majority of journalists, producers
and directors of the television system.
It is not evident that Hodac was politically compromised, although his
style of management had lost him many friends in the television
newsroom.
But his selection was so extraordinary and took place in such murky
circumstances that few were ready to believe it was anything other than
a political manoeuvre. In fact, it appears more likely that his
appointment and the circumstances surrounding it represent a
monumental error of judgement on the part of the Television Council.
The fact that he moved immediately to make appointments that were
themselves controversial—a former ODS adviser as News Director, and
a man criticised by the Prime Minister for involvement in a banking
scandal as Finance Director—only confirmed the strong feeling within
Czech TV that a political coup was in progress. The dismissal of 30
newsroom personnel by the new head of news came as a further
provocation.
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10. The criticism of the strikers that they compromised themselves because
of a close relationship with political supporters from the 4Coalition might
have carried more weight if there was evidence of any particular
political bias in their actions or demands. There was none.
11. Indeed, the strikers sought to appeal to the community at large and
their demands for a new law, for financial transparency and for editorial
independence are shared—in principle at least—by all political groups.
They made a stand on issues that struck a deep chord within Czech
society, raising awareness about quality and pluralism and the role of
media and tapping into a groundswell of public concern.
12. To suggest, as some have done, that the thousands who demonstrated
were manipulated by misinformation from politically-engaged journalists
and duped into taking to the streets is not sustainable. Whatever the
detail of political and editorial in fighting, the confrontation quickly
developed into a full-blown debate about the quality and reliability of
information. The comment by Jan Kavan, that the strike, the
demonstrations and the public debate they generated reflect not
weakness, but a maturing of Czech democracy, is well put.
13. The failure to carry out long-needed reforms in the political and financial
management of Czech TV and to promote confidence-building
measures to strengthen professionalism in journalism were undoubtedly
factors in creating the climate of intrigue and uncertainty that
undermined the Council’s work.
14. The debate over media privatisation added to the uncertain
atmosphere. While former Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus says he wants a
considered discussion, he may have contributed to fears that the ODS
objectives were firmly in place, namely the break up of the public media
system. A barely-concealed attack on the independence of Czech TV,
the fall-out from the Prorok affair and the former Premier’s capacity for
off-the-cuff speaking, which had him proposing the abolition of public
television in favour of privatization, may have added considerably to
public fears. However, there are few clean hands. Political forces on all
sides tried exploit the weakness of Czech TV for political advantage.
15. The Government was shaken by the possibility the strike could have a
serious effect on the country’s image abroad. Concerns expressed by
Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission, and statements
by leaders of the European Parliament and the Council of Europe,
added to fears that there were implications for European Union
membership.
16. Although Government leaders and politicians on all sides make a strong
defence of the country’s commitment to freedom of expression, the
status of the public media remains an important factor in estimating the
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quality of Czech democracy. The political consensus to improve the
standing of public broadcasting following events at Czech TV will be put
to the test in coming months, as the country prepares for national
elections next year.
17. The strike, which in all its important demands was swiftly won,
represents a significant turning point in the debate about the role of the
public media in the Czech Republic and, more importantly, about the
relationship between journalists and politicians.
18. The action of the journalists and media staff exposed how Czech TV
was vulnerable to political manipulation and poor management. It has
provided an opportunity for lasting reform. A political consensus now
exists to carry out reforms quickly. In particular, by eliminating direct
political involvement in the nomination of the supervising Council and
handing this over to civil society groups.
19. There is an overwhelming need for a wholesale review and overhaul of
Czech Television and its management. Such a review needs to take
place within a process of urgent structural change, including:
•

Rapid implementation of the new law for public television
and the creation of a transparent process for the nomination,
selection and Parliamentary confirmation of civil society
representatives to sit on the TV Council;
• Introduction of strict controls and a transparent and
accountable process of financial administration, including
openness in tendering and awarding of contracts and public
disclosure of such information;
• Introduction of structures for internal pluralism to assess
and strengthen quality of content, particularly in news and
current affairs, including the adoption of an editorial statute
guaranteeing editorial independence and allowing journalists
and other media professionals the right to act according to
conscience.
20. Internal structural change, no matter how well crafted will not be
enough. The political and professional culture that led to the crisis at
Czech TV arises from attitudes that are deeply-rooted in notions of
authority over and control of information that have no place in modern
democratic society.
21. A wider awareness raising campaign is required among politicians,
media professionals and within civil society to strengthen public
consciousness about the importance of pluralism in public information
services. The mandate for public television needs to be articulated in
clear and accessible terms so that citizens and consumers, staff and

155

Chapter IV

administrators, political and social partners can develop an
understanding of the imperatives of political independence and
professionalism.
22. There is also a need to promote wider understanding of the role of
journalists and the need for professional independence. The Syndicate
of Journalists has an important role to play, but its efforts to establish
wider respect for journalistic values needs stronger encouragement
from the authorities and less hostility from media organisations, many of
which foster unethical and unacceptable practices.
23. The challenge to journalists is to engage in professional and trade
union solidarity and to break with practices that undermine the
independence and plurality of information.
24. Journalists themselves should work together, in co-operation with the
Syndicate of Journalists, to establish mechanisms for monitoring public
broadcasting that will promote the highest quality and ethical
performance.
IFJ interview with Vaclav Klaus, Chairman of House of Deputies
and Leader of the Civic Democratic Party, January 2001
The IFJ conducted an interview with Vaclav Klaus, Chairman of House of
Deputies and Leader of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) as part of their
evaluation.
Mr Klaus began by insisting that the difficulties at Czech Television did not
reflect any problem related to the fundamental principles of freedom of
expression or political pluralism or democracy within the country.
He denied vigorously that his party or he himself had provoked the
crisis at the station. There was no dispute about the fundamental problems and
the need for reform but what had happened was the dramatic misuse of a
technical dispute.
He said groups like the 4Coalition—supported by President Havel—
who were preparing the ground for the parliamentary elections next year, were
manipulating the dispute. The crisis had been used to destabilise relations
between the ODS and the governing Social Democrats. “We did not
mastermind this confrontation,” he said.
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He denied any relationship with the TV Council, despite suggestions
that his party was influencing events behind the scenes. “I don’t know the
names of the Council members. The decisions of the Council are theirs and not
decisions of the ODS.”
He said that the appointment of Mr Hodac may have been a mistake—
“he is not the right person”, he said—but it was the decision of the Council
alone. He said that the Council may have been trying to solve the controversial
issue of who could lead the TV by appointing someone from outside the inner
circles of Czech political life and who had been absent from the country for
some years. In the event, it was a mistake, he said. “It was not organised by
us.”
He said that a compromise was necessary to solve the dispute and he
suggested that Hodac and some of the high profile people from his side and
some of the strike leaders should step down to allow a settlement to be agreed.
He was in favour of the new law being considered by the Parliament.
But then new problems would arise—how, for instance, to sift through
nominations from civil society groups, perhaps up to 10,000, for the positions on
the Governing Council of the new TV administration. In the end, he said, the
major parties in the parliament would probably have to agree on the distribution
of places. This would then have to be endorsed by the Parliament.
Reflecting on allegations of ODS interference and bias against the
television system, he said that he wanted to put on the record his objections to
this. He referred to the controversy over the dismissal of Roman Prorok, a wellknown chat show host where he had personally been accused of being
instrumental in his removal. He explained that he had been invited to attend a
round table debate with other political leaders, but he objected to this sort of
discussion being stage-managed by media. “It should be for us politicians to
decide when we meet and when we debate or it should happen when there is a
clear issue of public concern to discuss, in this case there was not,” he said. He
complained and refused the invitation to attend.
Nevertheless, he said, the TV maintained the format of the programme
and despite his protests they indicated that they intended to have an empty seat
in the studio designated for him. He had called the Director to complain
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because he was going to be out of the country. In the event he returned from
abroad and attended the show.
He had not intervened to press the management to discipline Prorok.
The decision to suspend the programme host was entirely their responsibility,
not his.
Mr Klaus was pressed on his declared preference for privatisation of the
broadcasting which had provoked suggestions that political influence was
directed towards creating instability and paving the way towards the break up of
the public broadcasting system and its distribution into private hands.
He said that it was absolutely valid to raise the debate about
privatisation. He said that some off the cuff remarks in reaction to the television
crisis should not be interpreted as reflecting only one fixed point of view. He
submitted a written statement that he hoped would clarify his position and the
position of his party.
IFJ interview with Helena Havlikova, Chief Executive, Council
of the Czech Republic for Radio and Television Broadcasting, January
2001
Another key part of the IFJ evaluation was an interview with Helena Havlikova,
Chief Executive, Council of the Czech Republic for Radio and Television
Broadcasting.
The Council is a state institution responsible for issuing licences and monitoring
content of broadcasting institutions in both the private and public sector. It was
established under Law 103 of 1992 and is responsible for the supervision of 238
licences and registrations currently in force.
Each of the state media institutions—the radio, television and news
agency—has its own council of administration, established by law, and
responsible for management of internal affairs, specifically the appointment of
General Director and budgetary matters. However, the Broadcasting Council
deals with complaints regarding content of all broadcast media and monitors
how all services meet their obligations under the licensing law.
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The Council has 13 members elected or removed by Parliament
“ensuring the representation of various opinion trends” (Section 3 of the
attached law, Appendix 3). This has meant that the Council is set up according
to the relative strength of political groups in Parliament. The same process of
selection is applied to the Councils that separately administer the Radio and
Television services.
The Council became involved in the Czech Television crisis almost from
the beginning and began an investigation into whether the Broadcasting Law
st
had been violated. On December 21 a letter was sent to the General Director
of Czech Television asking who was in control of broadcasting at the station. No
reply had been received.
The Council had met to discuss the crisis at Czech Television and had
found that the law had been violated. The General Manager had now been
instructed to respect the law and to ensure the continuation of broadcasting.
They were waiting for a response. If there were no compliance, the matter
would be taken to trial. The broadcasting Council took no position on the
appointment of the General Director at Czech Television, this being a matter for
the Czech Television Council. However, they were responsible for ensuring that
the Broadcasting Law of 1991 was properly respected.
The Council welcomed the draft proposals being considered by
Parliament that would introduce new principles for the selection of Council
representatives from wider civil society and not just according to streams of
political opinion.
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IV. 5 COUNTRY STUDIES:
POLAND AND UZBEKISTAN
We turn, now, to accounts of the role of public service broadcasting in transition
societies. These short excerpts are taken from a book: Media Reform:
Democratizing the Media, Democratizing the State, edited by Monroe E. Price,
Beata Rozumilowicz and Stefaan Verhulst (Routledge: 2002). The purpose of
the book was to ask this chicken-egg question: is a free and independent media
only possible in a democratic society or is a democratic society only possible if
there is a free and independent media. One can ask a similar question about
public service broadcasting: is an ideal public service broadcaster only possible
in a mature, democratic society or is a mature, democratic society only possible
if there is a strong public service broadcaster? In a sense, these essays are
about this question.
“Media in Transition: The Case of Poland,” by Karol Jakubowicz, in Media
*
Reform: Democratizing the Media, Democratizing the State, 2001
At the end of the 1990s, the 1992 Broadcasting Act was the major piece of
legislation regulating broadcasting in Poland. This law established the National
Broadcasting Council as the main regulatory authority. In consultation with the
prime minister, it was charged to formulate general state policy in the
broadcasting sector but remained effectively outside governmental structure.
The council was comprised of nine members who held six-year terms and
cannot be recalled. They directly elected their own chairman and were barred
from holding either political party office or parliamentary seats.
The Broadcasting Act determined the status of public broadcasters, the
licensing of commercial broadcasters, the programming obligations of public
and commercial broadcasters, advertising and sponsoring, registration of
retransmission of program services by cable operators, and the collection and
distribution of broadcasting fees.

*

Footnotes omitted.
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Licensing constituted a special administrative procedure based on the
Broadcasting Act and the administrative procedural code. The license
authorized program distribution as well as televised text communications. In the
licensing process, the council evaluated the type of proposed programming, the
applicant’s ability to make necessary investment, the share of the broadcaster’s
own programming in transmission time, and past observance of broadcasting
regulations. The council was obliged to examine the overall position of the
applicant within the mass media market, refusing the license if the applicant
holds a dominant position. This assessment was to include the press market
and programming production. The council also determined the licensee and the
conditions of the license. The president of the council issued the formal
licensing decision, which could be contested before the Supreme Administrative
Court.
Articles 15 and 18 of the Broadcasting Act determined content
requirements. The most significant, in 2000, was the domestic production quota,
which may not be lower than 30 percent of the annual transmission time
according to in Article 15.1. The exact amount of domestic production for
specific types of program services was determined by Broadcasting Council
Regulation of 22 September 1993. The quotas were differentiated and ranged
from 60 percent for nation-wide public television program services to 35 percent
for program services transmitted via cable or satellite. Other quotas impacted
independent producers. These stood at 10 percent of annual transmission time
and affected all broadcasters according to Article 15.2. Finally, the broadcasting
council, under authority of the Broadcasting Act, introduced a European
production quota.
The Act also stated, the broadcasting council chairman must register
retransmission of program services by cable systems if they meet formal
requirements determined by the Broadcasting Act and the council’s regulations
concerning registration procedures, model registers, and registration fees.
Under must-carry regulations, the cable operator was required to introduce the
program service in the following order: (1) national public program services (2)
regional public program services (3) commercial domestic program services
available in a given area (4) foreign broadcaster programming and domestic
programming not available in the area.
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The Broadcasting Act also made the following provisions for the
allocation of national broadcasting airtime. Under Article 21, public broadcasters
monitored appearances of political party representatives in their programming
and sought to preserve a rough balance corresponding to that particular party’s
performance in the previous elections. Under Article 22, the president, prime
minister, and speakers of the Sejm (Parliament) and Senat (Senate) could
request airtime for an occasional address to the general public. Via Article 23,
the National Broadcasting Council issued a regulation instructing public
broadcasters to air programs devoted to the discussion of current issues with
the participation of the main governing and opposition parties. Pursuant to
Article 24, public broadcasters were to allot free airtime to candidates in
presidential, general, or local government elections, under rules laid down in
acts of parliament. The State Electoral Commission supervised their
performance in this respect.
Licenses were granted under the act in Article 35 to Polish citizens or
legal persons resident in Poland. Companies with foreign shareholders could be
granted licenses if foreigners controlled less than 33 percent of opening capital
or stock in the company and the initial agreement or statutes of the company
specify the following: (a) Polish resident citizens constitute a majority of the
directorate and management boards of the company in question, and (b)
Foreign legal persons or persons controlled by them control less than 33
percent of votes in meetings of partners or in general meetings of shareholders.
In other words, outright foreign ownership and control of Polish broadcast media
was prohibited by law. Some stations did, however, have foreign co-owners, as
will be discussed in further detail below.
Nevertheless, given the size and commercial attractiveness of the
Polish broadcasting market, some television stations chose “delocalization,”
establishing themselves in other countries in order to evade the Polish
ownership restrictions and production quotas and take advantage of a more
liberal local broadcasting environment (for example, with regard to European
quotas). For example, Wizja TV established itself in the United Kingdom where,
among other things, it has not been obligated to comply with the European
quota. However, in the year 2000 Wizja TV applied for Polish licenses both as
the operator of a digital satellite platform and as the broadcaster of two original
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channels offered on this platform (Wizja 1 and Wizja Sport). This meant that it
had decided to subordinate itself to Polish jurisdiction and by all accounts
intended to move its operations to Poland.
Delocalization led to a debate in Poland over whether to raise the cap
on foreign capital involvement in anticipation of accession to the European
Union, when all limits to European capital have to be eliminated. Such a policy
may encourage “delocalized” broadcasters to relocate themselves in Poland.
For political reasons, however, such changes were rejected by parliament in
1998.
In autumn 1999, the government submitted another set of Broadcasting
Act amendments to parliament; again they proposed that caps on foreign capital
involvement be increased. The proposal was for the limit to be raised to 49
percent for terrestrial broadcasters and to 100 percent for satellite and cable
broadcasters. Some commentators believe that this is a direct result of lobbying
by Wizja TV, which operates both satellite channels and a large cable
operation. However, parliament rejected any changes, though it is aware that no
limits on foreign capital involvement can remain once Poland has joined the
European Union.
In terms of political infringements, if public broadcasters deviate from
political impartiality or neutrality, they do so either because of the political
leanings of particular program makers or because of the composition of their
governing bodies, and not because of direct outside political interference.
Nevertheless, certain problems did persist in the implementation of the
Broadcasting Act. In particular, successive Polish presidents and governments
have been loath to accept the independence of the National Broadcasting
Council or of a public service broadcaster, generally. Attempts have been made
to interfere in Television Poland (TVP) operations and to curtail its
independence.
In 1994, President Wałęsa dismissed the chairman and two other
members of the council for granting a national commercial television license to
an applicant he disfavored. The Constitutional Tribunal later ruled that the
president had acted without legal authorization. Consequently, the Broadcasting
Act was amended to provide for the direct election of the council chairman by its
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members, instead of by presidential appointment. Measures were also
introduced to prevent recall of council members.
Another instance of political interference occurred in January 2000
when the chairman and one of the Polish Radio board members were
dismissed. Both had been Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL) representatives who
apparently displeased their political masters. The party forged a coalition in the
supervisory board to have the two dismissed and replaced with other PSL
appointees. This coalition brought together representatives of the PSL, their
previous coalition partner, the Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD), and the
AWS. The rationale behind the AWS’s collusion lay in that party’s need for the
PSL’s support in promoting an AWS parliamentary candidate to a public post.
This deal was widely condemned as a political game of musical chairs with no
concern for the public interest.
The Ministry of Telecommunications and its agencies, which collaborate
with the National Broadcasting Council in the allocation of frequencies and in
determining technical aspects of station operations, too, have often delayed
procedures in order to complicate council operations. Since no legal mechanism
existed to control the National Broadcasting Council, governments made every
effort to marginalize it and to limit its influence.
The finance minister and later the state treasury minister have
occasionally dismissed supervisory board members or entire boards, even
though such actions are without legal basis. Since corporate law also governed
public service broadcasters, ministers have invoked its provisions to dismiss
members in spite of a constitutional tribunal ruling that members of these
supervisory boards should not be recalled during their 3-year terms.
Since 1997, the state treasury minister has tried to stop TVP from
entering the digital television field. The general meeting of shareholders has, for
example, passed a resolution instructing the management board not to
establish thematic digital channels. The management board, in turn, has taken
the matter to court, requesting that the resolution be dismissed.
Having no other recourse to influence TVP development or to alter its
governing bodies, the treasury minister has considered the possibility of
liquidation, with the appointment of a liquidator to run the state broadcaster. To
date, however, this action has not been taken.
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As the new century began, however, a new attempt by the government
to change TVP’s status and method of financing appeared possible. These
measures were ostensibly to depoliticize the broadcaster, but in reality they
served to weaken it. The plan, spelled out in draft amendments to the
Broadcasting Act prepared for the state treasury minister, called for ownership
rights to TVP and Radio Poland to be transferred to state universities, with
some shares also to be held by local government bodies and the ministry of
culture. The shareholders, the state treasury minister, the National Broadcasting
Council, and the employees would appoint members of the supervisory boards.
Board members would be appointed by the universities, with one person each
to be appointed by local government bodies and by the culture minister.
Under the proposal, one national channel would have been closed to
advertising, but would have been compensated by commercial television levies
that would be have been channeled into a fund used to commission or buy
programming for TVP in line with its public service mandate. After two years,
this programming would then become freely available to stations contributing to
the fund. The stations would also have been granted access to TVP’s archives.
The proposal, however, remains highly controversial.
Under the structure at the time of writing, public broadcasters were
financed from both license fee revenue and advertising. There were practically
no state subsidies for public service broadcasters, apart from funds earmarked
by the ministry of education for educational programming on the national
channels. Private broadcasters were financed entirely from advertising revenue.
Plans were being mooted that would involve state broadcasters as
shareholders in a new production company, Telewizja Familijna (Family
Television), which would operate a nation-wide Catholic television channel. The
company license was held by the Franciscan brotherhood, which previously
operated the local channel, Niepokalanów TV. Niepokalanów TV programming
was to be transformed into a satellite-to-cable channel and existing and future
terrestrial frequencies were to be taken over by Telewizja Familijna. This
process was to be financed by a number of state companies (from the copper,
oil, and power industries to the state insurance company) and two, as yet
undisclosed, foreign media corporations. One is reportedly European, the other
American.
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A former media adviser to the prime minister developed this project.
Given the significant role played by Radio Maryja in mobilizing support for the
right-wing AWS during the 1997 election, this project may also be interpreted
politically as a way of countering the perceived influence of TVP. When media
revealed this project, however, a number of state firms indicated uncertainty as
to whether they would indeed invest in the new station.
In addition to the domestic Broadcasting Act, there are a number of
international agreements and conventions which affected the audiovisual
sector, for example, the Europe Agreement establishing an association between
Poland and the European Community, the European Convention on
Transfrontier Television, and international copyright conventions.
The general parity of Polish broadcasting regulations with the European
Convention on Transfrontier Television resulted largely from the adoption and
implementation of the Broadcasting Act. Polish regulations also generally
comply with the requirements contained in the European Union’s Television
Without Frontiers Directive of 3 October 1989. A comparison of the main areas
of European and Polish broadcasting regulation indicates that only a few
domestic regulations need amendment to harmonize with European standards.
“Uzbekistan,” by Lutfulla Kabirov and Scott Smith, Media Reform:
*
Democratizing the Media, Democratizing the State, 2001
During the Soviet period, television reached nearly 100 percent of the
population and was an important tool for the formation of opinion and control of
information. Broadcast media continue to play an extensive role in the life of
Uzbek society. Watching television during the evening meal and into the night is
part of Uzbek culture. Since market economics have limited the operation of
print media and have reduced their impact, television and radio broadcasting
have continued to be important tools for state propaganda. Since the advent of
Uzbek independence in 1991, the state has controlled broadcasting media. In
1992, a state company for television and radio broadcasting was founded
through which the government has supervised the broadcasting media.

*
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In the last few years, as greater amount of information has reached
Uzbekistan from the West, and the content of Moscow programs transmitted
over Uzbek television has improved, the population has become increasingly
disappointed by the lack of quality programming and information relevant to
viewers. In response, the president issued a decree on 7 May 1996, “On the
Rise of the Role of Television and Radio in the Public Life of Uzbekistan.” With
this decree Uzbek television was transformed into a national television and
radio company, UzTeleRadio, and additional rights and creative possibilities
were delegated to it. The organizational structure of the television and radio
company is based on the eleven regional television companies, the radio
network and the “TeleFilm” studios.
According to this decree, UzTeleRadio was to become financially
independent from the state budget by 2000. No clear terms outlining
privatization or financial sustainability were established, and as a result the
company remained dependent on the state budget and control. By order of the
ministerial cabinet, an independent governing board of founders was to assume
control. The chairman of the television and radio company held the status of a
government minister and his deputies and political commentators were
appointed by a decree of the president. The company’s executives have all the
rights and privileges of high government officials, benefits which themselves
may cause these officials to adhere strictly to state policies. UzTeleRadio
remains largely funded from the state budget; nearly 60 percent of the funds
allocated are spent on hardware, and the company must earn the remaining 40
percent through advertising or other commercial activity. These resources are
then channeled into more creative purposes. Television programming is
transmitted over four channels: 1-National, 2-Youth, 3-Regional, and 4-Urban.
The total volume of programming across all four channels is sixty-four hours per
day. In-house production accounts for forty-nine of these hours.
The government has failed to move away from its totalitarian control
over television and radio broadcasting content and maintains the right to
regulate informational programming. The right to report political events in the
republic is granted to relatively few commentators. In Uzbekistan political
comments can only be made by specially appointed journalists and
commentators who have work experience and training in the central
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governmental bodies; from these positions they are deemed qualified to speak
on behalf of the government and assigned to TV. Journalists of state TV who do
not follow this career path are only allowed to read comments prepared by
governmental information agencies.
The freedom to political commentary faces certain important obstacles.
Across the common grid of television broadcasting, one channel that transmits
for 18 hours will broadcast informational programs in four blocks of thirty
minutes each for a total of two hours. These four blocks, however, are
absolutely identical. Within each of the informational blocks, the political events
are reduced to releases, which have been provided to the station by
governmental sources. Additional comments or the expression of political views
by the commentator are prohibited.
The structure of radio broadcasting mimics the organization of Uzbek
television. For instance, 80 percent of the radio network is open to inspection by
the state. There are eight radio stations registered with the designated state
committee. Five are state-run while three are non-governmental. In addition to
these, there are about twenty state radio studios registered in the regions.
The low popularity of print media in Uzbekistan has led to a recent
increase in the number of radio listeners. At the same time, the audience size of
radio has decreased since Soviet times because people prefer to watch
television. In addition, Uzbek radio often directly transmits news that was
printed in the newspaper and may also have been transmitted by television
because Uzbek radio does not possess its own information service. In the
regions, private radio stations are not registered. In the capital city of Tashkent,
three non-governmental radio stations are in operation: Grand, Sezam,
Uzbegim Taronaci. The majority of the transmissions of these three stations are
musical broadcasts. When they do broadcast “news,” they very cautiously refer
to political news and adhere to neutral subjects.
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IV. 6 PUBLIC SERVICE IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: BOSNIA
AND HERZEGOVINA
One of the new and difficult areas for establishing public service broadcasting is
in conflict zones and at the behest of the international community. This notion—
tied to ideas of the desirability of strengthening national identity, developing
notions of tolerance, establishing a voice for stability, is different from the
genesis and traditions of public broadcasting elsewhere. This process, first
developed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and then in Kosovo, does not have a
long history. We include here the excerpt of an essay by Mark Thompson and
Daniel De Luce, prepared for Forging Peace (edited by Thompson and Price),
to be published in 2002 by Edinburgh University Press.
“Escalating to Success? The Media Intervention in Bosnia and
Herzegovina,” by Mark Thompson and Dan De Luce, in Forging Peace,
*
2002

Towards public service broadcasting
In the autumn of 1997, SFOR, the NATO-led Stabilization Force in Bosnia,
seized the towers of SRT (Srpska radio-televizija, Serb Radio-Television) in
order to ensure more fair editorial coverage at the station and stem its
inflammatory coverage of events in the country. In the aftermath of this, British
and other Western ambassadors urged the High Representative to move
beyond SRT and launch broadcasting reform throughout the country. Carlos
Westendorp, then the High Representative, turned his attention to RTVBiH
(Radio-Television Bosnia and Herzegovina, formerly Radio-Television
Sarajevo). Westendorp’s office opted to promote genuine public service
broadcasting reform as a way of breaking the nationalists’ control of television
and radio.
[…] The final result of prolonged negotiations was a document that
supported admirable principles but set out contradictory paths. The

*
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‘Memorandum of Understanding on the Restructuring of RTVBiH’ called for the
creation of a television for the Federation and the eventual establishment of a
country-wide public corporation that would unify the Entity networks. The
Federation would gain a 'new public Entity television […] using the necessary
technical infrastructure of RTVBiH'. In the longer term, RTVBiH would
eventually form a single corporation with SRT, reflecting Bosnia’s constitutional
structure as a state with two Entities and three 'constituent peoples'. The
memorandum focused media attention on the need to end political interference
in publicly-funded broadcasting. For the first time, political leaders had to
address how a new public broadcasting service ought to be arranged.
[…] There was no mechanism in the memorandum to prevent or punish
political threats to RTVBiH’s editorial independence. It was a recipe for delay
and obstruction, encouraging Izetbegovic’s SDA to believe it could preserve the
existing RTVBiH indefinitely.
Momcilo Krajisnik, the Serb member of the Bosnian presidency, had
refused to participate in the negotiations for Memorandum. He condemned the
finished document as a violation of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) and
refused to sign.
The member states of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), which
was established in December 1995, hoping to bolster Bosnia’s weak statehood
and break the dominance of the nationalist parties, endorsed the public service
broadcasting reform in June 1998, calling for a single broadcasting system for
the whole country. Less than a year earlier, the Office of the High
Representative (OHR) had only sought to broadcast public information
programming on the local networks. Now it had international backing to
redesign the public broadcasting system.
The June statement was amplified at the end of 1998, when the PIC
adopted its fullest declaration to date on media reform. This called for legislation
on public media that enshrined the principles of editorial independence,
religious tolerance and financial transparency, prevented domination by political
parties and ensured respect for the interests of Bosnia’s three 'constituent
peoples'. In effect, the PIC was authorising an even more intrusive role in media
reform and development for the implementing organisations in Bosnia, above all
the OHR and OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe).
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The Madrid Declaration also called for the creation of a transmission system to
service a single PBS.
Shortly after the Memorandum was signed, the High Representative
appointed a multi-ethnic Board of Governors. Insolvent and grossly inefficient,
RTV BiH could only survive through the generosity of public enterprises and
banks controlled by Izetbegovic’s appointees. The morale of the 1,200
employees was dismal. Several members of the RTV BiH trade union
leadership had supported and signed the Memorandum, against the wishes of
Izetbegovic loyalists.
The Board appointed a director of RTV BiH, a Bosniak by nationality,
who was supposed to steer the network through the reform process. But he
failed to make genuine reforms in the news programming or to recruit nonBosniaks to top posts. […] An international part-time 'adviser' appointed by the
OHR, a Slovene television news producer, lacked the authority to carry out the
vast restructuring that was required.
The Board of Governors, increasingly frustrated at their weak position,
urged the director to rectify the ethnic, political bias in the news programme and
bring in non-Bosniaks to management positions. Their appeals were ignored.
Board members accused the OHR and donor governments of failing to support
political rhetoric with substantial financial support for the reform project. […]
For their part, the Bosnian Croat leaders continued to demand a
separately administered channel as the price of accepting a unified Federation
network (RTV FBiH). The Bosniak and Croat politicians could not agree to
adopt a law on Federation broadcasting that would turn RTV BiH into RTV
FBiH. Finally, in the spring of 1999, Bosniak SDA and Croat HDZ
representatives in the Federation education ministry negotiated a compromise
formula ... The compromise satisfied the HDZ but raised the danger of separate,
partisan editorial operations. Bosniak nationalists in the SDA later disowned the
compromise agreed by the education ministry. Throughout these negotiations,
both the Bosniak and Croat ruling parties in Bosnia spent large sums on the
cantonal broadcasters that were under their respective thumbs.
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SRT and Public Broadcasting
In Republika Srpska, progress in reforming the broadcast sector had also been
negligible. On 13 February 1998, under pressure from the OHR and with SFOR
still controlling the main transmitters, the government of the Republika Srpska
agreed to 'Interim Arrangements' for restructuring SRT in line with European
standards of public broadcasting. In April 1998, use of the transmitters was
restored to SRT. The following August, the government adopted a mechanism
for transparent and reliable funding for SRT. These provisions were to be
incorporated in a new law to be adopted by the end of 1998. No law was
adopted. Since the July 1998 elections had given the presidency of Republika
Srpska to an anti-Western (…) candidate, Nikola Poplasen, the political
atmosphere did not favour reform.
The SFOR action in 1997 had improved the basic quality of SRT’s
programmes. Yet, although the blatant attacks on the international community
and the DPA virtually disappeared from the screen, SRT presented itself as an
exclusively Serb broadcaster. The station displayed a clear bias in favour of
Biljana Plavsic’s 'moderate' faction, led by Prime Minister Milorad Dodik. Seeing
the Dodik government as a vital partner, the OHR and NATO states raised no
objection to the biased programming. The Bosnjak SDA accused the OHR of
applying double standards by insisting on public service principles for RTV BiH
while allowing mono-ethnic, politically-slanted programming at SRT.
The international community paid a price for such political expediency.
In 1999, SRT started to promote the Socialist Party of Republika Srpska
(SPRS), closely tied to Milosevic’s ruling Socialist Party in Serbia (SPS). The
lack of genuine reform was confirmed during NATO’s bombing campaign
against FRY in spring 1999, when SRT reverted to its worst practices of
disinformation and nationalist propaganda. Shortly after the end of the
campaign, the Independent Media Commission fined SRT 2,000 Deutschmark
for censorship, broadcasting false information, and publicising material
potentially threatening to public order.
On 31 August 1999, the High Representative issued amendments to
the Law on RTV RS that renamed SRT and went some way to redefining it
along public service lines. […] These amendments, upholding the principles of
editorial independence, financial transparency and cultural pluralism, brought
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RTV RS into line with the commitments that had been made, but not
subsequently honoured, in February 1998. RTV RS subsequently failed to fulfil
the spirit of the amendments and persisted with its mono-ethnic bias. […] The
Bosnian Serb authorities continued to resist any move to integrate the media
space, describing it as an attempt to strip Republika Srpska of its autonomy.
The controversial supervisor, Dragan Gasic, was forced to resign and a
new multi-ethnic Board was appointed in the summer of 2000. The OHR
retained its seat on the new governing board. Citing the failure of Republika
Srpska assembly, High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch instructed the new
Board to prepare a comprehensive law for RTRS and to draft a strategic plan
that would ensure RTRS programming and staff reflect the ethnic and religious
diversity of Republika Srpska and BiH citizens. Petritsch’s decision made clear
that public service broadcasting principles would now apply equally to both
Entities. The news programming has shown some signs of life and its coverage
of events in Serbia improved markedly in the autumn of 2000.
The Creation of PBS
In 1999, with all three of Bosnia’s nationalist regimes continuing to stall on
elementary media reform, the OHR took action. […] Following one of the [RTV
BiH] Board’s recommendations, OHR decided to impose a modest state-level
public broadcaster that would be financially realistic and based on the mutual
interests of the Entity broadcasters.
On 30 July 1999, more than a year after Izetbegovic and Zubak had
signed the 'Memorandum', the High Representative used his power of decree to
establish the Public Broadcasting Service of Bosnia and Herzegovina (PBS
BiH) and Radio-Television of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (RTV
FBiH), and called on the national assembly of the Republika Srpska to pass a
law 'establishing one public broadcaster for Republika Srpska, which will for all
legal purposes succeed to SRT'.
[The High Representative] cited Article III.1.h of the constitution, stating,
‘establishment and operation of common and international communications
facilities’ was a responsibility of the state institutions. He also mentioned the
‘accepted principle in all established democracies’ that the allocation of
broadcasting licences is a prerogative of the state. The decision also called for
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the creation of a state-wide public corporation that would manage the
transmission infrastructure. The Independent Media Commission and the Office
of the High Representative hoped the body would generate revenue and foreign
investment by offering access to transmission sites for mobile telephone and
data transmission services, thereby allowing the new PBS to become selfsufficient. But the Dayton Peace Agreement’s awkward framework, which
allowed each Entity to claim ownership over infrastructure on its territory, posed
a serious obstacle. The prime ministers of both entities had to agree on the
body's formation, meaning the international community would have to persuade
or coerce them to choose long-term economic benefit over short-term political
control. By the spring of 2001, the transmission corporation had yet to be
formed.
[…]
Implementing the sweeping reforms proved much more difficult than
issuing principles on paper. […] … PBS remained an abstraction, without a
budget, management, or a comprehensive law. It had to rely on the generosity
of sceptical Entity networks, OHR diplomacy, and donor government funding.
Two years after the 1999 decision, PBS had no regular evening news
programme.
[…]
Frustrated with political obstruction of PBS, the High Representative,
Wolfgang Petritsch, moved to assert greater international authority over the
project. In October 2000, Petritsch issued the OHR’s 'Second Decision on
Restructuring the Public Broadcasting System in Bosnia and Herzegovina'. This
act established 'two new public corporations, the Public Broadcasting Service of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Radio and Television of the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, (hereinafter PBS BiH and RTV FBiH)'.
…Where the first Decision mentioned only 'a unified news service
serving the whole country', Petritsch states that 'PBS BiH Television shall
provide, from the outset, a statewide and international news service transmitted
simultaneously to both Entities in prime time at a time to be decided, seven
nights a week as the heart of an evening PBS BiH network schedule'. PBS
would also commission programming from Entity broadcasters.
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The Second Decision also redefined the all-important matter of national
identities or components in the output of Federation broadcasting. The Decision
stated that RTV FBiH would be 'mandated to produce two radio networks, and
two channels of television. These services shall be complementary and mixed.
Each shall reflect national and cultural diversities, and shall be staffed by people
chosen on the basis of the highest professional criteria in accordance with the
principle of national equality as expressed by the Constitution of BiH'. This was
a clear improvement over the previous definition, quoted above, which would
have divided the two Federation channels along linguistic lines.
For the Republika Srpska, the Decision held that 'the development of
The Public Company Radio-Television of Republika Srpska Banja Luka
(hereinafter RTRS) is a fundamental part of the creation of a public
broadcasting system in BiH'. RTRS 'shall broadcast a single radio network, and
one television channel'.
[…] While the Second Decision should be welcomed, it may be overambitious. […] the OHR has come up with a proposal that may be too elaborate
and expensive for a small, impoverished country. It will require sorting out the
grossly inefficient operations of both Entity networks and scaling back a
massive workforce. Laying off hundreds of employees is the one step that the
local political parties have studiously avoided. Even if the collection of
subscriptions is improved, international assistance will make or break the reform
effort. It remains to be seen whether the donor community will be persuaded to
pay the 14.5 million Euro that the OHR is seeking to restructure public
broadcasting over the period 2001 to 2002. If such a level of donor support is
secure, it is far from clear how the network will pay for itself in the long run.
The end of the struggle to reform the broadcast sector is not yet in
sight. The OHR’s initial approach aimed to set legal and political parameters for
public broadcasting. Since 2000, the OHR has moved to assert managerial
control over the public broadcasting sector and has employed a team of
broadcasting, legal, and financial consultants to accomplish this task. […]
Thus far OHR has managed to stop the excesses of the Entity
networks, effectively neutralising the old propaganda. But a healthy alternative
has yet to emerge. PBS has yet to launch its evening news programme two
years since the High Representative’s first decision. The delay raises the
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question whether the OHR can build a successful network out of the ashes of
RTV BiH.
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C HAPTER V
TOWARDS THE FUTURE:
C O N C L U D I N G M AT E R I A L S
The objective, in assembling these materials, was
•
•
•
•

To establish certain fundamental principles of public service
broadcasting,
To present important elements of the European debate on public
service broadcasting
To examine tensions in the United Kingdom, Germany, and
elsewhere as public service broadcasting changes
To provide some window into the difficult process—over a decade
and more—of transformations from state broadcasting to public
service broadcasting in the so-called “transition” societies.

In this concluding chapter, our goal, drawing from certain of our
previous studies, is to look toward the future and draw certain conclusions. We
also wish to ask the reader to think, beyond the standard formulae, about the
function and need for public service broadcasting, particularly in fragmented,
redefining societies.
“Public Service Broadcasting: A Comparative and Analytic Approach,” by
*
Monroe E. Price and Stefaan Verhulst, January 2001
We reach several conclusions about the changes in public service
broadcasting. First, we argue that societies are moving, at least at a rhetorical
level, towards what might be called a concept of “distributed public service,” one
in which the obligations are not so concentrated in a single institution or set of
institutions. Such a model of distributed public service model is vital for planning
because of the nature of media transformations. Distributed public service risks
*

Footnotes omitted.
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weakening the institutions of public service broadcasting themselves. A parallel
set of conclusions deals with financing patterns. Almost universally, the blurring
of the lines between public service broadcasters and commercial counterparts
is putting pressure on modes of financing and subvention. In Europe, litigation
and negotiation have already led to altered boundaries in service provision and
the relationship to public financing or subvention through licensing. In a number
of states, existing and traditional modes of reliance on the license fee is
softening, partly because the practices of the public service broadcasters have
been questioned and attacked.
All this said, another remarkable aspect of modern tendencies in public
service broadcasting is a cross-boundary recognition and revival of the very
notion of public service, of modes of identifying and meeting public needs for
program services not provided through the marketplace. In some states, like
New Zealand, earlier downgrades of the public service broadcaster have been
reversed. In most societies, there is a noticeable concern at the decline of
market share and the increasing isolation and identity crises that weaken this
sector of program provision. The need for public service broadcasters continues
though the standard justifications seem shaky. We conclude that there are
emerging grounds for public service broadcasting tied to goals of international
stability based on strengthened national identities.
A hazard of studying transnational transformations of public service
broadcasters is to be too restrictive in terms of reference and purpose. The
shadow of the BBC and Reithian ideas of public service is a long one. Most
Anglo-US scholarship on public service broadcasting (even scholarship that is
critical of the Reithian ideal) is in the thrall of a set of ideas of public service
broadcasting and its relationship to society. We make some efforts to enrich the
debate here. As part of this, we focus, in part, on the dilemmas of post-Reithian
public service broadcasting in a dual system in the European Union.
Taxonomy Of The Notions Of "Public" Within PSB
In this section we propose to set forth a partial taxonomy of meanings of the
term “public” in different public service broadcasting contexts. This taxonomy,
like the one relating to social goals, is helpful in classifying and analyzing,
comparatively, shifts in the public service broadcasting environment. Among the
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potential meanings of “public” are “Public Interest,” “Public Funding,” “Public
Accountability,” “Public/Universal Service,” “Public Taste and Choice,” “Public
Identity and Representation (Minority groups)”, “Public Choice: Quality and
Complementary Programming” and “ Public Service Obligations.” In this Study,
we cannot provide more than an initial analysis of certain of these areas and
indicate potential directions for further research.
(a) Public Interest
Much has been written about the idea of public interest. It is intriguing to try to
determine the relationship between the phrase “public service” and the phrase
“public interest.” It may well be that the term public interest exists, primarily in
the US discourse, to describe those activities which are imposed upon private
broadcasters in their partial function as trustees of the public airwaves. In this
sense, the term “public interest” could be said to be a marker for what we call,
later in the paper, a system of “distributed public service” where the functions
are performed by public, private and mixed entities. The term “public interest” is
also deceptively bland. It bears within it the mark of being readily defined,
decent and generally acceptable. It is, however, culturally specific, contentious
and disguises important possible areas of debate about the range of dissent,
questions of pluralism, gender, and the allocation or redistribution of resources.
As we shall see in the later section on public funding, the very definitional
process takes on sharpness in the growing number of cases where public funds
can be used primarily to fund public interest or public service duties that are not
performed by commercial entities as part of their marketplace activities.
A recent exploration of public interest in this distributed way, looking
primarily at the duty of commercial entities, is the document Public Interest
Obligations of Digital Television Broadcasters. Produced by the US Gore
Commission, the report has made one of the most thorough analyses in the
new technological era. The report emphasized broadcast television and
democratic deliberation. US licensing arrangements that gave rise to public
interest obligations attempted to reconcile the prerogatives of commercial
interests on the one hand with the needs of the democratic system on the other.
In the Gore Commission’s view, the primary applications of the Public Interest
Standard were as follows: (1) “Encouraging Diversity of Programming,” if
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broadcasters are meant to act as trustees for the public interest, then they must
affirmatively present a wide diversity of perspectives. (2) Broadcasting as a
Forum for Political Discourse including Candidate Access to the Airwaves.
Although Congress gave broadcasters broad editorial control of the airwaves
under the Communications Act, it retained two common-carrier-like provisions
to ensure access for legally qualified candidates for Federal office. (3) Citizen
Access to the Airwaves. For many years, the chief legal vehicle for citizens to
gain direct access to the airwaves or hear diverse viewpoints on controversial
public issues was the Fairness Doctrine. (4) Broadcasting as a Force for
Localism. Another long-standing tradition in broadcast regulation has been the
affirmative need of stations to serve their local communities. (5) The Public
Interest in Children’s Educational Programming, (6) Access by Persons with
Disabilities, and (7) Equal Employment Opportunity were the last three
applications.
Another formulation on the public interest principle can be found in
Ireland. In its entirety, it has probably come to embrace the following elements:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Broadcasting is expected to serve the "public interest" or "general
welfare" by carrying out tasks that contribute to the wider and longerterm benefits of society as a whole.
Broadcast programmes should be available to the whole population.
Broadcast programmes should cater for all interests and tastes.
Minorities should receive particular provision.
Broadcasters should recognise their special relationship to the sense of
national identity.
Broadcasting should be distanced from all vested interests and in
particular from those of the Government of the day.
The public guidelines for broadcasting should be designed to liberate
rather than restrict the programme maker.

(b) Public Identity and Representation
One interesting area for studying the process of transformation lies in the
principle of “Public Identity and Representation.” The draft Charter for Television
New Zealand (TVNZ), published in September 2000, demonstrates the
importance of the question of representation. The document recognized that
TVNZ would contribute to a sense of national purpose, identity, and pride in
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New Zealand's diversity as well as extend the range of ideas and experiences
available to New Zealanders. It would feature programming across the full
range of genres and include programmes that entertain as well as inform and
educate. The Charter was interesting in that it specifically asserted a role in
maintaining a balance between programmes of appeal to New Zealanders in
general and programmes of special interest. The Charter called for the
broadcaster to “encourage creative risk-taking and experiment, investing in and
promoting the talents and creative resources of the New Zealand film and
television industry as well as those of the specifically Maori film and television
industry.” It was stated that TVNZ should feature programming that promotes
Maori language and culture to all New Zealanders and serve the interests and
informational needs of Maori audiences through programmes in the Maori
language and programmes promoting the Maori culture programmes with Maori
topics. It should also acknowledge in its programming the significant place of
Maori in the New Zealand population. The TVNZ should provide shared
experiences that contribute to a sense of citizenship and national identity. In the
area of Information and Democracy, the Charter urges TVNZ to provide
comprehensive, impartial, authoritative, and in-depth coverage and analysis of
news and current affairs in New Zealand and throughout the world. To provide
information that enhances the opportunities of Zealanders to participate in
national or community life it should also feature programmes that serve the
regions of New Zealand and that reflect the regions to themselves and to the
nation as a whole.
Another extremely important example of diversity as a hallmark of
public broadcasting is found in Australia’s Special Broadcasting Service (SBS),
Australia's national multicultural broadcaster. The Australian Parliament
provided a Charter for SBS that states:
•
•

The principal function of SBS is to provide multilingual and multicultural
radio and television services that inform, educate and entertain all
Australians, and, in doing so, reflect Australia's multicultural society.
SBS, in performing its principal function, must:
1. Contribute to meeting the communications needs of Australia's
multicultural society, including ethnic, Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander communities; and
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2. Increase awareness of the contribution diverse cultures to the
continuing development of Australian society.
3. Promote understanding and acceptance of the cultural,
linguistic and ethnic diversity of the Australian people.
4. Contribute to the retention and continuing development of
language and other cultural skills.
5. As far as practicable, inform, educate and entertain Australians
in their preferred languages.
6. Make use of Australia's diverse creative resources.
7. Contribute to the overall diversity of Australian television and
radio services, particularly taking into account the contribution
of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation and the public
broadcasting sector.
8. Contribute to extending the range of Australian television and
radio services, and reflect the changing nature of Australian
society, by presenting many points of view and using innovative
forms of expression.
SBS television service is broadcast nationwide to a potential audience
of 17.5 million people and the radio service is broadcast to millions of
Australians of diverse cultural background. SBS Radio, which began in 1975,
broadcasts 650 hours of programming each week in 68 languages. SBS
Television began in 1980 and 4.6 million Australians now view it each week. In
accordance with the Charter, SBS policy is that half of scheduled programming
will be in languages other than English, which requires hundreds of hours of
subtitling.
(c) Public Funding
One of the critical disputes concerning public service broadcasting involves
public funding. In a sense, this dispute, quite important within Europe, has long
term consequences for the structuring of public service broadcasting globally.
This is because the issue—defined in terms of subsidies and competition
policy—ultimately will be integrated with transnational concerns under the World
Trade Organization. The nature of the issue is traced in terms of EU debate
over whether state aid to public service broadcasters constitutes a violation of
EU competition rules.
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The approach which is at the basis of the amended Directive is also
confirmed by the 1998 report of the High Level Group on Audiovisual Policy
(chaired by then Commissioner Oreja) "The Digital Age: European Audiovisual
Policy". The report states: "The funding of public service broadcasting must be
in proportion to, and not more than, what is needed to discharge the public
service remit". "For this purpose, financial openness should be applied …
Furthermore, when that operator engages in purely commercial activities (that
is, that go beyond those activities defined as part of its public service remit),
separate accounting should apply."
(d) Public Choice: Quality and Complementary Programming
Another meaning of public involves public choice or providing complementary
programming. In a sense, this issue has been dealt with under the heading of
pluralism and national identity, in the categories of public interest and in the
discussion of the controversy over public funding. Often this question is put in
terms of forms of identifying and encouraging a separate and autonomous
group of programmers, a way of encouraging creativity in society. This has
been the contribution, primarily of Channel 4 in the United Kingdom, which, from
the start, determined that all programming should be commissioned rather than
produced from within a broadcasting monolith. This idea is also incorporated in
the Television Without Frontiers Directive, which, as a matter of European law,
requires broadcasters to gain at least 10% of programming from independent
sources.
Complementarity is difficult to achieve in an increasingly competitive
environment. Multi-channel growth has often left the public service broadcaster
moving to match or replicate services of commercial competitors. And in a multichannel environment with new means to gain income, commercial sources have
nibbled at areas that were the zone of complementarity for the public service
institutions (such as history, nature programming, children’s programming, even
instructional programming). These factors have yielded a complex programming
agenda for public service broadcasters as they seek to adjust to their own
digital, expensive and multi-channel environment.
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Broadcasting, Democracy and Independence
One of the functions attributed to public service broadcasting is its relationship
to building a public sphere. But elements of this relationship have not been
explored. Most tie the claim—certainly the geopolitical claim—for
unencumbered media to its role in reinforcing or fostering democracy. Edwin
Baker has written, with a small bit of irony, "democracy is impossible without a
free press. At least courts and commentators tell us so."
Does a “free and independent press” alone perform this function or is it,
as well, some version of public service broadcasting? Because each democratic
society has a different profile of its media, no specific matrix of media
development can be considered “essential” as part of the project of
democratization. Development of a “free and independent” press can, itself,
take many forms and freedom and independence can have many gradations.
Public service broadcasting can be an essential, central, causative aspect of
“free and independent media.” It is important to know what kind of media in
what kind of society will perform the functions that are necessary for the
process of building democratic institutions to proceed healthily. Given modern
telecommunications, especially the Internet, and greater and greater crossborder data flow, the functions of the traditional press may be complemented
though hardly superseded. Only with an understanding of basic elements of
structure and function can policies to further a particular right to receive and
impart information be evaluated.
The report of the late 1940s Hutchins Commission, in the United States,
“A Free and Responsible Press” identified five responsibilities as a measure of
press performance. The press should (1) provide “a truthful, comprehensive,
and intelligent account of the day’s events in a context which gives them
meaning,” a commitment evidenced in part by objective reporting; (2) be “a
forum for the exchange of comment and criticism,” meaning in part that papers
should be “common carriers” of public discussion, at least in the limited sense of
carrying views contrary to their own; (3) project “a representative picture of the
constituent groups in the society”; (4) “present and clarify the goals and values
of the society”; and (5) provide “full access to the day’s intelligence,” thereby
serving the public’s right to be informed. The Commission also identified three
summary tasks that are central to the media’s political role: to provide
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information, to enlighten the public so that it is capable of self-government, and
to serve as a watchdog on government. It might be said that there is often an
additional function of the media, namely to provide to various segments of the
society a sense that they are represented in the public sphere of relevant
discussion.
As Professor Baker has written, different conceptions of democracy
demand somewhat different functions of the media. Visions of a democratic
society that emphasize citizen participation, for example, would underscore the
need for media that, as Baker puts it, “aid groups in pursuing their agendas and
mobilizing for struggle and bargaining.” On the other hand, a more elitist version
of democracy requires principally that the media provide sufficient information
for those who participate in the public functions to act rationally, and, of course,
perform a watchdog function. In some models, the media has a responsibility to
assist in inculcating and transmitting “proper values.”
Frequently, the essence of transitions to greater democracy is the
fragmentation or destruction of a previous monopoly or oligopoly of power
(including the monopoly over information as a critical element of the monopoly
over power). In many societies, reform means ensuring that there is access for
a group of voices not previously included in the public marketplace of ideas.
The question then is how the market is opened and to whom. Put differently,
what new or additional suppliers in the market for loyalties are supported by
what sources of power or money and with what objectives. Russia in the late
1990’s provides an example of a transition in which media companies were, in
large part, proxies for major formations of capital and political influence as each
formation sought its own group of media entities.
Free and independent media may mean providing, in the marketplace
of ideas, instruments for articulating values and summoning public support that
are not wholly dependent on the state. Moving towards free and independent
media early in the process of transition may provide a building block for the
future stable set of democratic institutions. Even if the media do not perform the
function of effective watchdog, of engaging in information-providing and valuetransmitting functions in the early days, that may be because of lack of
experience. Starting the media early on the right road means that when the
watchdog and other functions are necessary, the media will be more prepared.
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Free and independent media may organically arise in a mature democracy, but
artificial steps are necessary in many transition contexts. Finally, one might
argue that the emergence of democratic institutions in transition societies will
come faster and with greater public support and involvement if there are free
and independent media to develop and inspire public opinion.
When broadcast regulation is oriented towards pluralism, as Lucas
Sierra has written, the reinvention of the “publicness” begins to materialise. He
cites Thompson to illustrate this point:
So how, in the late twentieth century, can we create the
conditions for a renewal of public life? How can we stimulate a
kind of publicness that is neither part of the state nor wholly
dependent on the autonomous processes of the market? We
can best pursue this goal, in my view, by seeking to implement
what I have described elsewhere as the principle of regulated
pluralism.

Broadcasting, Peace, and Reconciliation
Broadcasting in general, and public service broadcasting in particular have a
role to play in preventing conflict and healing in a post-conflict context. The
critical nature of public service broadcasting and how it should be structured
has not received the attention that it should. We have written about this
question in our work on “information intervention,” namely the increasing
process of the international community to enter a post-conflict zone and
address the nature of the media structures there. We have above provided
portions of a study of the construction of public service broadcasters in postconflict areas such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.
One element of information intervention, “peace broadcasting,” is close
to the role of public service broadcasting as it has evolved in the context of the
international community’s relationship to conflict areas. “Peace broadcasting”
has many elements. Intervention to provide “more speech” is generally
acceptable and widely applauded by guardians of press and citizenship.
Acclaim may be limited when those in power use “peace broadcasting” to force
an entity to broadcast “corrective statements” or explanations of official
positions. This type of information intervention took place in Bosnia.
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In Bosnia, the international community established an alternative
broadcast network and stitched together a network of existing independent
stations to create alternative voices to those of the Bosnian Serbs during the
period shortly after the signing of the Dayton accords. By reinforcing media
independent of hard line voices, the international community sought to ensure
that views in accordance with a plural and constitutional future were broadcast
to the state in question. Finally, the international community could use “external
radios” like Radio Liberty or the Voice of America to “peace broadcast” as,
somewhat awkwardly, surrogate public service broadcasters.
Recent experiences raise important questions about “peace
broadcasting.” Is it appropriate to create an “independent press” by using
foreign funds, as is often attempted? Many argue that support only goes to
those portions of the press that are inclined favorably to the donor’s point of
view. Dr. Reino Paasilinna, a media policy scholar and Member of the European
Parliament for Finland, attacked the Office of the High Representative (OHR) for
supporting commercial broadcasting at the expense of public service radio and
television in Bosnia “Democratization in the media cannot be guaranteed by
letting the market have its way, by supporting a private network [. . .] and
neglecting the public sector.”
In Liberia and elsewhere in Africa, one of the most interesting models
that approximates a function of public service broadcasting is the work of the
Foundation Hirondelle. We shall, as part of our more extensive research,
prepare a short case study of Star Radio, Hirondelle’s important contribution
during the post-conflict election period in Monrovia. Hirondelle, working together
with international broadcasters, sought to establish a radio voice that would
represent a plural approach to those competing in the election process, a
temporary, election-specific public sphere that would give voice to entities that
could not penetrate the precincts of the state broadcaster or who felt that the
state broadcasting entity was biased against them. Hirondelle has a record of
specialization, entering conflict areas and constructing, rapidly, public service
radio outlets that can perform such missing functions.
The international mission in the Balkans, as U.S. and Western
representatives saw it, was reconstitutive as well as preventive of further
conflict. NATO sought to build, under the Dayton Accords (and the UN in
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Kosovo), a plural society out of pieces that seem permanently fractured. The
OHR believed that plural and peaceful media were indispensable to the
rebuilding process. The Office proclaimed its desire to “use the opportunity to
remove one of the most serious obstacles bedeviling our efforts to re-establish
civil society in Bosnia," the fact that the media were ethnically based. More time
is needed to judge whether or not the UN, NATO, the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the OHR’s actions to encourage the
pluralism that comes from a reconstituted public service broadcasting entity and
free and independent media supported a more democratic post-conflict
environment.
Regional Models
One might ask whether various evolutions are occurring that are regional in
nature. For example, the debate within the European Union is pushing towards
a clarification of distinct categories of offerings: one subsidizable and one that
may be questionable under the Treaty of Rome. The consequence of shaping
the debate in this way is to create structural distinctions. The BBC is required,
virtually, to spin off certain activities that must then be free standing and have
limited cross subsidization of the public service sector (at least it is a possible
thrust that the public service sector cannot subsidize the profit-oriented sector;
the other directional flow is considered desirable).
Broadcasting, Market Intervention, and Purposes
(a) Broadcasting, Social Goals, Public Goods, and Public Sphere
Many think that technology will aid in resolving public service broadcasting’s
identity and purpose crisis. To be sure, some redefinition will occur because
adaptation to technology means taking structures apart and putting them back
together again. But technology does not obviate choice; the new technology has
the appearance of abundance, but public service television cannot do all things
or perform best by trying to continue and intensify all of its prior goals. Barring a
complete and quick technological revolution, it is necessary to look at the
variety of possible definitions for public television. Among these are national
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treasure, national identity; minority satisfaction or empowerment; public sphere;
distributed public service; and lifeline.
National Treasure, National Identity. This definition is a reminder of
the best traditions of European public television, in which the institution is
culturally overarching and like the monarchy, a secular version of the Church of
England, bearer and reflector of identity charged with a conscious strategic role
in changing culture. This social role is enough to justify a license fee. This
model is rarely the one that is used to explain public television in the United
States, and U.S. public broadcasting does not have sufficient audience share to
perform this role.
Minority Satisfaction or Empowerment Model. While it is often the
case that a monopolist or close to monopolist state broadcaster sees it as its
duty to reflect minority cultures, state broadcasters have rarely been in the
service of empowerment and focus more on minimal satisfaction. Efforts toward
empowerment include Channel 4 in the United Kingdom and Special
Broadcasting Service (SBS) in Australia where the network is dedicated to
Vietnamese, Indian, and other minority culture films and similar conscious
counter-programming with the intent that diverse groups feel more meaningfully
included in the Australian whole. The U.S. public broadcasting service performs
this function to some extent. However, when it does it in too notorious a way, it
is charged with ignoring its mainstream acculturating or reinforcing
responsibility.
Public Sphere. We deal with this more specifically below, but another
way of looking at purpose is to say that the public service broadcasting is an
instrument of civil society, part of the creation of a public sphere. It increasingly
takes on this function as the commercial entities in American television abandon
that role more and more. Perhaps it will have a ceded monopoly on certain
public events—like political conventions and broad-based, regional, and local
television debates.
Distributed Public Service. This definition is based on functions, not
specific entities. One could argue that too much of the discussion of public
service broadcasting has been focused on the historic institutions rather than on
the functions, while in a fragmented structural approach, the tendency is to look
increasingly at the functions not the institutions. For example, the recent
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Grossman-Minow study of possible funding entitled, “A Digital Gift to the Nation:
Fulfilling the Promise of the Digital and Internet Age,” started with the question
of what to do to assure financing of public service broadcasting. However, it
ended with something quite different: a proposal to establish a Millennium
Education Trust Fund “to enhance learning, broaden knowledge, support the
arts and culture, and teach the skills that are necessary for the emerging
Information Age.” Public stations, in this study, would be “a vital conduit” of the
products and services funded by the Millennium Fund: a “mighty megaphone”
rather than the cultural institution itself.
Furthermore, the function of public service would not only become
detached in terms of product, but also dispersed. The mode of distributing those
things, which ought to be produced in the society to establish its glue, its civic
education and its cultural enrichment would devolve upon a large number of
institutions which, themselves, would change. Museums would become
communicators with their own websites, as would schools, universities, and
ballet companies. These changes in institutional forms of content production
and distribution are essential to include in a comprehensive picture of the
evolution of dispersed public service broadcasting functions.
Entities that are now characterized as “commercial” might have
enhanced public service functions either because of renewed obligations or
because those entities that are subsidizing public service functions
(foundations, corporations, and governments) determine that the commercial
entities are better situated to perform them.
Lifeline. Under this definition, public service broadcasting takes on the
residue of public interest obligations from commercial broadcasting, whatever
they are. Under some proposals—the Children’s Television Act of 1990 in the
United States is an example—commercial broadcasters, in the technological
future, could shed public interest responsibilities if they were willing to pay noncommercial broadcasters to assume them in their stead.
Professor Hoffmann-Riem has written,
The example of Germany shows how difficult it is to realize the
idea of a public service broadcasting in today’s context […].
The German constitution clearly favoured the public
broadcasting model, but in a commercially organized system,
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public service obligations for broadcast programmes will not be
guaranteed by legal regulations alone. Legal stipulations can
be supportive—especially if they tally with the basic ethical view
and the interests of those in position of responsibility.”
He has noted that,
The new legal battlefront makes clear that the issues have
changed. Previously, the main ones were political
communication and the assurance of the basic right to freedom
of opinion and communication in a democracy followed by the
guarantee of public service. Now the thrust is to ensure
processes of economic exchange.
Perhaps the world is divided between two camps. One is where the
structure of private competition has been effectively controlled or influenced by
the public service broadcaster, or those who seek, as part of conditioning entry,
to preserve or strengthen the place of the public service broadcaster. The other
is where the development of private competition has been autonomous.
Sweden and India are examples of the former category while the U.S. is an
example of the latter. As the world moves toward greater distribution of public
service functions, or as these functions are diminished, the response will be
different depending on the proceeding broadcasting ecology. Germany may be
an example where there was some effort, perhaps ineffectively, to protect the
public service broadcasting. In the U.S., the “must carry rule” was an example
of congressional planning specifically designed to support public service
broadcasting in a time of technological change.
Mapping of the Transitions and Challenges to the Notions of PSB
Given all of this, we think that there are a number of challenges to public service
broadcasting that are present in different ways in different settings. There is the
challenge of digitalization, the puzzle of abundance and the continuation of
shifts in the means of distribution so as to wholly shatter the image of the public
service broadcaster (an image already rather shattered). Digitalization and the
altered forms of distribution perforce require differences in functions and
therefore differences in organization and, at the least, a reexamination of
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purposes. In addition, there is the challenge of globalization. We interpret
globalization, for this purpose, as the lowering of cost barriers to the access of
information across national borders and, certainly, the development of new
competitors challenging the hegemony of a domestic public broadcasting
system. In India, the capacity of the BBC to take images from India back to
London and then retransmit them to India in competition with Doordarshan has
been a dramatic example of this form of globalization. New technology and
globalization in this sense weaken the capacity of the state to control images
that course within its boundaries. India cannot easily prohibit the depiction of the
destruction of mosques or any country the depiction of images hostile to its
governing authority—at least where there is active and effective competition
between global public service broadcasters. At the present, there is a
competition for the role of global public service broadcaster, with the BBC,
through branding, extension of coverage and investment in programming
leading the process. There are two additional trans-boundary challenges. The
extensive transitions away from authoritarianism and toward democracy have
meant a process of change, not always successful, from state to public service
broadcasting. It has also meant a change within broadcasters to question
whether they can contribute to the deliberative democracy aspects of transition.
This has not always been a successful as transitions have also led to the kind of
competition from commercial and independent broadcasters that puts pressure
on the public service entity to be more aggressive and entertaining.
We have also drawn attention to two areas that are emerging as
important and less frequently discussed as part of the historic and present role
of public service broadcasting. These are the role of these broadcasters in
preventing conflict and in helping to harmonize and soothe in the wake of
conflict and the role of public service broadcasting institutions in nation-building
and economic development. Most studies, which focus on US and Western
European examples, do not focus on these roles as among the principal ones.
But in newly independent states, in states where language fragility and cultural
fragility is an important concern and in countries where there is a process of
recuperation from conflict, the role that the public service entities can play is
sensitive and critical.
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“National, Transnational and Global Approaches to Public Media," by Marc
*
Raboy, January 2001
"The limits on PSBs will not be technical: they will be sociopolitical."
—Winsbury, 1999: 19
"In the total ecology of the broadcasting system, it seems more
important to implement the criteria for good public service than
to try to define what high quality is."
—Siune and Hulten, 1998: 35

"If we expect broadcasting to play the role of a 'forum for
discourse' based on the new concept of the 'public', an
international viewpoint is needed when looking into the role of
public broadcasting as a venue for producing a space for
mutual understanding.... In other words, the 'public' in the future
should not be pursued solely for the people of any one
country."
—Hamada, 1997: 49
Introduction
Once upon a time, states and governments representing the public interest,
could—if they wished—exercise a certain constraining influence on the appetite
of commercial media. Conventional wisdom has it that that era is past, although
a healthy synergy still exists in many parts of the world between public policy
instruments and objectives in the cultural sphere. Nonetheless, in the year
2001, it is useful—indeed imperative—to situate the future of the very idea of
public service media in a global context.
*

Footnotes omitted.
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Great national institutions in the heartland of public service
broadcasting—western Europe, Canada, Japan, Australia...—continue to
occupy significant space in the media landscape. In the new democracies of
Africa, Asia and central and eastern Europe, the public broadcasting model is
seriously examined as an alternative to its strictly commercial counterpart.
Public broadcasting no longer enjoys monopoly status, is no longer clearly
distinguishable from the rest, but it remains an important reminder of the social
and cultural possibilities of the media, in an age when the dominant thrust is
overwhelmingly oriented towards consumerism (see Raboy 1996).
In this new, increasingly seamless and unprecedentedly global
communication environment, public broadcasting is more than an outmoded
utopian dream: it can be seen, in fact, as a model for public policy development
with respect to media in the context of globalization, new technologies and
shifting terrains of audience demographics, loyalties and behavior patterns.
There are two ways to think about public media in the context of
globalization: the nostalgic vision of the conventional PSB model, fixed in time
and place, a throwback to a bygone era... and a forward-looking vision focused
on imagining new models, reproducing the values of PSB but searching for new
institutional forms for promoting these values. Let me begin by recalling some
aspects of the concept of PSB.
The Idea of the Public
In a remarkable article published in the only issue of a short-lived Canadian
journal in 1960, an adult education activist by the name of Alan Thomas
explored the distinctions between three notions of the same thing: the audience,
the market, and the public.
Thomas reflected that the evolution of Canadian broadcasting had been
dominated by the interaction between these different ways of describing the
receiving end of broadcasting.
The market, Thomas noted, is characterized by attention to things
rather than people; in the name of freedom of enterprise, it is attentive to the
interests of "private" operators; in Canada, the market tended to be by nature
continental rather than national, "and its uncontrolled operations have been
seen as hostile to the existence of Canada as a national entity".
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The public, on the other hand, is identified with the state and the
community; Canada's problem was how to create a genuine public out of
separate geographic (as well as linguistic and cultural) communities: "The
whole history of Canada has been a conflict between the public which is
Canadian and the market which has been predominantly American." There was
a conflict here between the classical Athenian notion of the public and the public
that had developed with the age of broadcasting.
The audience is something else again, Thomas wrote. Considered
passive, the audience is made up of members of a public, as well as a potential
market, when they are tuned in. Unlike the public or the market, the audience is
wholly a creation of broadcasting—it does not exist without it.
The crux of Thomas' argument was that media tend to address people
as members of an audience, not a public; media policy, however, attempts to
restore the balance in broadcasting where market considerations have
outstripped public ones in their relations with the audience. Audience and
market tend to create a state of equilibrium. Restoring the role of the public
requires some kind of intervention to counteract that.
The idea of the public in a context of globalization can be viewed
through a similar lens. In The Power Elite, Mills recalled that the most important
feature of 'the public of opinion', that had arisen with the democratic middle
class, was 'the free ebb and flow of discussion' and the possibility of 'answering
back' through autonomous organs of public opinion, actively realized within the
established democratic institutions of power. (Thomas had written that one way
of enhancing the role of the public was to create stronger two-way channels
between producer and audience.) The image of this classical democratic public
was already something of an illusion in the 1950s America of which Mills wrote.
Mills reviewed the political process through which this had come about:
the arrival of mass democracy upset the democratic society of publics, by
placing the sovereignty of 'the people' over that of the individual. The harmony
of interests assumed by the democratic society of publics had given way to the
doctrine of class struggle. The idea of rational decisions based on public
discussion was bypassed by the insistence on a need for experts, and by the
notion of irrational man.
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Mills then made a clear distinction between the public and the mass, a
distinction he tied explicitly to the role of media:
In a public... (1) virtually as many people express opinions as
receive them. (2) Public communications are so organized that
there is a chance immediately and effectively to answer back
any opinions expressed in public. Opinion formed by such
discussion (3) readily finds an outlet in effective action, even
against—if necessary—the prevailing system of authority. And
(4) authoritative institutions do not penetrate the public, which is
more or less autonomous in its operations.
At the opposite extreme, in a mass, (1) far fewer people
express opinions than receive them; for the community of
publics becomes an abstract collection of individuals who
receive impressions from the mass media. (2) The
communications that prevail are so organized that it is difficult
or impossible for the individual to answer back immediately or
with any effect. (3) The realization of opinion in action is
controlled by authorities who organize and control the channels
of such action. The mass has no autonomy from institutions.
Nearly fifty years later, one can read in this passage an opposition of
the realities of conventional mass media and the promise or potential of the best
offered by the so-called "new media". Or, one can read this as an opposition
between the ideal and the reality of conventional nationally-based public service
broadcasting, as Thomas might have. Mills was not talking about PSB, of which
we have no evidence he was even particularly aware. But his text, read
alongside that of his contemporary, Thomas, allows us to think about the
democratic possibilities of a new public service media model, grounded in the
technological and geopolitical context of the 2000s.
The Idea of Public Broadcasting
Today's notion of the public collides and overlaps with other contested, still
useful, notions in need of re-problematization: notions such as community,
nation, citizen, consumer etc.
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What holds these together is that they are all possible discourses of
legitimation for public policy intervention in various spheres of human activity,
particularly for national states.
The idea of the public, however, is a particularly useful construct when
it comes to legitimating policy intervention with respect to media and
communication. What are the new discourses on public media in an age of
global politics and instantaneous communication? Can we speak of promoting
and protecting normative values with respect to new media such as the
Internet? Can we translate pre-globalization notions of the public, confined
within the borders of national states, to anything approaching a transnational or
global public sphere? Can there be such a thing as cultural rights and
entitlements beyond the framework of the national welfare state?
National peculiarities aside, questions concerning media structures are
increasingly global ones. In the new broadcasting environment, the issue of
public service broadcasting can be reduced to this: What social and cultural
goals attributed to broadcasting require a specially mandated, non-commercially
driven organization, publicly owned, publicly funded to the extent necessary,
and publicly accountable.
Broadcasters, politicians, media professionals and creative people,
community activists, and scholars worldwide were wrestling with this question in
the year 2000. While the diagnosis is global, the prescriptions are necessarily
context-specific. When we put them together, however, we find in the range of
models, examples, and ways of framing the issues the basis for a global portrait
and a sketch of a solution.
The context of technological convergence and the accompanying policy
debates can help to further clarify the concept of public service with respect to
media generally and, hence, to develop a more appropriate conception of public
service broadcasting. In telecommunication, for example, the concept of
universal public service has been much more clear and straightforward than in
broadcasting. The principle of universality has been tied to the operational
provision of affordable access (not an issue in broadcasting as long as the main
means of transmission was over-the-air, but increasingly so with the addition of
various tiers of chargeable services).
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The displacement of universal service by subscriber-based and payper-view services is the strongest factor favouring a shift toward the consumer
model in broadcasting, and proponents of public broadcasting feel that this
needs to be countered by policy measures and institutional mechanisms to
promote the democratic function of broadcasting. This can only come about
through a rethinking of what we mean by public service broadcasting.
For example, traditionally, public service broadcasting has been
expected to represent the national as opposed to the foreign. It may be time to
refocus these conceptual categories in terms of the local and the global. Global
cultural industries recognize this by developing products targeted to "niche
markets". Public broadcasting has a different role, which it seeks to fulfil
principally by conceiving its audience as a public rather than a market. Some
programmes may speak to a particular national public, but on any given national
territory there will be less-than-national broadcasting needs to be fulfilled.
National networks can no longer be expected to be forces of cohesion; they
can, however, be highly effective distribution systems for programmes of
importance to the communities they serve. For this to occur, public service
broadcasting needs to be redefined in terms suitable to a new public culture,
global in scope and experienced locally.
Nothing in the idea of public service broadcasting ties it intrinsically to
that of nationhood. It is, however, necessarily linked to notions of community. In
order to flourish in the future, public service broadcasting will need to be
reconceptualized in the context of a changing role for the still-present, still
formidable (for lack of a structure to replace it) nation state. As the alternative to
the state becomes the market, the alternative to national public service
broadcasting has been constructed as private sector broadcasting; this parallel
is logically flawed as well as politically shortsighted. The globalization of
markets is both global and local, in that global products are usually produced in
a single place, distributed worldwide and consumed locally, everywhere. As the
nation state struggles to find its way in this new environment, so does public
service broadcasting. It is false to assume, however, that there is no longer a
need for public service broadcasting, for this is at present the only established
medium that can still be said to place social and cultural concerns before the
imperatives of the marketplace.
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Today, despite the rapid move towards globalization, broadcasting is
still legally constituted within the confines of national borders. Every national
government is at some point faced with making some basic decisions about
broadcasting, if only to consider the allocation of frequencies to which it is
entitled by international agreements. The immediate result of these decisions is
a national broadcasting system in every country, made up of one or more
component parts.
One encounters a variety of existing broadcasting institutions in this
global environment. Despite a great variation from one country to the next,
however, there are only three basic types of national system, each of which,
while possibly encompassing different institutions, is built around a 'core' in
which one particular institutional form is dominant. These three main types are
what I call 'public service core systems', 'private enterprise core systems', and
'state core systems'.
Most of the countries we think about when we talk about public
broadcasting in the conventional sense have established public service core
systems. These are the systems in which the BBCs, CBCs, ABCs and so forth
have flourished over the years. These are also the countries in which the
question of financing has been most difficult recently. For obvious reasons, we
have all been anxiously watching the evolution of these broadcasters and their
efforts to adapt to the challenges of the new environment.
Public broadcasting has been relatively underdeveloped in those
countries with what I call private enterprise core systems—such as the USA,
where public broadcasting was never intended to be the central component of
the system. In private enterprise core systems, public broadcasting has been
positioned as a marginal 'alternative' to commercial broadcasting.
The state core systems include the 'residual' systems of countries
which have not yet broken with the tradition of a single, monolithic national
broadcaster, as well as 'emergent' systems which, although built around a stateowned and controlled broadcaster, are opening up to alternative commercial
and community voices, such as one finds in parts of Asia and Africa where
democratization is on the agenda. They also include the former Soviet-bloc
countries, which can also be described as 'transitional', insofar as they seem to
be inclined towards the existing dominant models.
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In the context of globalization, all of these hitherto national systems are
merging into a single global system made up of a mix of public, private and
other types of broadcasters. As an increasingly transnational political system
emerges, new cross-border public service media are beginning to emerge,
buttressed by the existing national frameworks. Television services such as TV5
and ARTE are examples of this. Associations of community radio broadcasters,
video makers, and progressive Internautes abound at other points of the
spectrum. The point is this: In a system, which is predominantly influenced by
market forces, an important place should be reserved for institutions, which
promote the cultural development on which the quality of democratic public life
depends. This is a political project that can be approached from a perspective of
media policy. In the very near future we need to begin paying a lot more
attention to the global ecology of broadcasting as a public service environment.
Transcending the National
In light of the growing commercialization of all media, public broadcasting
continues to designate a strong value of social worth, the 'last best hope' for
socially purposeful media acting in the public interest. But traditional public
service broadcasters are all facing pressure to diversify funding sources and
increase mass-market programming at the very time that all broadcasters'
market shares are inevitably in decline (due to the sheer multiplicity of
channels) and competition for revenues, both public and commercial, is more
intense than it has ever been.
It is now apparent that, in order to survive, every broadcaster needs to
find a place for itself within an overall broadcasting system that is
simultaneously both local (which, in most cases, still means 'national') and
global. There is still no substitute for independent, publicly-funded public service
broadcasting organizations, as the Council of Europe acknowledged in 1994
when it identified public broadcasting as essential to the healthy functioning of
the media in a democratic society. But at the systemic level there is an
important shift underway: more and more, public authorities are looking towards
the capacity of national broadcasting systems as a whole to meet public interest
goals and objectives.
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The inclusion in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty of a European Protocol in
favour of PSB was an important step in this direction. This was one of the first
concrete transnational agreements to support noncommercial practices in the
sphere of culture. Its basic point was that despite the emphasis on markets and
trade in international agreements, national governments could still, legitimately,
make policies and promote cultural institutions that would foster values and
objectives outside the sphere of commerce. Not only did this declaration
demonstrate the power of politicians to resist commercial pressures, it was the
first and to this date most substantial example of a cultural exception to the new
rules of deregulation that are being negotiated and applied by transnational
authorities. It is no coincidence that this occurred in the area of public
broadcasting. It is both an interesting policy model and a harbinger of the
possible usefulness of the PSB model in developing new public media forms in
the transnational, convergence-driven media environment.
The EU protocol considers 'that the system of public broadcasting in the
Member States (of the European Union) is directly related to the democratic,
social and cultural needs of each society and to the need to preserve media
pluralism'. This in itself is important in terms of legitimation of public service
broadcasting at a time when its basis is under attack on both ideological and
economic grounds. It links public broadcasting to the question of democracy,
emphasizes its sociocultural nature as a public service, and underscores the
distinctive role of public broadcasting in an otherwise uniformly commercial
system.
An analysis of the Protocol produced at the time by the European
Broadcasting Union remarked that this was 'the first time that the role and
specific nature of public service broadcasting have been explicitly recognized
within the legal framework of the European Union.'
The Protocol strengthens the dual broadcasting system, for
which all European states have opted, and provides legal
security for public funding. Moreover, it conveys a strong
message about Europe's approach to the information society
and responds to the calls of the European Parliament and the
Council of Europe for the independence of public service
broadcasting to be safeguarded through an appropriate, secure
and transparent funding framework.
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The Protocol represented a political consensus and sent an important
signal, according to the EBU, but 'the effectiveness of this guarantee will
probably depend on a clear, sufficiently broad definition being set out by each
Member State of the public service remit conferred upon the public service
broadcasting organizations'.
Multilateralism
The question of public media has also figured prominently in recent debates at
the multilateral level.
The World Commission on Culture and Development, created in 1991
by the United Nations and UNESCO, reported to the UNESCO General
Assembly in November 1995. In a broad review of cultural issues ranging from
ethics to the environment, the WCCD proposed an international agenda for
developing global policy with respect to cultural development. Several chapters
and proposals relating to mass media and new global issues in mass
communication were framed by the following question: 'How can the world's
growing media capacities be channelled so as to support cultural diversity and
democratic discourse?'
The WCCD recognized that while many countries were dealing
individually with various important aspects of this question, the time had come
for a transfer of emphasis from the national to the international level. While
many countries still needed to be incited to put in place or modernize existing
national frameworks, a transfer of attention was now justified.
"Concentration of media ownership and production is becoming
even more striking internationally than it is nationally, making
the global media ever more market-driven. In this context, can
the kind of pluralist 'mixed economy' media system which is
emerging in many countries be encouraged globally? Can we
envisage a world public sphere in which there is room for
alternative voices? Can the media professionals sit down
together with policy-makers and consumers to work out
mechanisms that promote access and a diversity of expression
despite the acutely competitive environment that drives the
media moguls apart?"
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The WCCD admitted that it did not have ready answers to these
questions, but that answers had to be sought through international dialogue:
"Many specialists have told the Commission how important it
would be to arrive at an international balance between public
and private interests. They envision a common ground of public
interest on a transnational scale. They suggest that different
national approaches can be aligned, that broadly acceptable
guidelines could be elaborated with the active participation of
the principal actors, that new international rules are not a pipedream but could emerge through the forging of transnational
alliances across the public and private media space."
In short, "There is room for an international framework that
complements national regulatory frameworks".
The WCCD's international agenda contained a series of specific
proposals aimed at "enhancing access, diversity and competition of the
international media system", based on the assertion that the airwaves and
space are "part of the global commons, a collective asset that belongs to all
humankind". Just as national community and public media services require
public subsidy,
...internationally, the redistribution of benefits from the growing
global commercial media activity could help subsidize the rest.
As a first step, and within a market context, the Commission
suggests that the time may have come for commercial regional
or international satellite radio and television interests, which
now use the global commons free of charge to contribute to the
financing of a more plural media system. New revenue could be
invested in alternative programming for international
distribution.
The WCCD called for a feasibility study, to be conducted under the
auspices of the United Nations system, to determine the possibility of
establishing international alternative broadcasting services, including funding
requirements. The study should begin to explore appropriate global
mechanisms analogous to national models of public service broadcasting, the
report said.
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One of the most crucial aspects of this question that needs to be
addressed is how to avoid such a discussion becoming yet another debate
among states, each representing its own national interest and those of its
partners in the private sector, rather than among a global public dealing with
global issues, across national borders and in quest of a global public interest.
The "Action Plan for Cultural Policies for Development", adopted at the
1998 UNESCO-sponsored Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies
for Development in Stockholm, provided some important examples that can
serve as a starting point for discussion on such matters. Recognizing that "in a
democratic framework civil society will become increasingly important in the
field of culture", the conference endorsed a dozen principles including the
fundamental right of access to and participation in cultural life, and the cultural
policy objective of establishing structures and securing adequate resources
necessary "to create an environment conducive to human fulfilment."
Among the relevant policy recommendations, the conference asked
UNESCO member states to:
"Promote communication networks, including radio, television
and information technologies which serve the cultural and
educational needs of the public; encourage the commitment of
radio, television, the press and the other media to cultural
development issues... , while guaranteeing the editorial
independence of the public service media...
"Consider providing public radio and television and promote
space for community, linguistic and minority services...
"Adopt or reinforce national efforts that foster media pluralism
and freedom of expression...
"Promote the development and use of new technologies and
new communication and information services, stress the
importance of access to information highways and services at
affordable prices..."
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The appearance of such an action plan endorsed by 140 governments
under the sponsorship of a world intergovernment organization was certainly
uplifting, but the subtext and context surrounding its adoption also pointed to the
difficulties that lay ahead. It took two-and-a-half years to organize the
Stockholm Conference, following the tabling of the WCCD Report on which the
working documents presented in Stockholm were based. The proactive thrust of
that report, based on the use of existing policy mechanisms and the extension
of the national policy logic to the global level, did not survive the diplomatic
horse-trading that culminated in the Action Plan adopted in Stockholm.
Furthermore, the draft version of the action plan presented at the outset
of the conference was far more affirmative in encouraging member states to
provide public radio and television (rather than merely "consider" their
provision), and in calling for international as well as national legislation to
promote media pluralism. Significantly, a proposal that such legislation foster
"competition and prevent excessive concentration of media ownership" was
changed to refer instead to "freedom of expression". A proposal to "promote the
Internet as a universal public service by fostering connectivity and not-for-profit
user consortia and by adopting reasonable pricing policies" disappeared from
the final text.
Globalization
As we have seen, the limits and possibilities of policymaking are cast into sharp
relief by the various aspects of what has come to be known as globalization—a
situation that I would define as being characterized by the following six broad
characteristics: the diminishing sovereignty of national states; the increasing
integration of the world economy; the technologically-based shrinking of time
and space; the passing of received ideas about identity; the emergence of new
geographically dispersed yet locally-based global networks; and the
establishment of a new framework for global governance.
In the sphere of media and communication, public policy has historically
sought to overcome the constraints of scarce resources—as in the case of radio
and later, television, air waves, for example. In today's information environment,
scarcity is no longer the problem, the problem is access. Today's policy issues
must address the problems raised by information abundance and the need to
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be sure that this cornucopia of information is meaningfully accessible to citizens
and not only packaged as marketable commodities or targeted to elites.
Access to the means of communication can be defined from the point of
view of the receiver or from that of the producer, that is to say, as the capacity
to receive everything that is available or as the possibility to bring one's
messages to the audience. To the extent that market forces alone can never
guarantee access, in either of these terms, governments, regulatory authorities
and media institutions must develop and implement policies designed to
maximize access. The need to ensure access thus remains an important
justification of the need for public policy in the sphere of communication.
Regulation, too, still has a role to play in ensuring equitable access to
distribution markets for producers and consumers, and in ensuring that the
means of communication can be channeled towards social and cultural
objectives. Regulatory frameworks may vary considerably from one context to
another, but they are always, necessarily in democratic societies, part of a
public policy process. Opening up the process of policymaking, policy
evaluation and regulation to broader public participation is therefore an
important aspect of access to communication.
Access is also one of the key operative concepts of models that see
communication technologies as instruments of social and cultural development.
In general, this requires mechanisms to ensure accessibility to channels of
production and distribution for all those capable of rallying a minimal public,
increasing interactivity in the relations between creators and their publics, and
providing for feedback which can ultimately result in corrective measures.
According to classical liberal press theory, unconstrained access to the
marketplace is considered to be the best guarantee for the free expression of
ideas. The limitations of the market mechanism in providing freedom of
information eventually generated its own critique, in light of which the idea that
access to the means of communication needed legal and even constitutional
assurances rapidly gained currency in the 20th century.
In countries such as Canada, Australia, Japan and most of western
Europe, access to reception was guaranteed in the charters of public
broadcasting organizations, whose mandates obliged them to make their
signals available throughout the territories in which they operated. To a greater

206

Public Service Broadcasting in Transition: A Documentary Reader

or lesser degree, many of these organizations were also noncommercial and
required to provide a range of diverse opinion in their programming.
With the emergence of an increasingly seamless global communication
environment, critics concerned about the sociocultural role and democratic
function of media have had to refocus their attention. The new context of
technological "convergence" between established communication forms
demands that we develop a new conception of access.
To illustrate, consider what happens when conventional broadcast
media and telecommunication technologies converge. The notion of access has
traditionally meant different things in broadcasting and in telecommunication. In
the broadcasting model, emphasis is placed on the receiver, and access refers
to the capacity to choose from the entire range of content on offer. In the
telecommunication model, emphasis is on the sender, and access refers to the
capacity to use the means of communication to get one's messages out. Within
these two models, public policy and regulation have been recognized as
necessary social measures for guaranteeing access.
In the context of new media, a hybrid conception of access is
necessary, and public policy will need to promote a model of communication
which combines the social and cultural objectives of established institutional
forms—not only broadcasting and telecommunication, but also libraries, the
education system, and so on. Critically, realizing the social and cultural potential
of new media requires ensuring maximum access for people to the means of
communication both in their capacity of receivers and consumers of services
and as producers and senders of messages.
Convergence, globalization and the general evolution of contemporary
societies thus provide a formidable new set of challenges to public broadcasting
organizations, whose role and function remains critical to democratic society, as
we have seen. To think that they can meet these challenges may well be a
utopian dream. But the very possibility of channeling public media for the good
of humanity make it essential to try turning that dream into reality, even if it
means pushing the boundaries of imagination in new and audacious directions.
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